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ABSTRACT  
 
 
The legal consequences of renouncing Islam or apostasy, which include depriving the apostate 
from some civil rights, and the non-recognition of the act itself by law in Egypt have been usually 
criticized as a blatant violation of the right to religious freedom. Such criticisms are based on the 
right’s definition according to international human rights law precisely the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. The dominant reasoning for this violation according to the majority 
of the related literature is the conservative interpretation of Sharia, the principal source of law, that 
has been adopted by Egyptian judiciary for more than fifty years. The advocates of this point of 
view argue that such violation could be resolved through adopting more lenient Sharia rulings 
concerning apostasy. Investigating the situation of apostasy from a broader legal perspective 
beyond the rhetoric of human rights demonstrates that resolving the complicated legal status of 
apostasy starts from realizing the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt as a single indication 
among others of legal pluralism. It is a problem that stems from the conflict between the rulings 
of both Sharia and IHRL, as law sources, regarding apostasy and their interpretation by the state. 
In light of its approach regarding constitutional Islamization, the Egyptian state through its 
legislature and judiciary has maintained the ambiguity of the legal situation of apostasy to balance 
between its constitutional obligation to apply Sharia and its international obligation to ensure the 
consistency of its laws with IHRL. Egyptian courts have undertaken this mission through 
reconstructing the application of some apostasy juristic and legal consequences under some secular 
legal regulations and the concept of public policy in contrast to the juristic position of apostasy 
according to Sharia.  
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I. Introduction: 
 
Most Muslim states, including Egypt, became parties to different international human rights 
treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which was 
adopted on 16 December 1966. After signing and ratifying the ICCPR, Muslim states became 
obliged to ensure the rights that were recognized in this treaty to all individuals within their 
territories without any kind of distinction. All states parties to the ICCPR have to use their 
domestic laws to facilitate the implementation of the recognized rights according to Article 2(2) 
of the treaty.1This obligation has posed many challenges to domestic legal systems of Muslim 
states. These legal systems have to balance between the full implementation of the ICCPR 
provisions and the full adherence to Sharia, which is the main source of law in many Muslim 
states like Egypt.2  
The fulfillment of the notion of religious freedom as recognized in the ICCPR is one of the main 
challenges that face these legal systems because it contradicts with some aspects of the concept 
of religious freedom in Sharia. The difference between religious freedom in Sharia and IHRL has 
resulted in major areas of contention concerning religious freedom in the Middle East. These 
areas include the practice of monotheistic religions (like preaching and building churches), 
freedom of non-monotheistic religions, conversion from Islam to another religion, pluralism 
within the same religious field, and freedom of expression. This research focuses mainly on 
assessing the legal situation of one of these areas of contention in Egypt precisely apostasy or 
conversion from Islam. In order to fulfill its international obligation regarding the right to 
religious freedom, the Egyptian state confirmed through its constitution that the State shall 
guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of practice of religious rites.3Moreover, 
Egyptian courts have always asserted in their verdicts the consistency of their rulings with the 
ICCPR’s definition of religious freedom.  
 
1International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 19 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976), available 
at https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. 
2CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, as amended, May 22, 1980, art. 2. 
3Id. art. 46 
2 
The tension between on the one hand the Egyptian state’s constitutional obligation to adhere to 
Sharia as the principal source of legislation and on the other hand its international obligation to 
ensure the fulfilment of the concept of religious freedom according to IHRL invites this research  
to study the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt as a clear indication of it. The purpose of this 
research is to assess this legal framework from different aspects to understand how the Egyptian 
state through its legislature and judiciary managed the conflict between different law sources 
regarding apostasy to impose its understanding of the concept of religious freedom in both Sharia 
and IHRL; as a result, the state could shape the legal framework of apostasy. Consequently, in 
order to understand and asses this legal situation, it is crucial to examine some key aspects of this 
issue which include features of legal pluralism in Egypt, the legal position of Sharia as a 
principal source of law in Egypt, the juristic situation of apostasy in Sharia, the ICCPR’s 
definition of the concept of religious freedom, Egyptian court’s approach regarding apostasy, and 
the role of public Policy as a key factor in Imposing state’s definition of religious freedom and 
some apostasy consequences in Egypt.  
This thesis argues that the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt is a manifestation of secular 
reconstruction of Sharia by a modern state. In addition, it argues that the legal situation of 
apostasy in Egypt contradicts with the concept of religious freedom in both Sharia and IHRL. 
Accordingly, it challenges the dominant debate that has limited apostasy law in Egypt as only a 
violation of the Egyptian state’s international obligation to ensure religious freedom and a 
reflection of conservative interpretation and implementation of Sharia rules by judiciary. Rather, 
Egyptian courts have exploited the legal regulation of apostasy, which is characterized by 
ambiguity and fragmentation, to enforce state’s definition of religious freedom through the 
reconstruction of some apostasy legal consequences either under some legal regulations or the 
concept of public policy.  
The thesis is composed of two main chapters. The first chapter investigates the scope of religious 
freedom in Sharia and IHRL as key factors in shaping the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt. 
The first section of this chapter focuses on illustrating the concept of legal pluralism and its 
features in Egypt including the legal situation of Sharia as the principal source of law. The 
second section examines the scope of religious freedom according to Sharia focusing precisely 
on illustrating the juristic position of apostasy (renouncing Islam). The third section defines the 
3 
scope of religious freedom as considered by IHRL and the interpretation of this international 
obligation by Egyptian courts. The second chapter evaluates the legal framework of apostasy in 
Egypt. The first section of this chapter assesses this legal framework in different law fields 
according the legal regulation of apostasy rules and Egyptian courts’ approach in this regard. The 
second section of this chapter explains the role of the concept of public policy as a key factor in 
imposing state’s definition of religious freedom and shaping the legal framework of apostasy.  
II. Understanding the Scope of Religious Freedom in Both Sharia and IHRL as key 
Factors in Shaping the Legal Framework of Apostasy in Egypt: 
 
The legal framework of apostasy in Egypt must be understood as a single indication between 
others of legal pluralism in Egypt. Accordingly, discussing this framework requires examining 
the role of Sharia as the main source of law in Egypt and its definition by the SCC. Such 
definition has demarcated the ambiguous legal situation of conversion from Islam in Egypt since 
decades. Moreover, it also requires investigating the legal position of apostasy according to each 
of the conflicting law sources in Egypt Sharia and IHRL. The first section of this chapter focuses 
on illustrating the concept of legal pluralism and its features in Egypt including the legal 
situation of Sharia as the principal source of law. The second section examines the scope of 
religious freedom according to Sharia focusing precisely on illustrating the juristic position of 
apostasy. The third section defines the scope of religious freedom as considered by IHRL and the 
interpretation of this international obligation by Egyptian courts. Through the introduced analysis 
in this chapter, we could conceive the ambiguity of the definition of Sharia principles in the 
Egyptian legal system and the apparent contradiction between Sharia and IHRL regarding 
apostasy or conversion from Islam.  
A. Legal Pluralism in Egypt:  
 
The legal framework of apostasy in Egypt must be understood as a single indication between 
others of legal pluralism in Egypt. The concept of legal pluralism simply means the coexistence 
of more than one legal source or system that govern the same conduct within the same social 
field. Examining this legal concept and its main features enables us not to conceive apostasy law 
in Egypt as an isolated legal phenomenon, but as a result of legal pluralism in Egypt and the 
conflict between different law sources (Sharia, IHRL, State secular law). Consequently, 
reforming religious freedom related laws and their jurisprudence including apostasy legal 
4 
framework could not be achieved by limiting the discussed issue as a human rights problem that 
can be resolved by adopting more liberal law provisions within the existing legal system; 
otherwise, it is a problem that stems from the conflict between different law sources and their 
interpretation by the state. This requires us to understand the definition of legal pluralism, 
examine the position of Sharia as the main source of law in Egypt and display the role of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) in defining Sharia law in Egypt. 
 
1. Defining the Concept of Legal Pluralism: 
 
a. The Idea of Legal Pluralism: 
 
Legal pluralism has no single or strict definition; rather it has various definitions that reflect its 
nature as a model for analysis aims to achieve reconceptualization of the law and society 
relation. Legal pluralism traditionally defined as “a situation in which two or more legal systems 
coexist in the same social field.”4Considering the broad meaning of this definition entails that 
legal pluralism also includes situations when any social “functioning subgroup” constructs its 
own internal legal order, that varies from other subgroups’ and also from the state’s legal 
system.5These subgroups may include political confederations, factories, syndicates, universities, 
families, tribes, etc. This broadens the definition of legal system not only to include the system 
of courts, judges and law enforcement forces supported by the state but also to include non-legal 
forms of normative ordering;6 hence, this may lead us to conclude that “virtually every society is 
legally plural.”7 4From another perspective, defining legal pluralism according to the governing 
law code could be “a multiplicity of diverse communicative processes that observe social action 
under the binary code of legal/illegal.”8There are more than one code governing the existing 
legal system and judging social conducts and these normative codes could be either legal or 
 
4John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 18 J. of Legal Pluralism & Unofficial L.1-55 (1986), cited in Sally Engle 
Merry, Legal Pluralism, [22, No.5.] L. & Soc'y Rev. 869, 869-96 (1988).    
5Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, [22, No.5.] L. & Soc'y Rev. 869, 869-96 (1988).   
6Id.   
7Id. at 871.                                                                                                                                                                                    
8Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism,13 Cardozo L. Rev.1443 (1992), cited in 
Kilian Bälz, Shari‘a and Qanun in Egyptian Law: A Systems Theory Approach to Legal Pluralism, 2 Y.B. Islamic & 
Middle E. L. 37, 53 (1995).                                                                                                                                               
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illegal (like religious law or customary law) in nature.9Furthermore, if we review legal pluralism 
as an observed socio legal phenomenon, it may be defined as “the condition in which a 
population observes more than one body of law”10Accordingly, this negates the idea of legal 
centralism, which supposes the emergence of all law rules from the state, because the condition 
of plurality is achieved by merely the observance of more than one body of law regardless of 
their sources either the state or not. As we can see, according to the mentioned definitions there 
is no one theory or single definition of legal pluralism. This confirms that it is a model for 
analysis aims to achieve reconceptualization of the law and society relation that “seemed to need 
modification according to each specific case.”11 
 
Elaborating the idea of legal pluralism and the premises of its definitions requires referring to 
some of the leading literature in this regard to be able to comprehend the different situations of 
legal pluralism that will be discussed in this section. Jacques Vanderlinden in Le Pluralisme 
Juridique defines legal pluralism as “the existence within a particular society of different legal 
mechanisms applying to identical situations.”12The type of the applicable law in this situation 
varies according to the subject of law who committed the conduct. Barry Hooker in his book 
Legal Pluralism defines legal pluralism as “the situation in which two or more laws 
interact”13Hooker in his work focuses mainly on instances of legal pluralism which have resulted 
from the transplantation of a developed body of law in a new territory without replacing the 
original law sources of this territory.14This case was manifested in the colonial period when 
many colonized territories received colonizers’ laws to coexist with their original laws including 
religious or customary law. John Griffiths in his paper What is Legal Pluralism? defines legal 
pluralism as “the state of affairs, for any social field, in which behavior pursuant to more than 
one legal order occurs”15Griffiths believes that state law acts only as an order among others in 
 
9Kilian Bälz, Shari‘a and Qanun in Egyptian Law: A Systems Theory Approach to Legal Pluralism, 2 Y.B. Islamic 
& Middle E. L. 37, 53 (1995).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
10
BAUDOUIN DUPRET, MAURITS BERGER & LAILA AL-ZWAINI, LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 3(1999). 
11Id. at xii.                                                                                                                                                                                    
12Jaques Venderlin, Le Pluralisme Juridique: Essaie De Synthese, in  LA PLURALISME JURIDIQUE (l'Universite de 
Bruxelles ed., 1972),  cited in BAUDOUIN DUPRET, MAURITS BERGER & LAILA AL-ZWAINI, LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE 
ARAB WORLD 4(1999).                                                                                                                                                                                     
13Id. at 5.                                                                                                                                                                                  
14Id. 
15Id. at 9.                                                                                                                                                            
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any social field. According to this idea, legal pluralism only happens when there are other 
parallel independent legal orders operating outside that of the state in the same social field or 
territory, so any other subdivision or plurality within the state’s legal system is “a feature of the 
arrangement of state law.”16Such point of view has been rejected by many legal authors who 
emphasize the practical usefulness of identifying situations of legal pluralism within state law17I 
think that even if we take into account that the majority of legal authors and lawyers believe in 
the existence of legal pluralism within state law, these different perspectives could show us that 
the utility of the model of legal pluralism in solving situations of conflict between different 
bodies of law could vary according to the types of these laws and their relations in these 
situations. Legal pluralism is only useful if it helps to develop the existing laws and legal policies 
to be compatible with another body of law without violating the essence of the latter.   
The realization of Legal pluralism as a model for analysis, that introduces different solutions to 
reform state laws so that they could reconcile with other bodies or sources of law, requires 
recognizing types of law in situations of legal pluralism and different possibilities of their 
relation. We could distinguish between types of law in situations of legal pluralism according to 
two typologies or classifications; the first one is the distinction between state and non-state law, 
and the second is identifying law types as constituent elements of situations of legal pluralism.18 
State law refers to all normative orders that are associated and administrated by state institutions, 
so state law may include legislation, customary law, precedents (which are combinations of 
legislation and customary law).19On the other hand, non-state law is considered to be all 
normative orders unassociated with the state like customary law, religious law and foreign 
legislations. Recognizing the mentioned classification of law entails distinction between two 
general categories of legal pluralism: state law pluralism and deep legal pluralism.20State law 
pluralism arises when “a state law is composed in a part of an elaborated body of norms first 
developed as a state law, and in part of another body of norms which has been developed outside 
the context of state law and given recognition by state law in question.”21For instance, the 
 
16Id. at 10.                                                                                                                                                                                  
17
See generally Id. at 4-14 (demonstrating the weakness of this point of view and the significance of internal legal 
pluralism). 
18Id. at 11.                                                                                                                                                                                      
19Id.                                                                                                                                                                                     
20Id. at 5.                                                                                                                                                                                      
21Id. at 8.                                                                                                                                                                                         
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mentioned example of colonized territories that received colonizers’ laws to coexist with their 
original laws including religious or customary law. In the most of these cases the colonizers’ law 
had been developed to serve as state law, whereas natives’ laws were given effect and recognized 
to operate in particular law fields. State law pluralism has two main features; firstly, it aims at 
regulating the relations between different laws to avoid “internal conflict of laws”22and 
uncertainty of the applicable law. Secondly, it is studied to identify methods of recognition of 
one law by its counterpart. In deep legal pluralism, the constituent elements of this situation are 
state law and non-state law which is not recognized by the state. In this case there is a conflict 
between these different normative orders in the same social field or territory. Now let us turn to 
the second typology, the distinction between law types as constituent elements of situations of 
legal pluralism.23According to this classification, these constituent elements could be one of 
three types: legislation, customary law, and religious law.24Legislation is regarded as the 
common form of state law, and it becomes law only after passing through certain institutional 
procedures. It also could be made in non-state law and proclaimed orally. Customary law is 
“created by a consensus within a community, reached over a period of time in a relatively 
informal manner. It is not normally written, although some customary laws have been recorded 
in writing.”25So customary law could be transformed into written legislations in sometimes. 
Religious law usually refers to rules or normative orders which are derived from any religion and 
gain their authority from their divine origin. When any religious law is recognized by a modern 
state as a source of law, this creates a situation of legal pluralism. For instance, this paper 
primarily discusses a situation of legal pluralism in Egypt, which Sharia is one of its constituent 
elements. The observance of more than one body of law of the mentioned types creates situations 
of legal pluralism. The relations between these constituent laws in situations of legal pluralism 
could be one of the following26agglomeration, conflict, integration, recognition, separation, and 
unification.27Agglomeration happens when two bodies of legal norms govern separate fields of 
activity in the same social field. Conflict exists when “the laws in a situation of legal pluralism 
 
22
Id. at 9. 
23Id. at 15.                                                                                                                                                                                    
24For the purpose of this paper, it is not intended here to mention the various definitions and the main features of 
these three types, but only to make a passing reference to them.                                                                                                
25DUPRET ET AL., supra note10, at 15.                                                                                                                                             
26The author based this classification on Vanderlinden’s in his work Le Pluralisme Juridique.                                            
27DUPRET ET AL., supra note10, at 16-19.                                                                                                                                   
 
8 
contain norms which impose mutually contradictory requirements upon the population.”28This 
means that while one law urges its subjects to commit a certain deed, the other one forbids them 
from committing it. The conflict could be avoided by integration because this kind of legal 
pluralism redesigns the norms of both laws to be compatible with each other. For example, if one 
law urges its subjects to commit a certain deed, the other one should at least neither forbid nor 
require it. In the situation of recognition, one constituent law of a case of legal pluralism 
recognizes the other law(s) and refers to their existence.29If this recognition leads only to achieve 
compatibility between these laws, this form could be regarded as a case of agglomeration. In 
addition to this form, recognition has two other important forms. Normative recognition occurs 
when “one body of law includes provisions requiring its own institutions to give effect to the 
norms of another law.”30Secondly, institutional recognition occurs when the institutions of the 
recognized law are incorporated within their counterparts of the recognizing law. Both normative 
and institutional recognition usually occurs in situations of state law pluralism, when the 
recognizing state law receives another body of law. Legal pluralism is terminated in both cases 
of separation and unification, when the different bodies of laws either unified or separated. After 
displaying types of law in situations of legal pluralism and different possibilities of their relation, 
this could enable us to identify and analyze legal plurality in Egypt especially concerning the 
position of Sharia as the main source of law.   
b. Investigating some Features of Legal Pluralism in Egypt and the Arab World: 
 
By scrutinizing the Egyptian legal system, as a leading example of the existing legal systems in 
the Arab world, it appears clearly that Sharia acts as the main legal player that forms legal 
pluralism in Muslim countries. According to the mentioned types of laws and situations of legal 
pluralism, legal pluralism in these states could be regarded as a normative recognition in a 
situation of state law pluralism. This because most of the Arab countries during the colonization 
era since the early nineteenth century received the colonizers’ law, which had been developed to 
serve as state law. On the other hand, Sharia that was the common law of Muslim countries 
before this time was given effect and recognized to operate in particular law fields like personal 
 
28Id. at 17.                                                                                                                                                                                     
29Id. at 18.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
30Id.                                                                                                                                                                                              
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status law.31The marginalization of Sharia started gradually by adopting “Islamic” law codes 
modeled on secular or European codes like the Mecelle of the ottoman empire that was 
promulgated in the1870s.32Although Egypt was not under effective control of the Ottoman 
empire in this time, it also started a similar legal “reform” as a result of “the imperialist, liberal, 
and statist pressures[.]”33In 1883 the Egyptian government issued codes based on the French 
code at this time.34This was followed by establishing a new national centralized court system 
mirrored that of the French system to apply the issued codes.35The adoption of such reforms was 
at the expense of the implementation of Sharia and the jurisdiction of Sharia courts, which was 
abrogated finally in 1955. There was no effective political opposition to the trend of 
secularization of law until the early twentieth century.36Islamist political opposition during the 
decolonization era introduced Islamic law or the application of Sharia as “the national legal 
tradition, providing the basis for a law that reflects the national character as opposed to borrowed 
European codes that were increasingly perceived as the legacy of the colonial age.”37The 
struggle of this opposition, its powerful support by the Egyptian public, and the acceptance of the 
Islamic trend by the ruling regime in Egypt (as an alternative political choice to liberalism, 
communism, socialism, etc.) and other regimes in the middle east led finally to the recognition of 
Sharia as a source of law in these states. Finally, in 1971 the Egyptian constitution recognized 
Sharia in Article 2 as a “a chief source of legislation” before being amended in 1980 to regard 
Sharia principles as “the chief source of legislation”38Accordingly, Arab or Muslim countries 
could be divided into two groups in matters of legislations.39The first group counties recognize 
Sharia as a source of law among other sources of legislation, while the second group countries 
found their legislation entirely on Sharia by codifying its legal rules and principles which were 
derived from its sources (Quraan, Sunnah, etc.). In Egypt, as it will be explained in detail, Sharia 
is recognized by the constitution as the chief source of law and not merely as a source among 
 
31Bälz, supra note 9, at 37.                                                                                                                                                       
32The Mecelle is the Islamic civil code of the ottoman empire.          
33
NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF 23 (1997).                                
34CLARK BENNER LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT: THE INCORPORATION OF THE SHARĪʻA 
INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71 (2006).                                                                                                                   
35Id.                                                                                                                                                                 
36Id. at 72.                                                                                                                                                                                               
37Bälz, supra note 9 , at 37.                                                                                                                                                                  
38LOMBARDI, supra note 34, at 133.     
39
DUPRET ET AL., supra note 10, at 125. 
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others. Whether this constitutional recognition of Sharia within a secular based legal system is 
sufficient or not to restore the historical role of Sharia as the common law of the state or achieve 
a real reconciliation between Sharia and a European modeled legal system in an assumed 
situation of legal pluralism is always a disputed matter. I think that since these amendments it 
has become obvious that the restoration of the historical role of Sharia without restoring the 
privileged positions of its judicial system and Ulama is practically impossible. Concerning the 
compatibility of the existing laws and judicial decisions with Sharia, the upcoming analysis of 
apostasy law in Egypt in this paper would show us that this recognition has not solved the 
contradiction between Sharia norms and the secular based legal system in Egypt.  
 
The successive failure of the Egyptian state to achieve the proposed compatibility between 
Sharia and its secular modeled legislations since 1971 has made some legal writers consider the 
constitutional recognition of Sharia in Egypt as a kind of legal duality and contradiction rather 
than a situation of legal pluralism.40The proponents of this point of view justify it on the grounds 
that the word pluralism by itself implies a peaceful legal coexistence among different legal 
systems or bodies of norms, whereas legal duality means that there are contradictions between 
different law sources within an official legal system. Accordingly, in Egypt this duality exists 
because there are contradictions within the official legal system between secular western law 
references and purely religious law references like Sharia.41It is believed that “[t]he state always 
produces such dualities through the elaboration of official constitutional and political laws which 
the state hastens to violate.”42Also, if we would categorize the existing contradiction under the 
concept of legal pluralism it could be categorized as a conflict in a situation of state law 
pluralism rather than a recognition. I think that the primary standard to assess whether there is a 
situation of duality or plurality in any legal system is the degree of adherence to the genuine 
essence and standards of the recognized source of law. Also, the genuine standards of this source 
of law should not be defined according to the recipient law, but according to the recognized law 
itself. For instance, if we talk about religious freedom in Sharia, the adherence to this notion 
should be assessed according to Sharia standards and not to “the official definition of religious 
 
40Id. at 159.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
41Id.                                                                                                                                                                                            
42
Id. at 161.  
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freedom in Sharia by Egyptian jurisprudence”. Thus, if the recognition of Sharia as a source of 
law within the Egyptian legal system achieved reconciliation between different law sources 
without breaching sharia standards according to Sharia itself, then it is a situation of legal 
pluralism. On the other hand, if this recognition results in contradictions between different law 
sources and breaches Sharia standards as defined by it, then we face a situation of duality or 
conflict. As it will be discussed later in this paper, such legal duality is employed to impose 
modern state’s definitions of the constituent law sources and, as a result, its definitions of the 
scope of all rights. 
 
Before explaining in detail the position of Sharia as the main source of law in Egypt, I think that 
a crucial question to our analysis should be answered. If we are faced with legal duality or a 
conflict situation of legal pluralism in Egypt, how could two contradicting legal orders coexist 
and interact within a legal system of a modern state?43I agree with the point of view that prefers 
to answer this question in “a manner that permits a move away from a rather simplistic model of 
"influence" to a more sophisticated paradigm which offers an explanation as to how two 
autonomous legal orders that remain radically divorced nevertheless interact.”44Accordingly, the 
relation between Sharia and western based legislations should be discussed from another 
perspective other than that focuses on considering the relation between both systems of norms as 
a simple mutual influence that has resulted in the “Islamization” of secular modeled laws or 
“secularization” of Sharia norms. In this regard, there is an analysis that could give us a deeper 
explanation for this relation. Kilian Bälz reintroduced the paradigm of "operational closure and 
cognitive openness" that was proposed by the theory of autopoiesis45to provide a new 
explanation for the study of legal pluralism in the Middle East concerning the relation between 
Sharia (traditional law) and Qanun (modern law). According to this analysis, the development of 
modern legal systems as alternatives to the existing traditional (Islamic) legal systems in Muslim 
states involves splitting the existing legal system into modern legal system that operates on 
 
43The following paragraph draws heavily on Kilian Bälz, Shari‘a and Qanun in Egyptian Law: A Systems Theory 
Approach to Legal Pluralism, 44-53.                                                                                                                                      
44Bälz, supra note 9, at 40.                                                                                                                                                        
45Autopoiesis is the central concept on which the theory of social systems is based. This theory was developed by 
Niklas Luhmann, who argues that that society is fragmented into various functionally differentiated, autonomous 
subsystems. These radically autonomous subsystems are operationally closed and cognitively opened to reproduce 
themselves and maintain their existence within society.                                                                                                            
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modern law code, and traditional legal system that operates on traditional law code.46As it was 
illustrated previously, the marginalization of traditional legal system takes place through 
shrinking its jurisdiction in favor of modern legal order and its newly promulgated laws. After 
this fragmentation, both traditional and modern legal systems have operated as two autonomous 
legal systems, which struggle to preserve their operational closure and autonomy through being 
cognitively opened systems. The proposed analysis assumes the operational closure of any 
subsystem implies or means that this system’s operations are guided by “a specific distinction the 
binary code.”47Accordingly, both traditional and modern legal systems apply their own 
normative codes of legal/illegal or valid/void. This means that each legal system decides whether 
any deed is valid or void only according to its normative rules. In order to adapt to various social 
or political conditions, each legal system reconstructs other legal systems ‘elements and extra-
legal concepts as external references into the system.48By adopting such cognitive openness, 
these normative orders maintain their operational closure and existence. Bälz illustrates the 
application of this paradigm concerning the interaction between Sharia and “man-made” or 
modern law when he points out that:  
one can isolate a pattern similar to that underlying the renewal of Islamic law. The 
system of secular law must remain operationally closed. Letting Islamic law take over 
the code, i.e. leaving the decision legal/illegal to Islamic law, would lead to an 
immediate dissolution of the system. However, facing the political challenge of the 
call for a comprehensive Islamization of the law, the system of secular law can only 
maintain operational closure by being cognitively open, i.e. reconstructing principles 
of Islamic law within the system. However, the principles of Islamic law contained in 
the Draft Code are a purely internal construct of the system of secular law. As in the 
case of the application of Islamic law by the Mixed and National Courts, the 
reconstruction of the principles of Islamic law in the Draft Code caused a 
transformation of the principles of traditional Islamic law.49 
This transformation took place through the process of codifying the principles of Islamic law in 
the language of modern statutory law. I believe that even if this process of codification has 
traditionally been regarded or declared by legislators as an urgent development of Islamic law to 
cope with the requirements of the modern state without distorting Sharia’s identity, it has been 
the main guarantee of the existence of secular legal systems in Muslim states. We can say that 
 
46
Bälz, supra note 9, at 41. 
47Id. at 40.                                                                                                                                                                                        
48Id. at 53.                                                                                                                                                                                 
49Id.                
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through this process modern legal system could have governed the “terms of the game”. These 
terms include choosing the incorporated principles of Sharia, choosing the adopted juristic 
opinions, and having the exclusive power of interpreting “Islamized” law statutes. Through these 
terms Islamic law principles have been re-constructed to be compatible with secular legal 
systems’ policies and not vice versa. For instance, Islamic draft code of civil transactions, which 
was drafted by the Egyptian parliament in the late 1970s to replace 1948’s civil code, validated 
insurance transactions.50Such kind of transactions are void according to Sharia because “they 
contain an unlawful aleatory moment (gharar)”51The draft code reconstructed the principal of 
partnership in profit and loss (sharikat al-mudaraba) in Sharia as a basis for insurance contract 
that was defined by the draft as a cooperative contract. The main conclusion that could be drawn 
from the displayed analysis is that legislating Islamic law represents no more than a process of 
reconstruction of these norms to achieve policies of a modern legal system by using an Islamic 
scheme to overcome any calls for the application of Sharia. 
2. Sharia as the Principal Source of Law in Egypt: 
 
As it will be illustrated in the last section of this chapter, Egyptian statutory laws do not 
explicitly regulate apostasy law in Egypt. The absence of this explicit regulation has always 
made the Egyptian constitutions have a direct rule in shaping the legal framework of apostasy in 
Egypt. This because the absence of any regulation of apostasy in the codified laws drives 
Egyptian courts to interpret constitutional provisions regarding Sharia and religious freedom to 
make their decisions on apostasy related cases. Consequently, displaying the position of Sharia 
throughout different Egyptian constitutions is a substantial point for the current research. 
Illustrating the different references to Sharia in these constitutions and focusing primarily on its 
position since 1971’s constitution could show us how the ambiguity of Islamic supremacy clause 
could be used by successive ruling regimes in Egypt as a guarantee of their legitimacy and 
political power. The ambiguity of the discussed clause has resulted in promoting the role of the 
Egyptian judiciary in demarcating Islamization and all its related cases, like apostasy, in Egypt. 
This could give us an explanation for the absence of any explicit regulation of the act of apostasy 
 
50Id. at 51.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
51Bälz, supra note 9, at 52.                                                                                                                                                          
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in statutory laws in Egypt. The Egyptian state has always maintained this legal ambiguity to 
impose its own definition of Sharia and its principles.   
The legal status of Sharia in the Egyptian constitutions has been changed since the promulgation 
of the first Egyptian constitution in 1882.52Islam was referred to as the official religion of the 
state for the first time53in 1923’s constitution and its counterparts in years 1930, 1953, 1956, 
1958, and 1964. The Egyptian constitution of 1971 adopted for the first time the principles of 
Sharia as a principal source of legislation in Article 2, which states that “Islam is the religion of 
the state. Arabic is its official language, and the principles of the Islamic Sharia shall be a chief 
source of legislation.”54There are two main observations about this article; firstly, by regarding 
the principles of Sharia as “a chief” source of legislation, Article 2 did not consider Sharia as a 
supreme source over other sources of legislation.55Thus, the inconsistency of any Egyptian law 
with Sharia under this constitution did not have to entail the invalidity of this law. Secondly, 
Article 2 was vague as it did not identify the principles of Sharia or how they could be 
interpreted.56These observations was directly related to the political interests of the ruling regime 
at this time that inspired its adoption of such article for the first time. President Anwar al-Sadat 
managed to enhance the legitimacy of his regime and face his predecessor’s political supporters 
by gaining the support of other marginalized political groups.57He released many political 
prisoners including Islamists, liberalists, judges, and lawyers. Moreover, the new constitution 
that was promulgated in 1971 included a number of liberal measures58as well as Sharia close in 
Article 2. It is believed that “Sadat’s motivation in including an Islamic supremacy clause then 
lay in using it as a political device that would legitimate extensive presidential authority 
contained in this constitution.”59Accordingly, this constitution focused on fusing many political 
 
52Dawood Ahmed & Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Islamization and Human Rights: The Surprising Origin and 
Spread of Islamic Supremacy in Constitutions, University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper, 
No. 477 (2014).                                                                                                                                                                              
53Moataz Ahmed El Fegiery, Islamic Law and Freedom of Religion: The Case of Apostasy and Its Legal 
Implications inEgypt,10(1) MWJHR 1-26(2013).                                                                                                                                                                                      
54
Egyptian Constitution, supra note 2, 11 Sept. 1971, art. 2. 
55LOMBARDI, supra note 34, at 125.                                                                                                                                             
56Id.                                                                                                                                                                                                
57See generally Ahmed & Ginsburg, supra note 52, at 56-76 (discussing the political background of constitutional 
Islamization in Egypt).                                                                                                                                                                
58This constitution based the government on the rule of law, prohibited torture, guaranteed freedom of speech, etc.   
59Ahmed & Ginsburg, supra note 52, at 60.      
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powers in the person of the president.60Through being regarded as the “Believing President” who 
adopted the Islamic supremacy clause for the first time in any Egyptian constitution, Sadat could 
acquire Islamists’ and public’s political support to promulgate a constitution that broadened his 
presidential authority. I believe that these political circumstances could justify the vagueness of 
Article 2. The ambiguity of Article 2 drove the Supreme Court in April 1976 to issue a striking 
opinion pointing out that “Article 2, as vague as it was, might require all Egyptian law[s] to be 
consistent with the essential principles of Sharia.”61Also, the vagueness of Article 2 enabled the 
government or the ruling regime to negotiate Islamization terms with both Islamists and 
liberalists to acquire their political support without giving up the state’s ultimate control over the 
process.62Searching for more political support from Islamists and ordinary Egyptians to face the 
increasing domestic opposition to its economic and foreign policies, Sadat’s ruling regime 
rushed to negotiated Islamization for the second time in 1980. On May 22, 1980, Article 2 was 
amended to state that “. . . the principles of Islamic Sharia are the chief source of 
legislation”63According to this amendment, any Egyptian law contradicts with Sharia principles 
would be invalid. However, Article 2 still vague as it does not identify the principles of Sharia or 
how they could be interpreted. The claimed intention of the legislature through adopting this 
amendment was clarified by the report of the official committee which states that “[The 
amendment] means that it is imperative to review the laws which were in effect before the 
Constitution of 1971 and to amend these laws in such a manner as to make them conform to the 
principles of Islamic law. . .”64This normative recognition of Sharia in the Egyptian constitution 
imposed a constitutional obligation on the legislature and judiciary to give effect to Sharia 
norms. Regarding the identification of the principles of Sharia, the drafting committee points out 
that the legislature should consider “Quran, the Sunna and the opinions of learned jurists and 
imams.”65It was intended to leave the interpretation methodology of Sharia principles as 
ambiguous as it was to acquire the ruling regime a flexible position in negotiating Islamism with 
different political powers. Such flexibility would be lost if Sharia principles or their 
 
60For instance, Article 108 authorized the president to issue decrees having force of law in situations of emergency. 
Furthermore, according to this constitution, the president is also appointed as the chair of the Supreme Judicial 
Council.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
61LOMBARDI, supra note 34, at 129.                                                                                                                                           
62Id. at 132.                                                                                                                                                                                 
63Egyptian Constitution, supra note 54, as amended, May 22, 1980, art. 2.         
64The Report of the Drafting Committee, cited in LOMBARDI, supra note 34, at 133. 
65Id. at 134.                                                                                                                                                                                                        
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interpretation methodology was identified by the amended constitution. Also, authorizing the 
official religious institution “Al-Azhar” to take over this process might threaten state’s control 
over it. It is notable that the amendment of Article 2 in 1980 was also accompanied by amending 
another article to enable Sadat to stay in power.66The proposed comprehensive Islamic review of 
the existing laws has not been carried out since amending Article 2 in 1980. It is believed that the 
executive in Egypt renounced its public commitment to Islamization after the assassination of 
Sadat in 1981 by an extremist Islamic military cell.67The intended closure of such a political 
process, that could carry out a comprehensive Islamic law review of the existing laws, has 
promoted the role of litigation as an alternative process through which Islamists could enforce 
Article 2.68This  justifies the crucial role of Egyptian judiciary in shaping legal Islamization in 
Egypt during 80s and 90s. The Egyptian courts led by the SCC had to develop their official 
methodology of interpreting Article 2 and deducing Sharia norms to be able to make their 
decisions on lawsuits concerning the application of Sharia. Most of these lawsuits were brought 
to courts by Islamists against legislations that were claimed to be contrary to Sharia principles. In 
addition, others were filed by normal people or lawyers to challenge both state and non-state 
actions that they believed to be contrary to Sharia norms. Through this litigation process, the 
Egyptian state could control the borders of constitutional Islamization in Egypt. This will be 
demonstrated in the next section through exploring the SCC’s methodology of interpreting 
Article 2. After shutting down all other political channels, it seems that liberals, Islamists and all 
other political powers in Egypt accepted the litigation choice as the only way was permitted by 
the ruling regime in Egypt to challenge, define or fulfil constitutional Islamization. I believe that 
it is important to refer that the ambiguity of Article 2 in the discussed constitution not only 
served the political interests of the ruling regime in Egypt but also served as a guarantee of non-
conservative or modernist application of Sharia in Egypt. This simply because defining Sharia 
principles and the methodology of interpreting Quran and Sunnah by the constitution would 
make judges under a constitutional obligation to adhere to all these rules strictly. Moreover, 
authorizing the official religious institution Al-Azhar to takeover this process would ensure a 
stricter application of Sharia norms than to be applied by western educated judges. This point 
 
66Article 77 of the 1971 constitution presented a stumbling block since it limited the President to two six-year terms. 
It was amended to include the phrase “the President may be reelected for other successive terms.”    
67See generally LOMBARDI, supra note 34, at 135- 139.                                                                                                       
68Id. at 139.                                                                                                                                                                                     
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leads us to take a look at the status of Sharia in Egypt’s 2012 constitution.69 Examining the 
position of Sharia in this short-lived constitution could show us how liberals and human rights 
activists are very susceptible to any constitutional amendment that could resolve the legal 
ambiguity of Article 2 and, as a result, lead to more conservative interpretation of Sharia.  
After the fall of the regime of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, a new Egyptian constitution was 
promulgated in 2012. It was promulgated by the Constituent Assembly whose membership was 
dominated by the Muslim Brotherhoods and Salafis.70This domination happened because “[t]he 
transitional provision regulating the election of the C A—a provision approved in the March 
2011 referendum—required an absolute majority vote of the elected members of Parliament.”71 
Both the Freedom and Justice Party (representing the Muslim Brotherhoods) and Al-Nur party 
(representing Salafis) had a majority exceeding two thirds of seats of the newly elected 
parliament at this time. With a majority of Islamists, the Constituent Assembly of the 2012 
constitution added some constitutional articles to consolidate and clarify the authority of Islamic 
law in the new adopted constitution.72 In addition to Article 2, whose form was not changed, 
Articles 4 and 219 were added to clarify the ambiguity of the definition of Sharia principles and 
their implementation. Article 4 states that: 
Al-Azhar is an independent Islamic institution of higher learning. It handles all its affairs 
without outside interference. It leads the call into Islam and assumes responsibility for 
religious studies and the Arabic language in Egypt and the world. The al-Azhar’s Body of 
Senior Scholars is to be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law.73 
According to this article Al -Azhar could provide advisory opinions on any matter related to 
Sharia, while Article 175 reserved the SCC’s exclusive jurisdiction on the constitutional matters. 
Article 219 explains the principles of Sharia as it states that “Sharia principles include Sharia’s 
general evidences (adillah kulliyah), rules of jurisprudence (qawa‘id usuliyyah) and juristic 
principles (qawa’id fiqhiyyah) and the sources considered by the Sunni schools of law”74 
 
69
I would like to refer that the focus of this section is to examine the status of Sharia in the 1971 constitution as 
Egypt’s most enduring constitution that shaped the legal situation of Sharia and, consequently, apostasy case law for 
forty years. However, pointing to Sharia related constitutional articles in the 2012 and 2014 constitutions is 
significant to show how the ambiguity of Sharia constitutional articles could also achieve the interests of the 
modernist or secular point of view as well as the State’s.   
70Gianluca P. Parolin, Shall We Ask Al-Azhar? Maybe Not Lessons from the Ṣukūk Bill Incident, 7 Middle E. L. & 
Governance 212-35 (2015).                                                                                                                                                      
71Id. at 217.                                                                                                                                                                                 
72El Fegiery, supra note 53, at 4.                                                                                                                                                    
73CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 4.                                                                              
74Id. at art. 219.                                                                                                                                                                                                       
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Introducing Art. 4 into the new adopted constitution resulted in raising many objections from 
liberals and human rights activists as Moataz El Fegiery summarizes in the following paragraph: 
This Article has provoked outrage from a wide range of liberals and human rights 
activists. In a public statement, 23 Egyptian human rights NGOs considered this move as 
a bold step towards theocracy, where unaccountable religious scholars intervene in the 
work of the elected bodies. They expressed worries that this Article copies the Iranian 
system of wilayat al faqih but in a different shape. According to them, Article 4 
‘undermines the concept of the modern democratic state and sets the country up for 
significant legal uncertainty’. Even though the opinions of the Association of Senior 
Scholars are not mandatory, the Constitution provides religious scholars with a powerful 
moral and religious authority over elected parliamentarians. Their opinions would be 
hardly ignored.75 
These objections and worries from liberals, NGOs, and human rights activists could show us 
how the legal ambiguity of Article 2 and its interpretation is not only sponsored by the Egyptian 
state but also backed up by secular or liberal elites. I think that according to this perspective, 
legal ambiguity that leads to a modernist interpretation of Sharia is more acceptable than legal 
certainty that could lead to a conservative interpretation of Sharia. Moreover, “advisory” 
opinions of “unaccountable” religious scholars in Sharia matters is a blatant intervention in the 
work of the elected bodies, while the binding interpretation of Sharia by secular educated and 
state appointed judges has not been regarded as an intervention in the work of the elected bodies 
since 80s! It is not supposed here, according to the scope of this research, to assess whether or 
not these added Articles could end the existing legal ambiguity or to examine the surrounding 
political circumstances that caused these amendments.76The point here is to be aware that leaving 
Article 2 with its original ambiguous form since 1981 has enabled the Egyptian judiciary to 
adopt a centrist or modernist interpretation of Sharia. Liberals opposed the added articles because 
“[u]nder Articles 4 and 219, liberal and un-orthodox approaches of Islamic law have no 
legitimacy in Egyptian legal reasoning.”77This point is crucial to the upcoming analysis of the 
legal framework of apostasy in Egypt. I believe this because, with such ambiguous definition of 
Sharia principles, it is irrational to agree with any claims considering this legal framework as a 
result of a conservative interpretation or implementation of Sharia in Egypt. Then why did 
liberals, NGOs, and human rights activists objected the consultation of al-Azhar in matters 
 
75El Fegiery, supra note 53, at 4.                                                                                                                                                      
76See generally Gianluca P. Parolin, Shall We Ask Al-Azhar? Maybe Not Lessons from the Ṣukūk Bill 
Incident, 7 Middle E. L. & Governance 212-35 (2015).                                                                                                                   
77
El Fegiery, supra note 53, at 5.  
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pertaining to Islamic law if we already have a conservative interpretation of Sharia by the state? I 
think that the answer is because there is a difference between the state’s modernist interpretations 
of Sharia under a single ambiguous constitutional article and its classic interpretations by 
religious scholars under a constitutional article defining its principles. After the deposition of 
Morsi and his government in the summer of 2013, the new military backed government drafted a 
new constitution that was approved by a national referendum in January 2014.78Article 2 was 
kept with the same form in the new constitution, whereas Art. 219 and the paragraph stating the 
consultation of Al-Azhar in matters pertaining to Islamic law were both omitted.  
Before explaining the SCC’s methodology of interpreting Article 2, let’s summarize some 
important findings that should be taken into consideration. The political intention of adopting 
Article 2 or Sharia supremacy clause since 1971 was not to enforce Sharia principles within the 
Egyptian legal system; rather, it was adopted to consolidate the political power of the ruling 
regime at this time. Consequently, Article 2 was formulated and kept with its vagueness without 
a definite interpretation of Sharia principles or the methodology of their deduction to push all its 
related political and legal conflicts to courts and litigation process. This process has been the 
only remained channel to discuss or reform constitutional Islamization after the closure of all 
other political channels including legislation. As it will be demonstrated, the vague form of 
Article 2 has enabled the state through its constitutional judiciary to have an ultimate control 
over the definition of Sharia principles and the scope of its enforcement. Also, the ambiguity of 
the definition of Sharia principles has been backed up by liberals or secularists who have 
opposed any further mandatory constitutional definition of these principles that could lead to a 
more conservative interpretation of Sharia. The present findings confirm that “the introduction of 
Article 2 has not substantially changed the Egyptian legal system, which has maintained its 
secular features.”79Now, let’s see how the SCC has adopted a modernist approach to interpret 
and deduce Sharia principles and norms. Such approach has kept “the incorporation of Islamic 
law into the Egyptian legal system to a minimum.”80 
 
78Ahmed & Ginsburg, supra note 52, at 67.                                                                                                                                         
79El Fegiery, supra note 53, at 3.                                                                                                                                                   
80
Maurits S. Berger & Nadia Sonneveld, Sharia and National Law in Egypt, in SHARIA INCORPORATED A 
COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF TWELVE MUSLIM COUNTRIES IN PAST AND PRESENT (JanMi 
chiel Otto ed., Leiden Univ. Press), cited in El Fegiery, supra note 53.    
 
20 
3. Examining the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC)’s Approach to the 
Interpretation of Article 2:     
The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) has an exclusive power to interpret and apply 
constitutional provisions; thus, the SCC has a main role in interpreting Article 2 including the 
definition of Sharia principles and the scope of their application within the Egyptian legal 
system. The evolution of the SCC’s substantive Article 2 jurisprudence since its establishment 
right now is a direct result of the historical evolution of constitutional review in the Egyptian 
legal system. For many decades before 1969, all Egyptian courts had the authority to consider or 
discuss the constitutionality of legislations.81Accordingly, any court could decide not to apply 
laws that were considered by the court to be unconstitutional according to a legal practice called 
abstention control.82In 1969 the Supreme Court was established by Law No. 81 of 1969 to have 
an exclusive authority of constitutional review of all legislations.83The 1971 constitution 
introduced for the first time the SCC to “undertake the judicial control in respect of the 
constitutionality of the laws and regulations and .. undertake the interpretation of the legislative 
texts in the manner prescribed by law.”84The court was established in 1979 under Law No. 48, 
which regulates the operation of the court.85According to this law, lower courts act as gate 
keepers that “determine which constitutional claims can be brought before the SCC [through] a 
function that is often referred to as their ‘gate keeping function’.”86Since the early 1990s the 
court’s justices have worked to identify the general principles that should govern their 
interpretation of all constitutional texts.87The court has consistently confirmed through its official  
reports and publications that the “constitution must be interpreted as an organic whole.”88This 
implies that the interpretation of any constitutional text must be consistent with all governing 
constitutional principles that are identified by the court. These principles include: the 
commitment to democracy and separation of powers, the commitment to equitable social and 
economic policies, the commitment to ensure that Egyptian law respects the “rule of law”, and 
 
81LOMBARDI, supra note 34, at 143.                                                                                                                                           
82Id.                                                                                                                                                                                                
83Id. at 144.      
84Egyptian Constitution, supra note 54, art. 175. 
85LOMBARDI, supra note 34, at 144.                                                                                                                                                
86Id. at 145.                                                                                                                                                                                                               
87Id. at 150.                                                                                                                                                                                 
88Id. at 149.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
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the commitment that Egyptian law must respect the principles of Sharia.89Both the third and the 
fourth principles has shaped the SCC’s methodology of interpreting Article 2.The commitment 
to ensure that Egyptian law respects the “rule of law” has been interpreted by the court to mean 
that “the government [has] to respect human rights, including ones widely recognized as 
fundamental human rights in international agreements and by constitutional courts around the 
world.”90In addition, the forth principle requires from the court to ensure that all its 
interpretations of constitutional texts must be consistent with Sharia norms as the main source of 
legislation in Egypt. The court’s desire to balance between these two principles has ensured its 
liberal interpretation of Article 2 to fulfil its international commitment to human rights. In other 
words, the SCC’s commitment to develop “a holistic interpretation of the constitution led it to 
demand that Egyptian constitutional law be harmonized with unwritten international human 
rights norms.”91I think that there is a rational question that could be raised here; why it is 
assumed here that the SCC’s commitment to a holistic interpretation of the constitution has led to 
a liberal interpretation of Sharia and not to a conservative interpretation of international human 
rights? There are two reasons that confirm this assumption. The first one is that the upcoming 
analysis of the court’s methodology of interpreting Article 2 would show us how it has 
developed such methodology to ensure a liberal or non-conservative interpretation of Sharia 
norms. The second reason is because the SCC as the exclusive interpreter of Article 2, and as a 
result, of Sharia principles it is not restricted to any other interpretation of Sharia principles. On 
the other hand, the SCC’s interpretation of human rights is restricted to IHRL and could be 
criticized or reviewed by international human rights organizations and international community. 
In order to take its time to develop its own theory of Islamic legislation and to identify its 
methodology of interpreting Sharia principles, the SCC postponed any substantive Article 2 
opinions till 1993.92The court had ensured this by issuing two opinions in 1985 to confirm that 
“it had limited authority to exercise Article 2 review. It could not exercise review of laws that 
were in force at the time that Article 2 was amended in 1980. It could, however, review laws that 
entered into force thereafter.”93It is believed that the court applied the principle of non-
 
89Id. at 150.                                                                                                                                                                                           
90Id.                                                                                                                                                                                                 
91Id. at 158.                                                                                                                                                                                        
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retroactivity of legislation to the constitutional amendment of Art. 2 because it was reluctant to 
reveal a systematic theory of Islamic legal interpretations before taking its time to ensure that its 
reasoning would be accepted by the executive branch, lower courts, political powers including 
liberals and Islamists, public, and international community. According to what will be illustrated, 
we could see how this intention has resulted in an ambiguous theory that is formulated in 
concepts and terms drawn from different theories of Islamic law.94 
 
The critical question that the SCC has tried to answer through its methodology of interpreting 
Sharia principles: under which circumstances are legislations to be considered unconstitutional 
on the basis that they violate the principles of Sharia?95In order to answer this question, the court 
defines Sharia principles in one of its decision on the case known as the “battle over the veil”, 
which states that: 
It is not permitted for a legislative text to contradict those shari'a rulings that are certain 
with respect to their authenticity and meaning (al-ahkam al-shar'iyya alqat'iyya fi 
thubutiha wa dalalatiha), considering that these rulings alone are those for which ijtihad 
is forbidden,  because they signify [the Islamic shari 'a's] universal principles (mabadi 
'aha al-kulliyya) and its fixed roots (usulaha al-thabita), which accept neither 
interpretation nor substitution.  And accordingly, it is unimaginable that the 
understanding of [such rulings] would change with a change of time and place. They 
cannot be amended. It is forbidden to contravene them or twist their meaning. The 
Supreme Constitutional Court has been charged with the duty to watch out for violation 
of these [shari 'a rulings that are absolutely certain with respect to both their authenticity 
and meaning] and to overturn any [statutory] rule (qa'ida) that contradicts them.96  
 
In its interpretation of Article 2 the SCC has attempted to “develop an approach to Islamic legal 
interpretation that would be respected by a wide range of people-including a wide range of 
Islamists”97and consistent with the protection of IHRL as well. According to the SCC’s 
interpretation to Article 2, the Egyptian laws should meet two criteria; firstly, consistency “with 
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universally applicable scriptural rules of Islamic Shari'a.”98Secondly, these laws must advance 
the goals of Sharia.99Regarding the first standard, the SCC identified “universally applicable 
scriptural rules of Islamic Shari'a” by searching for principles that are authentic and have certain 
meaning. The court accepted the Quran as authentic, but has not clarified its method of 
“separating the absolutely trustworthy hadiths from the merely probable.”100Since the SCC 
considers a scriptural command is not binding unless it is certain with respect to both 
authenticity and meaning, the Court could find few of such binding scriptural commands. The 
next question that had to be answered by the court’s theory of interpretation was: how to 
differentiate between universally applicable scriptural rules of Islamic Shari'a, for which ijtihad 
is forbidden, and other Sharia rulings which are subject to change or contradiction by enacted 
laws? The court defines these “flexible” Sharia principles as:  
And whereas: Use of the rule of reason, where there is no [scriptural] text, develops 
practical rules (qawa'id 'amliyya) that are, in their ramifications, gentler for the people 
and more concerned with their affairs and [that] better protect their true interests 
(masalihhim al-haqiqiyya)… The statements of the classical Islamic jurists (fuqaha ') on 
a matter related to the shari 'a are not granted any sanctity or placed beyond review or 
reexamination. Rather, they can be replaced by other [interpretations of Islamic law]. 
Opinions based on ijtihad in debated questions do not in themselves have any force 
applying to those who do not hold them. It is not permitted to hold [such opinions] to be 
firm, settled shari'a law that cannot be contravened.101 
 
Accordingly, the violation of these disputed or flexible rules of Islamic law regarding texts that 
are speculative in their origin or meaning (ẓannī al-ṯubūt aw al-dalālah) by any legislative 
enactment does not entail its unconstitutionality unless the SCC decides so. Moreover, the court 
has an exclusive authority to decide which of Sharia norms are regarded as universally applicable 
scriptural rules and which are flexible rules. The court also could elevate any disputed rule to be 
a universally applicable scriptural rule through preventing its contravention by any enacted 
law.102It is believed that the SCC had to explain some issues that govern its categorization and 
deduction of Sharia norms to lend its new developed methodology much more legal credibility, 
and to give lower courts’ judges more guidance about how to deduce, interpret and categorize 
Sharia rules. These issues include: what is the adopted Islamic legal theory by the court to 
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deduce rules from Sharia principal and supplementary sources? How do the court purify and 
categorize the Prophet’s hadiths as a principal source of Sharia? How would the court integrate 
the rulings of both Quran and Sunnah within its legal reasoning? The lack of any answer to these 
questions has made it obvious that “the SCC exploits the differentiation between definite and 
flexible rules of Islamic law in order to enlarge the scope of legislative discretion.”103The court 
has misused Islamic technical terms without rational Islamic legal reasoning to declare its 
constitutional theory of interpretation as an Islamic. Concerning Sharia goals, the court believes 
that there are specific goals that should be promoted by specific types of laws and general goals 
that must be promoted or not be impeded by all laws.104The Court determines specific goals 
through textual analysis and analysis of history, while the general goals are derived by reason. 
According to the Court, the general goals “must give effect to the unambiguous, utilitarian 
principle announced in the hadith, namely ‘no harm and no retribution’ (la darar wa-la 
dirar)”105Thus, they include advancing human welfare. The flexibility of the SCC’s theory of 
interpretation of Article 2 enables it to ensure that enforcing Sharia norms on enacted legislations 
will be consistent with its international commitments to liberal economic philosophy and to the 
protection of civil and political rights. This because the justices of the court have always 
considered “the enjoyment of human rights (as these have been defined by the court) as 
axiomatically good”106; as a result, their violation by any law is not permitted. The SCC has 
written its Article 2 opinions in a compact language that does not illustrate how the court reached 
its liberal conclusions about Sharia command.107The members of the court haven’t clearly 
explained their methodology of interpretation of Sharia for their successors or lower courts to 
follow because they might be uncertain themselves about the adequacy of their approach.108 
Other courts including the Court of Cassation, administrative courts, and regular courts have 
followed the SCC’s theory in a slightly more conservative approach.109This does not absolutely 
mean that these courts have always adopted more conservative juristic opinions that contradict 
the liberal approach of the SCC; rather, their decisions only implied more systematic use of 
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Hadith or Sunnah literature. Hence, “[t]he most striking pattern in the judiciary’s application of 
the SCC’s theory is the implicit resistance to the SCC use (or non-use) of the hadith 
literature.”110In the absence of any guidance from the SCC, checking the authenticity and the 
interpretation of any Hadith falls only under the discretion of the concerned court. judges who 
have different training than traditional Islamic religious scholars could not introduce an 
alternative theory of Islamic interpretation, but they misuse Islamic technical terms in order to 
Islamize’ state law in a pattern that is consistent with democracy, international human rights and 
economic liberalism.111 
 
The main conclusion that can be drawn is that the SCC has adopted a modernist approach to 
interpret and deduce Sharia principles and norms to maintain the secular nature of the Egyptian 
legal system. In the absence of a clear definition of Sharia principles by the adopted constitution 
of 1981 and precisely by the discussed Article, on one hand, and renouncing a comprehensive 
Islamic review of the existing laws to be carried out by legislatures, on the other hand, the SCC 
had to innovate an interpretation theory to face the increasing resort to litigation procedure to 
reach political ends. The constitutional court managed to innovate its interpretation theory to 
balance between two requirements; firstly, to have an Islamic template to be accepted by the 
public, Islamists, and judges of other courts. Secondly, to create an interpretation methodology 
that ensures a liberal or modern interpretation of Sharia sources and norms as a fulfillment of its 
international commitments to protect international human rights and economic liberalism. In 
order to achieve this balance, the court’s methodology has relied upon a process of a secular 
reconstruction of Islamic law.112 
 
On the other hand, there is a counter point of view challenging the “secularizing effect” of the 
constitutional judicial review of Sharia in Egypt. For instance, in her article The Least Religious 
Branch? Judicial Review and The New Islamic Constitutionalism Intisar Rabb argues that “prior 
judicial practice reveals that Egypt's constitutional court engaged rather than contained or 
secularized Islamic law; and the more it engaged, the stronger and more legitimate the bases for 
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the Court's decisions.”113She asserts that Article 2 established jurisprudence closely examines and 
explores the elements of the Islamic legal tradition. Intisar adds that the SCC’s judges throughout 
1990s and 2000s interpreted a variety of Islamic law sources, arguments, classical 
interpretations, general goals of law, classical and modern notions of public interest, and legal 
maxims.114Our analysis here does not deny such engagement; rather, it proves that the Court’s 
consideration of some elements of Islamic legal tradition has aimed to control their interpretation 
and integration within the Egyptian legal system. The paradigm of operational closure and 
cognitive openness is manifested in the court’s adopted methodology. The court’s theory ensures 
that Egyptian courts leaded by the SCC are the official readers and interpreters of Sharia texts 
and norms; thus, they have the authority to categorize sacred texts and Sharia sources, determine 
their obligatory nature, choose adopted juristic opinions, and choose the incorporated principles 
of Sharia. The system of secular law has maintained its operational closure by reconstructing 
principles of Islamic law within itself. In his impressive analysis of the SCC’s interpretation of 
Article 2, Balz asserts that this interpretation:  
[I]llustrates the struggle to defend the autonomy of the secular legal order. The 
underlying strategy of the Court’s decision[s] is to gain control over the authoritative 
interpretation of Islamic law: the SCC pays rhetorical tribute to being “bound” by the 
rules of Islamic law in principle, while it reserves the right to determine the substance 
of these rules. It is exactly this “substantializing” of Islamic legal rules within the 
secular legal order that allows the latter to maintain its autonomy.115 
 
However, such adopted interpretation methodology has not introduced a real alternative theory 
of Islamic interpretation to be followed by judges to take over the process. The SCC has only 
misused Islamic technical terms to Islamize its interpretation of Sharia upon which its decisions 
were built. The present findings confirm that the normative recognition of Sharia as a main 
source of law in Egypt since 1971 has not created a real case of legal pluralism in Egypt where 
the existing laws and legal policies were developed to be compatible with Sharia without 
violating the essence of the latter. In contrast, it has created a situation of legal duality or conflict 
where the modern state monopolized and exploited the interpretation of the constituent law 
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sources and, as a result, its definitions of the scope of all rights. As supposed earlier in this 
research, the primary standard to assess whether there is a situation of duality or plurality in any 
legal system is the degree of adherence to the genuine essence and standards of the recognized 
source of law. The genuine standards of this source of law should not be defined according to the 
recipient law, but according to the recognized law itself. Having a full picture of how the 
discussed interpretation of Sharia as the main source of law in Egypt by the SCC has led to the 
current contradicting and ambiguous legal framework of apostasy, it is substantial to have a brief 
or a simple introduction to Sharia sources and Islamic legal theory. Such introduction would give 
us a general background about the classic or the “genuine” categorization of Sharia sources and 
Sunni legal theory (Usul al-Fiqh) that has been used in deducting Sharia rules from sources.  
 
B. The Scope of Religious Freedom According to Sharia:  
 
Assessing and analyzing the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt requires examining the main 
features of religious freedom according to Sharia as a key aspect of our current research. The 
importance of such examination stems from the assumption that evaluating Egyptian courts’ 
approach (including the SCC’s) to the act of turning away from Islam or apostasy should include 
exploring the position of the same act in Sharia. This because the status of apostasy within 
Sharia, as the main source of law in Egypt, is considered as the original reference according to 
which apostasy is prohibited or criminalized, and its legal consequences are applied. Thus, 
regarding Egyptian judges’ approach to the act and its legal framework as a conservative, liberal, 
secular, or ambiguous should be supported by the comparison with its status in Sharia. After 
explaining the concept of Sharia as defined and understood by the SCC, I will start here by a 
simple introduction to the classic or the traditional definition of Sharia sources and Islamic legal 
theory. This introduction could show us how the SCC’s definition and interpretation of Sharia 
differs from its definition from the perspective of Sharia itself. The definition of the classic 
meaning of Sharia will be followed by investigating the scope of religious freedom according to 
Sharia including main juristic opinions regarding the legal consequences of apostasy. 
1. What do we Mean by Sharia? 
 
Before defining Sharia and its sources, it is substantial to identify the conceptual indication of the 
term Sharia in this thesis. Sharia refers to the traditional or scriptural meaning of the word. 
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Consequently, refers to juristic rulings which are derived from divinely revealed scriptures of the 
Quran or Sunnah and they acquire their authority from their Divine origin. These rulings could 
be stated explicitly in Quran legislative verses or in Sunnah speeches of the Prophet Muhammad 
 Deriving Sharia rulings has been practiced through scholars and jurists “who develop their .(ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص)
own methodology for the classification of sources, derivation of specific rules from general 
principles, and so forth.”116Such traditional or fundamentalist concept of Sharia contradicts with 
some modernist and functionalist approaches, which consider Sharia as mere normative rules 
produced from human practice of reasoning and interpretation of jurists and scholars to reach to 
what they believe to be the law of God and they also include law in action.117Accordingly, from 
this perspective, Sharia norms are not always connected with scriptural legitimacy or acquire 
sacredness. Holding the traditional concept of Sharia in this thesis is based upon two main 
reasons; firstly, besides its consideration as the “dominant Islamic religious belief”118among 
Muslims, the prohibition of apostasy in Islam is stated explicitly in Quran and acquires its juristic 
authority from its Divine origin. Secondly, as we pointed out earlier, the drafting committee of 
the 1971 constitution referred that in order to identify the principles of Islamic Sharia, the 
legislatures must consider Quran, the Sunna and the opinions of learned jurists and imams. 
 
Defining and explaining the meaning of Sharia here as a key concept of this research includes a 
simple introduction to the literal meaning of the term itself, Sharia sources, and its legal theory. 
Sharia literally means in Arabic “the right path or the clear approach”119Sharia could be defined 
as “the divine law as embodied by God’s Word (the Quran) and the sayings and actions of His 
prophet Muhammad (the Sunna)”120 The term could be also defined as “a ‘divine,’ ‘religious,’ or 
‘sacred’ law representing the will of God as expressed in revealed scriptures to the Prophet 
Muhammad.”121Sharia has different categories of sources from which its rules and norms are 
deduced. The primary sources are the Quran and the Sunnah, while secondary sources are 
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consensus (ijma’) and analogy (qiyas). In addition, Sharia disputed sources include public 
interest (istslah), juristic preference (istihsan), custom (urf), etc.122Quran is considered by 
Muslims as “the most sacred source of law, embodying knowledge that God had revealed about 
human beliefs, about God himself, and about how the believer should conduct himself or herself 
in this world.”123Concerning the authenticity of Quranic texts, Quran is regarded by Muslims as 
wholly certain. The second primary source of Sharia is Sunnah, which had the form of specific 
narratives called hadith.124Hadith corpus narrates the Prophet’s deeds and speeches along his life. 
The legitimacy and the importance of Sunnah as a primary source of norms in Islam stems from 
Muslims’ belief that the Prophet Muhammad (ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص) “was God’s chosen messenger [who] 
understood God’s [messages and orders] better than anyone else and acted upon them in his daily 
life.”125The authenticity of the hadiths concerning their transmission chain (isnad), their main 
texts (matn) and other aspects has been confirmed through different criteria determined by 
scholars and jurists through the science of hadith and its rubrics. Jurists refined trustworthy 
hadiths from other weak or fabricated ones and produced several collections of hadith including 
main six canonical collections that report Sunnah. In addition to the primary sources of Sharia, 
jurists and scholars uses secondary sources when Quran and Sunnah are silent regarding the 
researched case. Consensus (ijma’) could be defined as “the agreement of community as 
represented by its highly learned jurists living in a particular age or generation, an agreement that 
bestows on those rulings or opinions subject to it a conclusive, certain knowledge.”126It has 
commonly been assumed that consensus has been considered as dead source of law because it 
became practically impossible to ascertain after the dispersion of Muslims across wide Islamic 
territories.127Accordingly, the normative legitimacy of consensus as a source of Islamic law is 
limited to the era preceding the Prophet's death in 632 CE. Analogy (qiyas) is considered as the 
fourth source of law in Sharia.128It could be defined as “a form of analogical reasoning through 
which prescribed norms in the Qur'an, Sunna or Ijma' can be extended to unregulated legal 
problems if they share the same 'illa, or ratio legis.”129The other disputed sources of norms in 
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Sharia are sources which there is a disagreement among jurists and scholars about their 
legitimacy as sources of rules. This means that while some jurists regard these sources could 
include rules and norms to solve issues that primary and secondary sources are silent about, 
others deny this. They include public interest (istslah), juristic preference (istihsan), custom 
(urf), Prophet’s companions’ consensus, prior judicial decisions of Sharia judges and Muftis, 
preceding nations’ rulings (Sharā‘min qablinā), etc. 
 
Deriving rules from various Sharia sources to deal with the new arising issues facing Muslims in 
their daily life has not been practiced through a random process, but according to standards set 
by Islamic legal theory which called in Sharia the science of Usul al-Fiqh. The science of Usul 
al-Fiqh is defined as “the general principles that are used to deduce the legal rules of conduct 
from their detailed sources.”130Thus, Usul al-Fiqh is the methodology of deriving the rules of 
Sharia, that governs the conducts of Muslims, from its primary, secondary and disputed sources 
of Sharia. The main function of Usul al- Fiqh is to develop methods to enable jurists to 
understand and combine between the judgements that are mentioned explicitly in Quran and 
authentic Sunnah reports; for instance, Usul al- Fiqh mentions the required conditions to apply 
abrogation among different Quranic or hadith texts. Moreover, it develops methods for jurists to 
discover what is supposed to be God’s judgment about the issues that are not mentioned 
explicitly in these sources; for example, it sets the required rules of analogy. To avoid the error 
that may result from the personal judgement of any jurist, Usul al-Fiqh “draw[s] a master plan of 
systematic methodology not only for the purpose of understanding the contents of the sources but 
also for drawing conclusions that are thought to be identical to those of the lex divina.”131The 
foundation of the science of Usul al-Fiqh and its development have been progressed as a 
response to the need of Muslims to discover Sharia rules regarding the arising issues in each era 
of the Islamic history. Starting with the age of the Prophet (ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص), the Prophet’s companions used to 
ask him about any arising questions regarding Sharia rules. These questions were answered 
either by Quran or by the Prophet (ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص) himself (hadith). During their age, the prophet’s 
companions did not face many hurdles in interpreting Quran and Sunnah and discovering Sharia 
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rules for the new arising issues. This because they had known the interpretation of these sources 
and the occasion of each text from the Prophet.132Also, in answering the new arising questions, 
which were few, they used some methods of Usul al- Fiqh like analogy only as a concept without 
reference to their terms. During the era of followers, jurists expanded in their reference to the 
methods that have been used in deducting Sharia rules from sources due to the increasing 
number of the new arising cases.133By the second century of hijra, jurists managed to establish 
the science of Usul al-Fiqh to avoid any error in deducing Sharia rules from sources due to the 
mixture of Arabs and non-Arabs (ajam) Muslims and the expansion of the territories of the 
Islamic state. Al-Shafii’s book Al-Resala is considered as the first significant book that 
assembled the main rules of Usul al-Fiqh as a distinctive science of Sharia. This historical 
background shows that the study and the development of Usul a-Fiqh in any age has been 
inspired by the needs of the Islamic community to discover Sharia rules regarding the arising 
problems and should be adopted by scholars and jurists who have “complete understanding of 
the Qur'an and the Sunna, the foremost sources of law”134 
 
The concluded corpus of legal rules regarding any case are called in Sharia Fiqh rulings. The 
science of fiqh could be defined as “the knowledge of Shari'a rules concerning the acts of 
worshipers or Muslims.”135The usage of Usul Al- fiqh methodologies and methodological tools 
does not ensure reaching the same conclusions regarding furu or unprecedented questions by 
different jurists; rather, it may lead to a variety of juristic opinions for the same issue. This 
justifies the fact that “no less than 19 schools (Fiqh Madhhab) developed during the first four 
centuries of Islam producing diverse juristic opinions.”136The main Sunni doctrinal legal schools 
in Islamic law are: the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali. They are named after their founder 
jurists. The reached fiqh rulings regarding any act or issue aim to establish a legal norm for every 
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new case.137Sharia recognizes five types of norms under which the entire range of human activity 
is categorized. According to this categorization, any act committed by Muslim could be 
considered as forbidden (muharram), obligatory (wajeb), neutral (mubah), recommended 
(mandoob), or disapproved (makrouh).138 Thus, any jurist aims through his reasoning to establish 
a judgement on the conducts of Muslims that he believes is identical to God’s judgment about 
the researched issues.  
 
One of the most significant findings to emerge from our investigation here is that there is a major 
difference between the classic or the “genuine” meaning of Sharia (including its sources, legal 
theory, and legal rules) and its interpretation as elaborated by the SCC. The SCC’s interpretation 
of Sharia principles could be considered as a distorted or deficient recognition of Sharia. A 
possible explanation for this might be that such recognition failed to introduce a clear review of 
the adopted approach to deal with Sharia sources other than Quran, its legal theory, and its 
different juristic perspectives. Hence, we are talking about a case of recognition where the 
recipient legal system ignored to take into consideration the constituent elements of the 
recognized law. This deficient recognition of Sharia within the Egyptian legal system has 
resulted in the contradicting legal position of apostasy in Egypt as what will be illustrated later in 
this research. 
2. The Scope of Religious Freedom According to Sharia: 
 
The principle of non-compulsion in religion is ensured under Islamic law. This principle is 
confirmed in many Quranic verses such as verse (2:256) that states that “There shall be no 
compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear from the wrong. 
So, whoever disbelieves in Taghut and believes in Allah has grasped the most trustworthy 
handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing.”139Also, God urges the 
Prophet (pbuh), and consequently, his followers after him in Quran not to let their keenness to 
call non-Muslims to embrace Islam as justification for coercion. In this regard, verse (10:99) 
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states that “And had your Lord willed, those on earth would have believed - all of them entirely. 
then, [O Muhammad], would you compel the people in order that they become believers?”140 
This implies that imposing any form of coercion either physically or psychologically141 
psychologically133to enforce non-Muslims to embrace Islam is prohibited in Sharia. Muslims 
have a general duty to call non-Muslims to embrace Islam by good exhortation and not to coerce 
them to do so as verse (16:125) confirms “Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and goodly 
exhortation, and have disputations with them in the best manner; surely your Lord best knows 
those who go astray from His path, and He knows best those who follow the right 
way.”142Consequently, forced conversion to Islam is void under Sharia. Such juristic ruling is 
illustrated by the twelfth century Hanbali jurist Ibn Qudamah, who points out that: 
It is not permissible to force a non-believer into embracing Islam. For instance, if a 
non-Muslim citizen (Dhimmi) or a protected alien (Musta’man) is forced to embrace 
Islam, he will not be considered as a Muslim except his embrace of Islam is of his own 
choice…The authority of this prohibition of coercion is the words of God Most High 
that says: ‘There is no compulsion in religion’.143 
 
Religious freedom in Sharia is not only governed by the principle of non-compulsion to ensure 
the full persuasion of any person embraces Islam, but it is also restricted by the principle of the 
prohibition of conversion from Islam or apostasy. Such conclusion is justified by the fact that 
while the principle of non -compulsion in religion is confirmed in many Quranic verses, Quran 
also includes repeated threats and strong warnings of punishment for apostasy in the Hereafter as 
a major sin. The act of conversion from one religion to another is also prohibited and punished in 
other Heavenly religions, namely Judaism and Christianity.144Apostasy is the English translation 
of the Arabic term Riddah which literally means “turning back.”145Apostasy could be defined as 
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Islam. The woman declined. The Caliph was reported to have then stated his sincerity of purpose in the following 
words: ‘My lord, I did not intend to compel her, because I am aware that there must be no compulsion in religion the 
right path has certainly become distinguished from the wrong path.’ Cited in MASHOOD A. BADERIN, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC LAW (Oxford University Press) (2003), ch. 3, at 122.                                                                                                                                   
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143IBN QUDAMAH, AL-MUGNI cited in MASHOOD A. BADERIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC LAW 
(Oxford University Press) (2003), ch. 3, note 385. 
144ABDALLAH SAEED & HASSAN SAEED, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, APOSTASY AND ISLAM 38 (Ashgate 
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“‘turning away from Islam’ (al-rudjfi' 'an din al-islam) or ‘severing the ties with Islam’.”146The 
apostate or murtad is the Muslim who renounces his religion. The prohibition of conversion from 
Islam or apostasy is stated in many Quranic verses like verse (2:217), which states “And 
whoever of you reverts from his religion [to disbelief] and dies while he is a disbeliever - for 
those, their deeds have become worthless in this world and the Hereafter, and those are the 
companions of the Fire, they will abide therein eternally.”147Accordingly, any Muslim either by 
birth or by conversion is not allowed to renounce his religion regardless he subsequently 
embraces another faith or not. 
3. Main Juristic Opinions Regarding the Legal Consequences of Apostasy in Sharia: 
 
Apostasy in Sharia has different forms, which are classified in three main categories: utterance 
related, action related, and belief related.148Utterance related apostasy could be explicit like 
mocking or abjuring Islam and its rites,149insulting God (sab Allah), and insulting the Prophet 
(sab Al-Rasol).150Using of foul language with regard to God, the Prophet, the angles, other 
Prophets, and the Companions of the Prophet constitutes a serious offence of blasphemy.151 
Blasphemy offence expression is not stated explicitly in the Quran or Sunnah speeches. Such 
offence in Sharia is one of the greatest sins regardless of the religion of its committer was 
Muslim or non-Muslim. There is a difference of opinion among jurists regarding the status of the 
Muslim committers of blasphemy in Sharia. While most jurists consider the Muslim committers 
of this act as apostates condemned to death, some jurists consider them as Muslims deserve death 
penalty. The considered punishment of this act is based on certain reported incidents in the 
lifetime of the Prophet (pbuh).152If the perpetrator of this act was non-Muslim he will also incur 
death punishment.153Implicit apostasy statements include repudiation of some of the Scriptures 
by adding or omission Quran verses154and repudiation of the axiomatic articles of faith (ma 
 
146Rudolph Peters & Gert J. J. De Vries, Apostasy in Islam, 17 DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 1-25 (1977).                                   
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'ulima min al-din bl- darura).155The refusal to judge, or to be judged, according to the Shari'a is 
also considered as implicit apostasy156according to verse (5:44) that states “And whoever does 
not judge by what Allah has revealed – then it is those who are the disbelievers.”157Action 
related apostasy could be committed by any acts mocking Islam like throwing Quran in a dirty 
place intentionally, etc.158Also, Apostasy could happen by negative acts like leaving any of the 
axiomatic articles of faith (such as praying).159Belief related apostasy happens by merely the 
intention of unbelief which “ covers many cases, including doubts about the existence of Allah 
and/or about the message of the Prophet Muhammad or any other Prophet; doubts about the 
Quran, the Day of judgement . . .”160Like the act of apostasy, which is subjected to certain 
conditions, the committer of this act must fulfill specific conditions to be accountable for such 
acts.161 
In Islam, there is no doubt that apostasy is regarded as a grievous sin.162Apostasy is punished by 
death penalty in Sharia.163This opinion is held by the main four Islamic juristic schools and the 
majority of Muslim scholars (gumhor al-fuqaha’).164This opinion is primarily based on  some 
speeches of the Prophet Muhamed (pbuh) in Sunna such as "whoever changes his religion, then 
kill him.”165Also, the Prophet Muhamed (pbuh) said “[t]he blood of a fellow Muslim should 
never be shed except in three cases: that of  a married adulterer, the murder, and one who has 
abandoned his religion, while splitting himself off from the community.”166It is important here to 
refer that there are two isolated opinions of premodern jurists Ibrahim al-Nakha'I and Sufian al-
Thawri oppose the mainstream position and see that the apostate should be asked forever to 
 
155Abd Allah Ahmad AN-Na’im, The Islamic Law of Apostasy and its Modern Applicability: ACase from the Sudan, 
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repent and not be killed.167There is a difference of opinion among jurists regarding the nature or 
the categorization of this punishment in Sharia.168This difference is based on the fact that death 
sanction is not prescribed for apostasy in Quran. Sharia recognizes three kinds of punishment: 
hadd which is fixed punishment, qisas which is retaliation, and ta’zir which is discretionary 
punishments prescribed either by the ruler or his deputy (judge).169Some jurists including 
Shafi’is believe that the death punishment for apostasy is a hadd.170On the other hand, others 
hold the view that this punishment is ta’zir because it is not stated explicitly in Quran. The 
predominant opinion of Sharia jurists emphasizes that apostasy death sanction could only be 
imposed by the governor (Waly Al-amr) or his deputy after granting the apostate a reprieve of 
few days to repent (Istatabah) and remembrance Islam.171 Concerning the legal categorization of 
repentance and its duration there are two positions in Islamic jurisprudence. The majority of 
jurists consider offering the apostate an opportunity for repentance as obligatory, while others 
like Hanafies consider it as a recommended act.172Repentance duration according to the 
majority’s point of view is three days, and according to other jurists like some of the Shafi’is  the 
apostate should be offered repentance immediately and killed unless he reembraces 
Islam.173Moreover, there are two opinions in Sharia regarding the punishment of apostate 
woman. The first point of view, which is held by Malikis, Shafi’is and Hanbalis, see that “the 
apostate woman must repent within three days; otherwise she faces the death penalty.”174The 
second opinion, which is held by Hanafies, exclude female apostate from capital punishment and 
see that she should be imprisoned and beaten until she repents or dies.175 
Apostasy in Sharia entails other legal consequences other than death penalty. Concerning the 
apostate’s property, the majority of jurists including Malikis, Shafi’is, Hanafis and Hanbalis176 
Hanbalis167see that the apostate does not lose his property by apostasy, but his disposal rights are 
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suspended.177Accordingly, the apostate is not allowed to perform any legal transaction of his 
property until his situation becomes clear either by repentance or execution. Once he returns to 
Islam, he restores these rights. This implies that if the apostate did not repent and died as “as an 
unbeliever, his acts are legally void; if he readopts the faith, they are considered to have been 
legally from the beginning and without interruption.”178Another opinion is argued by some Hanafi 
jurists such as Abu Yusuf and Shaybani who believe that the apostate’s right to ownership of 
property is not affected or suspended by apostasy as they consider his situation as “a criminal 
awaiting his execution, who does not lose his legal capacity either.”179Also, we have a third opinion 
held by some jurists like Abu Ishak Al-Sherazy see that the apostate loses all his property which 
transfers to the Islamic state’s public treasury as (fay’).180Some Hanafis also see that female 
apostate does not lose any of the mentioned rights because she is excluded from death 
penalty.181Concerning the right to inheritance, apostasy in Sharia affects both apostate’s rights as 
well as his heirs’. The apostate does not have the right to inheritance even from those whose co-
religionist he has become because his conversion is not approved or accepted according to 
Sharia.182In Islamic jurisprudence there are three different opinions regulate inheriting apostate’s 
estate. The first one, which is argued by Shafi’is, Malikis, and Hanbalis, see that whole apostate’s 
property should transfer to the Islamic state’s public treasury as (fay’).183 This opinion is based 
upon the Prophet’s speech which states that “a Muslim does not inherit an unbeliever (kafir) and 
an unbeliever does not inherit a Muslim.”184Secondly, some jurists like Abu Yusuf see that the 
Muslim heirs should inherit everything that the apostate owned either before or after his 
apostasy.185 Thirdly, Hanafi legal theory differentiates between property acquired before the act of 
apostasy and property acquired after it; while the first part transfers to his Muslim heirs, the other 
part of his estate becomes fay’.186Apostasy entails also some legal consequences on marriage in 
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Sharia. Apostasy results in annulment of the marriage contract upon apostasy of one or both 
partners without need for judicial decision.187Thus, a new marriage is to be contracted if the 
apostate repents and wants to return to his or her spouse. Hanafis and Malikis see that spouses 
should be separated immediately after committing the act of apostasy, while Shafis and some of 
Hanbalis see that spouses may not be separated during the wife’s waiting period ('iddah)188, so 
that, if the apostate repents during this period the marriage remains valid.189The apostate does not 
have the right to marry even those whose co-religionist he has become because his conversion is 
not approved or accepted according to Sharia and his marriage in this case will be considered as 
void.190In regards to children, any child whom mother was pregnant with before the apostasy of 
the parents (either one or both) is considered as Muslim191and cannot be allowed to follow any 
other religion other than Islam.192Our examination of the main consequences of apostasy in Sharia 
has shown that the impact of renouncing Islam is not only limited to capital punishment, but it also 
affects the whole life of the apostate. According to what was illustrated, the apostate suffers in 
Sharia from a civil death as he is not allowed to inherit, marry, and dispose of his property. The 
apostate is also separated from his spouse and not allowed to choose another religion other than 
Islam for his children in some cases. I think that these consequences are directly related to the legal 
nature of Islam as a religion. Islam like many other beliefs (including Christianity and Judaism) 
all its rulings and norms are based upon a main principle, which is the distinction between believers 
and unbelievers; consequently, embracing Islam or renouncing it automatically results in many 
other legal consequences in Sharia. Such legal consequences are related to principal and general 
norms in Sharia and their ignorance or elimination is not an allowed choice from religious 
perspective. For instance, the apostate husband is separated from his spouse simply because 
Muslim woman is not allowed to marry a non-Muslim, and this general principal in Sharia is 
confirmed by many Quranic verses such as verse (2:221), which states “And do not marry 
polytheistic women until they believe. And a believing slave woman is better than a polytheist, 
even though she might please you. And do not marry polytheistic men [to your women] until they 
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believe. And a believing slave is better than a polytheist, even though he might please you. Those 
invite [you] to the Fire, but Allah invites to Paradise and to forgiveness, by His 
permission.”193Another example could be added in this regard, the apostate is also deprived from 
his right to inherit from any of his Muslim relatives and this deprivation is based upon, as 
mentioned above, a general principle in Sharia that “a Muslim does not inherit an unbeliever (kafir) 
and an unbeliever does not inherit a Muslim.”194Hence, apostasy consequences in Sharia could not 
be eliminated or abolished simply by abolishing death penalty because these consequences are set 
in Sharia either because they are related to general norms or because apostasy is a grievous sin and 
prohibited act that cannot be approved or accepted from the perspective of Sharia. I believe that it 
is essential to refer to this point here before displaying different points of views concerning capital 
punishment of Apostasy. The importance of such reference here stems from the fact that usually 
the rhetoric of human rights when addresses the legal framework of apostasy in Muslim countries, 
as a limitation on freedom of belief, concentrates the discussion on the question whether apostate 
deserves the death penalty or not although this sanction is no longer applied in the most of Muslim 
countries.195The proponents of this perspective consider capital punishment of apostasy in Sharia 
as the main obstacle in achieving reconciliation between the notion of religious freedom in both 
Sharia and IHRL. From their point of view, abolishing capital sanction of apostasy in Sharia is a 
plausible argument to prove that apostasy rules at all is a disputed matter in Sharia that negates 
with the principle of no compulsion in religion196 religion187and, as a result, Muslim states should 
ignore them to make their laws and judicial practice consistence with the concept of religious 
freedom as defined by IHRL. Our investigation here of apostasy consequences in Sharia has shown 
that either applying or abolishing its capital sanction could not justify regarding the whole of its 
rules and legal framework in Sharia as a disputed matter that could be abolished from the 
perspective of Sharia.  
Capital punishment for apostasy has been debated by many scholars as a main feature of the 
legal discourse concerning apostasy. Although apostates are no longer being put to death in most 
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of Muslim countries since the first half of the last century,197some modernist thinkers, jurists, and 
religious scholars challenge the traditional position of pre-modern or classic Muslim jurists and 
scholars. As was pointed out earlier, except one or two isolated opinions, there is an almost 
consensus or agreement among the main four Islamic juristic schools and the majority of Muslim 
scholars (gumhor al-fuqaha’) that apostasy is punished with death penalty. Some modern 
thinkers and jurists challenge the traditional position on apostasy and hold that the apostate 
should not be put to death on the mere ground of his apostasy. It is believed that their argument 
is inspired by their belief that capital punishment of apostasy in Sharia is the main obstacle in 
achieving reconciliation between the notion of religious freedom in both Sharia and IHRL. 
According to this approach, the whole issue should be rethought in the light of significant change 
in time and circumstances.198From their point of view, abolishing capital sanction of apostasy in 
Sharia is a plausible argument to prove that apostasy rules at all is a disputed matter in Sharia 
that negates with the principle of no compulsion in religion and, as a result, Muslim states should 
ignore them to make their laws and judicial practice consistence with the concept of religious 
freedom as defined by IHRL. In order to support their argument to be accepted by the judiciary 
and even the public, they have tried to justify it from within Sharia. Some of these arguments are 
going to be displayed here to assess their plausibility from the perspective of Sharia and to see if 
it could offer the proposed compatibility with the “international” concept of religious freedom. 
The most well-known argument in this issue is that the apostate should not be put to death on the 
mere ground of his apostasy because apostasy is mentioned in Quran in many verses without 
prescribing any temporal punishment on this act. Apostasy is mentioned in Quran as a grievous 
sin whose committer is threatened with a severe punishment in the afterlife; for instance, verse 
(2:217) states  “And whoever of you reverts from his religion [to disbelief] and dies while he is a 
disbeliever - for those, their deeds have become worthless in this world and the Hereafter, and 
those are the companions of the Fire, they will abide therein eternally.”199Some modernists 
thinkers see that capital sanction for apostasy is based upon two speeches relying on only one 
authority (khabar al-ahdd) and were not widely known among the Prophet’s 
companions;200consequently, these speeches could not be relied upon to establish a fundamental 
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principle of Islam especially that there is no evidence that the Prophet executed an apostate 
because of his apostasy.201They claim that apostasy speeches contradict with explicit Quran 
verses, like verse (2:256) which makes freedom of belief a basic right in Islam.202Another point 
of view asserts that only the apostate who revolts against Islam or constitutes a harm to the 
community should be punished with death sanction, while those who abandon Islam quietly as 
individuals do not deserve this punishment.203 194In this regard, a contemporary Islamic thinker 
Mohammed Al-Awa expresses that: 
The [death] punishment is inflicted in cases in which the apostate is a cause of harm to the 
society, while in those cases in which an individual simply changes his religion the 
punishment is not to be applied. But it must be remembered that unthreatening apostasy is 
an exceptional case, and the common thing is that apostasy is accompanied by some 
harmful actions against the society or state. A comparison between the concept of 
punishing those who commit treason in modern systems of law and those who commit 
apostasy in Islamic law would be useful.204 
 
A similar argument corelates between apostasy sanction and treason. The supporters of this idea 
contend that apostasy speeches were stated in a time when Islam constituted a socio-political 
order, and apostasy in this time did not just mean renouncing Islam but meant treason and 
joining enemies.205Accordingly, death sanction was imposed on apostates not because of their 
apostasy but because of their treason. They refer to the Prophet’s speech as an evidence, when 
He said “[t]he blood of a fellow Muslim should never be shed except in three cases: that of a 
married adulterer, the murder, and one who has abandoned his religion, while splitting himself 
off from the community.”206Other modernist thinkers also suggest that abolishing death penalty 
could be based upon the two isolated opinions of premodern jurists Ibrahim al-Nakha'I and 
Sufian al-Thawri, who oppose the mainstream position and see that the apostate should be asked 
forever to repent and not be killed.  
In this regard, there are many counter arguments that could face the mentioned opinions from the 
viewpoint of Sharia. Saying that death sanction of apostasy should be abolished basing on its 
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non-prescription in Quran contradicts with the fact that Sunnah is a primary source of norms in 
Sharia. A reasonable argument to refute this position could be that the non-prescription of capital 
punishment for apostasy in Quran does not negate its existence in Sharia because there are many 
provisions of Sharia only mentioned in Sunnah. As was pointed out earlier in this section, the 
legitimacy and the importance of Sunnah as a primary source of norms in Islam stems from 
Muslims’ belief that the Prophet Muhammad was God’s chosen messenger who understood 
God’s messages and orders better than anyone else and acted upon them in his daily life; hence, 
Sunnah is a complementary source to Quran as it explains some of its meanings and elaborates 
some provisions that are not mentioned explicitly in the Noble Book.  For example, this has been 
seen in the case of Muslim prayers as the way by which Muslims are praying is only elucidated 
in Sunnah and not Quran. Also, the reliance of apostasy speeches on one authority (khabar al-
ahdd) does not affect the authenticity of these traditions as long as the narrator is a trusted 
person, and this principle has many evidences in Sharia.207The most of apostasy speeches were 
narrated by many well-known companions of the Prophet as Othman,208Ibn Masoud, and the 
Prophet’s wife A’esha.209It is important here to refer that a well-known  pre-modern jurists like 
Al-Shafii210and some proponents of the modernist approach see that some narrators in the 
transmission chain (isnad) of some apostasy speeches are not trusted. However, such 
observations have not changed the mainstream opinion of pre-modern jurists that apostasy is 
punished with death penalty because such penalty is mentioned in other speeches even with more 
trusted transmission chains (isnad) and even with different main texts (matn). This could justify 
why Al-Shafii himself and his doctrinal school after him considers that apostasy is punished with 
death penalty depending on other more authentic speeches.211Furthermore, the assertation that 
the Prophet (pbuh) did not execute an apostate because of his apostasy as an evidence to suggest 
the non-existence of death sanction could be challenged. It is believed that all apostates who 
declared their apostasy since establishing the Islamic state in Al-Madina (a state that could 
impose sanctions) during the Prophet age escaped away; accordingly, there is no evidence in 
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Sunnah that any apostate continued to enjoy his normal life in Al-Madina after declaring his  
apostasy.212One of the most repeated arguments in this discourse that apostasy speeches 
contradict with explicit Quran verses, like verse (2:256) which makes freedom of belief a basic 
right in Islam. The contradiction between Quran and authentic Sunna traditions is not an 
acceptable idea in Sharia because it cannot exist either among Quran verses or between Quran 
and Sunnah.213It impossible to say that the Prophet (pbuh) God’s chosen messenger who 
understood God’s messages and orders better than anyone else could say speeches contradicting 
with Quran. Consequently, any belief in the existence of this contradiction is resulted from a 
misinterpretation of the interpreter according to his limited understanding to the apparent 
meanings of texts. As illustrated above, Sunnah is a complementary source to Quran as it 
explains some of its meanings and elaborates some provisions that are not mentioned explicitly 
in the Noble Book. After examining reasons for revelation of apostasy speeches and Quranic 
texts concerning religious freedom (like verse (2:256) that states “no compulsion in religion”), 
the majority of Muslim jurists have agreed upon using the rubric of takhsis al-'amm 
(specification of the general term) under Islamic legal theory or Usul al- Fiqh to specify the 
apparent generalization of the mentioned Quranic texts by apostasy speeches.214The same 
methodology has been used by Muslim jurists in deducing other provisions in Sharia even related 
to some prescribed punishments (hudud) in Quran.215Other modern jurists and some human 
rights advocates see that only the apostate who revolts against Islam, constitutes a harm to the 
community, or commits treason should be punished with death sanction, while those who 
abandon Islam quietly as individuals do not deserve death penalty. They deduced this limitation 
from their interpretation of some related speeches as I have referred above. From a juristic 
perspective such argument is not based upon any real evidence other than their interpretation, 
whereas they ignore other reported speeches (and their related incidences) in the same issue   
 
212Is it true that apostates were not punished in the era of Prophecy?, https://islamqa.info/ar/answers/277442/; 
Contra AL-ELWANY, supra note 200, at 101-105 (The author mentions apostasy incidents during the age of the 
Prophet as an evidence for the mentioned assertation; however, these incidents prove that all apostates escaped from 
Al-Madina).       
213YASSIN, supra note 167, at 117.                                                                                                                                                                      
214Id.      
215For instance, verse (5:38) states that “[As for] the thief, the male and the female, amputate their hands in 
recompense for what they committed as a deterrent [punishment] from Allah. And Allah is Exalted in Might and 
Wise.” Jurists specified the general meaning of the verse depending on some Sunnah speeches to deduce the 
minimum value of robbery and the other required conditions to impose the prescribed punishment in Quran.           
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which confirm that death penalty is directly related to the act of apostasy itself.216Also, the 
connection between apostasy and “splitting off from the community” could be understood as a 
prima facie connection between apostasy and revolting against community or religion especially 
that the apostate suffers in Sharia from a civil death. A serious weakness with this argument, 
however, is that there is no one strict definition of treason or harm according to which jurists or 
judges could judge when an apostate deserves death penalty. Accepting this point of view also 
could imply that death sanction may be abolished only in cases of non-announced (inner belief) 
apostasy; otherwise, any announced apostasy (either explicit or implicit) is susceptible to death 
penalty because it can be considered as a danger to the state especially when it is accompanied 
by calling other Muslims to follow certain thoughts that corrupt their belief. This idea transforms 
apostasy from a matter of belief in Sharia to a political issue assessed according to the political 
standards of the state or rulers. As I have referred, another opinion proposes that abolishing death 
penalty could be based upon the two isolated opinions of premodern jurists Ibrahim al-Nakha'I 
and Sufian al-Thawri, who oppose the mainstream position and see that the apostate should be 
asked forever to repent and not be killed. Some scholars find that there are some contradictions 
related to these opinions, and from a juristic perspective the consensus of the Prophet’s 
companions about the issue and their practice could not be refuted by these isolated opinions.217 
Sufian al-Thawri narrates this opinion about Ibrahim al-Nakha'I and agrees with him; however, 
the most contradicting thing concerning this opinion that it is narrated about Ibrahim al-Nakha'I, 
who also agrees with other jurists who see that apostate woman should face death penalty.218 
 
The main goal of the current analysis was to explore the framework of the act of apostasy in 
Sharia including main juristic opinions regarding it and its legal consequences. This because the 
status of apostasy within Sharia, as the main source of law in Egypt, is the original reference 
according to which apostasy is prohibited or criminalized, and its legal consequences are applied 
in the Egyptian legal system. Apostasy is punished by death penalty in Sharia. This opinion is 
held by the main four Islamic juristic schools and the majority of Muslim scholars (gumhor al-
fuqaha’). Only two isolated opinions of traditional Muslim jurists see that the apostate should be 
 
216YASSIN, supra note 167, at 139.                                                                                                                                                
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asked forever to repent and not be killed. Some jurists including Shafi’is believe that the death 
punishment for apostasy is a hadd. On the other hand, others hold the view that this punishment 
is ta’zir because it is not stated explicitly in Quran. Apostasy in Sharia entails other legal 
consequences other than death penalty. The apostate suffers in Sharia from a civil death as he is 
not allowed to inherit, marry, and dispose of his property. The apostate is also separated from his 
spouse and not allowed to choose another religion other than Islam for his children in some 
cases. These consequences are set in Sharia either because they are related to general norms or 
because apostasy is a grievous sin and prohibited act that cannot be approved or accepted from 
the perspective of Sharia.  Some modern thinkers and jurists challenge the traditional position on 
apostasy and hold that the apostate should not be put to death on the mere ground of his 
apostasy. It is believed that their argument is inspired by their belief that capital punishment of 
apostasy in Sharia is the main obstacle in achieving reconciliation between the notion of 
religious freedom in both Sharia and IHRL. According to this approach, the whole issue should 
be rethought in the light of significant change in time and circumstances. From their point of 
view, abolishing capital sanction of apostasy in Sharia is a plausible argument to prove that 
apostasy rules at all is a disputed matter in Sharia that negates with the principle of no 
compulsion in religion and, as a result, Muslim states should ignore them to make their laws and 
judicial practice consistence with the concept of religious freedom as defined by IHRL. Our 
investigation of the most prominent arguments in this issue has led us to some important 
conclusions that are to be elaborated here. Firstly, these arguments are refutable from the juristic 
point of view. Secondly, even agreeing with abolishing apostasy capital punishment will not 
change the fact that conversion from Islam is regarded as a grievous sin in Sharia. Thirdly, 
abolishing death penalty could not be accepted from a juristic perspective as a reason for 
abolishing apostasy legal consequences and regarding them as disputed matter in religion 
because they are set in Sharia, for they are related to general norms and apostasy is a grievous sin 
that could not be approved in Islam.       
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C. The Scope of Religious Freedom as Considered by International Human Rights 
Law:                                           
The legal framework of apostasy in Egypt is not only regulated according its counterpart in 
Sharia as the principal source of law in Egypt, but it is also governed and affected by the 
international obligation of the Egyptian state to ensure the consistency of its domestic laws with 
international human rights law including its definition to the right to freedom of religion. The 
source of such obligation is stipulated in Article 151 of the 1971 constitution, which states “[t]he 
President of the Republic shall conclude treaties and communicate them to the People’s 
Assembly, accompanied with suitable clarifications. They shall have the force of law after their 
conclusion, ratification and publication according to the established procedure.”219 
210Consequently, after Egypt had ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and published this ratification in the Official Gazette it has acquired the force of law in 
Egypt. Also, as was pointed out earlier in this research, the SCC has consistently confirmed 
through its official reports and publications that the constitution must be interpreted as an organic 
whole. This implies that the interpretation of any constitutional text must be consistent with all 
governing constitutional principles that are identified by the court. These principles include: the 
commitment to democracy and separation of powers, the commitment to equitable social and 
economic policies, the commitment to ensure that Egyptian law respects the “rule of law”, and 
the commitment that Egyptian law must respect the principles of Sharia. The commitment to 
ensure that Egyptian law respects the “rule of law” has been interpreted by the court to mean that 
“the government [has] to respect human rights, including ones widely recognized as fundamental 
human rights in international agreements and by constitutional courts around the world.”220 
Accordingly, the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt has been demarcated by the evident 
intention of the Egyptian state, through its legislature and judiciary, to balance between 
respecting human rights as recognized in international agreements and the full adherence to 
Sharia as the main source of law in Egypt.  Having examined the status of apostasy within Sharia 
as the original reference according to which apostasy could be criminalized and its legal 
consequences are applied in Egypt, I will now move to discuss the notion of the right to freedom 
of religion as recognized by the ICCPR. I will focus precisely on legal permissibility of the right 
to change one’s current religion with another belief under the covenant. The purpose of this part 
 
219Egyptian Constitution, supra note 54, art. 151.                                                                                                             
220LOMBARDI, supra note 34, at 150.               
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of thesis is to investigate the main features of the concept of religious freedom according to the 
ICCPR to assess its compatibility with the legal status of apostasy within Sharia. This would 
enable us to track how the state’s attempt to balance between these two competing legal orders 
has shaped the ambiguous legal status of apostasy within the Egyptian legal system.  
 
1. ICCPR’s Definition of Religious Freedom: 
 
The right to freedom of religion, conscience, and thought is a fundamental right that has been 
stipulated and confirmed by international human rights law through many of its instruments 
since the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) by the United 
Nations’ General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948.221The notion of religious freedom 
was stipulated for the first time by the United Nations in Article 18 of the UDHR which states 
“[e]very one has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance.”222Nine Muslim majority nations out of ten voted in favor of the declaration 
including Egypt despite some of their reservations about Article 18’s clause that mentions the 
right to change religion or belief.223For the same reason, Saudi Arabia abstained from the final 
vote on the declaration. Johannes Morsink refers to the Egyptian reservation in this regard when 
he states: 
In the plenary General Assembly debate, the Egyptian foreign ministry’s legal adviser, 
Wahid Fikry Raafat, noted his country’s support for the UDHR generally, but he had 
“reservations” about this right to change religion or belief. These reservations were set 
aside when Egypt supported the UDHR text as a whole.224 
 
These reservations by Muslim majority countries were early indicators that the concept of 
religious freedom as defined by IHRL will create a continuous source of controversy in these 
states due to its apparent contradiction with Sharia norms. It is believed that such 
 
221 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G. A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), available at, 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).                                                                                                                                                                      
222Id. art.18.                                                      
223JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
RELIGION (Columbia: Univ. of Mo. Press 2016), p.162.    
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contradiction results from the secular imprint of IHRL and its instruments that collides with 
any religious based laws.225While the UDHR is respectful of all existing religious beliefs, it 
abolishes and prevents any restrictions on the right to freedom of religion (according to its 
definition) that could be based upon any of these beliefs. According to what will be explained 
in our upcoming analysis of Article 18 of the ICCPR, IHRL only permits some political 
limitations that could be imposed by the state on some aspects of the right to religious 
freedom. Since the adoption of the UDHR its binding legal character has been controversial 
and such controversy urged the United Nations to develop it and establish its fundamental 
rights into a wide range of legally binding conventions like the ICCPR.226 
 
The ICCPR is considered as the only binding treaty that introduces a comprehensive articulation 
of the right to religious freedom as defined by IHRL.227The right to freedom of religion is 
emphasized in Article 18 of the ICCPR, which states that: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty 
of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral 
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.228 
 
This article defines subject, content, and limitations of religious freedom. The right to freedom of 
religion is entitled to “everyone”. This means any individual in any territory around the world 
must enjoy this right. The content of this right includes freedom from coercion to adopt a 
 
225Id. at 159.                                                                                                                                                                                         
226HANA SADIK EL-GALLAL, ISLAM AND THE WEST: THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Peter Lang AG, 
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religion or belief, liberty of parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children, 
and freedom to manifest religion or belief. The only freedom that can be limited in this right is 
freedom to manifest one’s religion. The first draft of this article was faced by reservations and 
abstentions from some Muslim and socialist states including Egypt.229This because it included 
“freedom to change one’s religion or belief” like article 18 of the UDHR. Later, this statement 
was amended to "freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one's choice."230It is believed 
that the reason for these reservations from Muslim majority countries like Saudi Arabia was 
based upon the contradiction of the mentioned clause with the principles of Islam that prohibit 
apostasy.231The reached compromise that aimed to acquire the largest number of signatory 
Muslim states to the new adopted convention at this time has raised many criticisms by human 
rights advocates and scholars who think that it has resulted in a contradiction between Article 18 
of ICCPR and Article 18 of UDHR.232According to this point of view, Article 18 of UDHR 
ensures a wider protection for religious freedom as it includes freedom to change one’s religion 
or belief, whereas Article 18 only refers to the right to freedom to have or adopt a religion or 
belief of one's choice.  
 
This supposed difference or contradiction between Article 18 of UDHR and its counterpart in 
ICCPR could be solved by arguing that freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one's 
choice under ICCPR implies freedom to change one’s religion.233The Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) held this point of view in its interpretation of the Article. The HRC is established under 
article 28 of the Covenant and it is composed of independent experts who must be nationals of 
States parties to the Covenant.234The principal mission of this committee is to monitor the 
implementation of the covenant by its state parties. It also publishes its interpretation of the 
content of human rights provisions, known as general comments. Accordingly, understanding the 
 
229 Mashood A . Baderin, Islamic Law and the Implementation of International Human Rights Law: A Case Study of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in MANISULI SSENYONJO & MASHOOD A . BADERIN, 
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M.D. dissertation, University of Toronto), at 53.                                                                                                                           
232Id. at 54.                                                                                                                                                                             
233Id.                                                                                                                                                                                                      
234
Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee, available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx.  
 
50 
scope of the freedom to change one’s religion under Article 18 of the ICCPR, for the purpose of 
this research, requires examining the official interpretation of the Article by the HRC. The 
committee interpreted Article 18 of the ICCPR in its general comment no. 22 which was adopted 
on 30 July 1993. I think that it is important here to refer that such interpretation was adopted in 
1993 after most of States parties to the covenant had signed and ratified it like Egypt that signed 
the covenant in 1967 and ratified it on 14 Jan 1982.235 This means that even regarding general 
comment no. 22 as the official obligatory interpretation of Article 18 contradicts with the fact 
that it has not existed since the adoption of the treaty in 1966 to be taken into consideration by 
signatory States. General comment no. 22 included many principles that identify the scope of the 
freedom to change one’s religion under Article 18 of the ICCPR, and they could be summarized 
in the following points: 
• The scope of protection under Article 18 includes theistic and non- theistic beliefs and 
not only limited to traditional religions.236 
• The committee insisted that the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief 
necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to 
replace one’s current religion or belief with another, and it also added that “18.2 bars 
coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the 
use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to 
adhere to their religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to 
convert.”237 
• Imposing any restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion must be prescribed by law 
for the protection of public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others. 
• Limitations on the freedom to manifest religion to protect public morals must not be 
driven from a single tradition. 
 
 
 
235Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties – Egypt, available at 
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• Any limitation on the freedom to manifest religion “must not be applied in a manner that 
would vitiate the rights guaranteed in article 18.”238 
 
• The recognition of a specific religion as a state religion that is embraced by the majority 
of the population should not impair the enjoyment of the recognized rights in this 
covenant even if this belief is treated as the official ideology in state’s constitutions and 
statutes. 
 
Having investigated the scope of the right to freedom of thought, conscience or religion and 
focusing precisely on the freedom to change one’s religion under Article 18 of the ICCPR as 
identified and interpreted by the HRC, it is important here to restate subject, content, and 
limitations of this right. Any individual in any territory around the world must enjoy this right. 
The content of this right includes freedom from coercion to adopt a religion or belief, liberty of 
parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children, and freedom to manifest 
religion or belief. The only freedom that can be limited in this right is freedom to manifest one’s 
religion. The scope of protection under Article 18 includes theistic and non- theistic beliefs; 
however, it prevents any restrictions on the right to freedom of religion that could be based upon 
any of these beliefs. The freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief necessarily entails the 
freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or 
belief with another. Accordingly, the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel 
believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs is banned under this Article. 
Imposing any restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion must be prescribed by law for the 
protection of public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others. Such restrictions or limitations based upon public morals must not be driven from a single 
tradition or applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights guaranteed in article 18. 
 
Recognizing any religion or belief as the official ideology in state’s constitutions and statutes 
should not impair the enjoyment of the recognized rights in the ICCPR.  One of the more 
significant findings to emerge from our analysis is that the covenant as an instrument of 
international human rights law adopts a secular approach to the definition of the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience, or religion. While it is respectful of all religious beliefs including theistic 
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and non- theistic beliefs, it bans any limitations on religious freedom that could be based upon 
any of these beliefs. In contrast, imposing any restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion 
must be based upon the protection of public safety, order, health or morals. The notable thing 
here is that neither the ICCPR nor the HRC comment in this regard introduced a strict or an 
obligatory definition of any of the mentioned categories. Consequently, we could say that the 
combination between emphasizing the illegality of any limitation on religious freedom that is 
driven from a single religion and the absence of any clear strict definition of public safety, order, 
health or morals according to which any state could limit freedom to manifest religion has 
offered a loophole for states parties to the covenant to breach its concept of the right. This means 
that any state could limit any aspect of the right to freedom of thought, conscience or religion as 
long as this aspect is categorized by the state as a freedom to manifest religion, which variates 
from one belief to another. Furthermore, any state party to the covenant could justify such 
limitations by the protection of public safety, order, health or morals, which have no strict 
definition. Accordingly, the secular approach of the Article has ensured that only political 
limitations could be imposed by the state on some aspects of the right to religious freedom. The 
legal framework of apostasy in Egypt is a clear manifestation of this paradigm. The case law of 
the Egyptian civil courts regarded apostasy as a part of the practice of belief that is regulated by 
the “internal order” of Islam and can be restricted on the bases of public policy.239Public policy 
is used to ground apostasy rules, which are based on Sharia principles, into the Egyptian legal 
system and to ensure their application without being stated in any statutory law.240 
2. The Egyptian Reservation in this Regard: 
 
Egypt ratified the ICCPR in 1982 after declaring that "Taking into consideration the provisions 
of the Islamic Shari'a and the fact that they do not conflict with the text [i.e. the Covenant] ... we 
accept, support and ratify it”241Although the amended statement still ensure the freedom to 
change one’s religion (as it was confirmed in the HRC comment), Egyptian government officials 
expressed that “this provision does not violate ‘the rules of Shari'a law.’”242Maurits Berger refers 
that some scholars believe that the Egyptian statement in this regard is an exception close or 
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reservation, while others interpret it as a confirmation of the consistency the ICCPR provisions 
precisely Article 18 with Sharia.243Concerning the legal effect of this kind of reservations on the 
binding nature of the ICCPR’s provisions and other human rights instruments, the HRC has 
addressed this issue in its general comment no.24. Firstly, the HRC distinguishes between 
reservations and declarations to a State’s understanding of the interpretation of a provision as the 
comment states that “If a statement, irrespective of its name or title, purports to exclude or 
modify the legal effect of a treaty in its application to the State, it constitutes a reservation. 
Conversely, if a so-called reservation merely offers a State’s understanding of a provision but 
does not exclude or modify that provision in its application to that State, it is, in reality, not a 
reservation.”244In addition, the comment insists that the covenant neither prohibits reservations 
nor mentions permitted reservations, and the absence of such prohibition does not imply the 
permission of any reservation to the covenant provisions.245Reservations under the covenant and 
its first optional protocol is governed by international law precisely Article 19(3) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.246Accordingly, the permission for any reservation 
concerning the covenant provisions is correlated with its compatibility with the object and the 
purpose of the covenant. General comment no. 24 defines the object and the purpose of the 
covenant when it states:  
The object and purpose of the Covenant is to create legally binding standards for human 
rights by defining certain civil and political rights and placing them in a framework of  
obligations which are legally binding for those States which ratify; and to provide an 
efficacious supervisory machinery for the obligations undertaken.247 
Basing on applying the “object and the purpose test”, the HRC considers that all the covenant 
provisions represent preemptory norms of customary international law and may not be subject of 
reservations. Also, after taking into consideration that there is no there is no hierarchy of 
importance of rights under the Covenant, the committee ruled that the suspension of the 
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operation of certain rights is not allowed. For instance, a State may not reserve to “deny freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion [or] to presume a person guilty unless he proves his 
innocence.”248Through applying all the mentioned standards and categorizations on the Egyptian 
statement or “reservation”, we can assess its legal consequences on its international obligation to 
ensure the protection of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as defined by 
the ICCPR, in the Egyptian territories. Thus, the Egyptian statement which states “Taking into 
consideration the provisions of the Islamic Shari'a and the fact that they do not conflict with the 
text [i.e. the Covenant] ... we accept, support and ratify it”249could not be considered as a 
reservation according to the distinction set by general comment no. 24, and it is merely a 
statement of policy or a State’s understanding of the interpretation of a provision. Even if this 
statement is considered according to some scholars as an exception close or reservation, this 
reservation could not suspend the operation of certain rights of the ICCPR in Egypt or limit 
them. This because the HRC considers that all the covenant provisions represent preemptory 
norms of customary international law and may not be subject of reservations, which negates the 
object and the purpose of the covenant. I think that it is important here to note that the Egyptian 
statement in this issue, as some scholars emphasize, indicates how Sharia as the highest source of 
law in Egypt plays a crucial role in the interpretation of the international obligations of the 
Egyptian State.250It also, “shows that Islamic Shari’a is a higher source of law in Egypt than 
international obligations and that its application is the highest legal obligation according to [the 
Egyptian constitution at this time].”251 
3. The Judicial Enforcement of this International Obligation by Egyptian Courts:  
 
While ensuring the application of constitutional provisions and their interpretation falls within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the SCC, the international treaties signed and ratified by Egypt could 
be applied by any Egyptian court or called upon by Egyptian litigants.252This stems from the fact 
that ratified international treaties acquire the force of law in Egypt after fulfilling certain 
procedures. As stated earlier in this research, such legal principle that incorporates the rules of 
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ratified international instruments within the Egyptian legal system was set by Article 151 of the 
1971 constitution, which reads “[t]he President of the Republic shall conclude treaties and 
communicate them to the People’s Assembly, accompanied with suitable clarifications. They 
shall have the force of law after their conclusion, ratification and publication according to the 
established procedure.”253The same position is emphasized in both constitutions of 2012 and 
2014 with some changes.254Consequently, it is believed that “[t]he fulfillment of some formal 
requirements is a prerequisite for the legal enforcement of these instruments, [and] the ratified 
instruments are only enforceable after their parliamentary approval and publication in the 
Official Gazette.”255Ratified international instruments including human rights treaties are 
considered as sovereign acts, which are excluded from the jurisdiction of domestic courts 
according to Article 17 of the Judicial Authority Law no 64. Year 1972.256The SCC has also 
confirmed this rule in various precedents.257On the other hand, the SCC could invalidate the 
ratification of an international treaty in the case of the non- fulfillment of the formal 
requirements of this process according to the constitution. Thus, our investigation here could 
lead us to a conclusion that the ICCPR provisions precisely Article 18 has the force of law before 
courts that have to ensure their enforcement within the Egyptian legal system. 
 
III. The Legal Framework of Apostasy in Egypt between Law and Judicial Practice: 
 
The previous analysis of the legal position of apostasy or turning away from Islam in both Sharia 
and IHRL proves that we are in front of two contradicting rulings that govern the same conduct 
in two different legal orders. From the perspective of Sharia, apostasy is a grievous sin whose 
committer predominately faces death penalty (according to the main four Islamic juristic schools 
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and the majority of Muslim scholars) and civil death. On the other hand, according to IHRL 
precisely Article 18 of the ICCPR, the protected freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief 
necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief including the right to replace one’s 
current religion or belief with another. Accordingly, the use of threat of physical force or penal 
sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs is banned under 
this Article. The enjoyment of such recognized freedom should not be impaired by the 
recognition of any religion or belief as the official ideology in state’s constitutions and statutes. 
The normative recognition of Sharia in the Egyptian constitution as the principal source of law 
imposed a constitutional obligation on the legislature and judiciary to give effect to Sharia norms 
and to ensure the consistency of all Egyptian laws with Sharia principles. As shown earlier in the 
previous chapter, the supremacy of Sharia “principles” as a source of law over all other law 
sources within the Egyptian legal system has been officially declared by the reports of 
constitution drafting committee, SCC’s decisions, and even the Egyptian statement concerning 
the ratification of the ICCPR, which indicates how Sharia “principles” as the highest source of 
law in Egypt plays a crucial role in the interpretation of the international obligations of the 
Egyptian State. Furthermore, the Egyptian state represented in its judiciary and legislature faces 
another constitutional obligation to enforce ratified international covenants like the ICCPR, 
which acquired the force of law after its conclusion, ratification and publication according to the 
established procedure. The legal framework of apostasy in Egypt reflects the political will of the 
Egyptian state to balance between these two obligations through the reconciliation between two 
contradicting legal frameworks in two different legal orders. This approach has taken place in a 
manner that ensures state’s monopoly over interpretation of both Sharia principles and its 
international obligation regarding the ICCPR’s notion of religious freedom. Such political 
approach has resulted in the current legal position of apostasy in Egypt, which has been formed 
by Egyptian legislature and judiciary. Their approach created the current ambiguous legal 
framework that, as we will see, violates the standards of religious freedom in both Sharia and 
IHRL. Egyptian statutory laws do not explicitly regulate the act of apostasy or conversion from 
Islam; rather, they regulate some of its forms like blasphemy and apply some of its legal 
consequences. The existence of some apostasy consequences within the Egyptian legal system 
has been usually criticized by the proponents of IHRL as an aspect of Sharia enforcement that    
“allows the judiciary in some cases to adopt rulings the are irrational, illogical, lacking in 
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humanity, and completely incompatible with the progress that has been achieved as a whole in 
the field of human rights.”258On the other hand, our analysis here will prove that the criticized 
rulings are direct result of a secular reconstruction of Sharia principles by the Egyptian state that 
contradict with apostasy rulings in Sharia as well. This chapter seeks to examine the legal 
framework of apostasy and to answer many questions including how did the Egyptian legal 
system through its statutes and judiciary try to balance between these constitutional obligations 
regarding the legal framework of apostasy? How did it address the contradiction between 
apostasy rulings in both Sharia and the ICCPR? Does the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt 
agree with standards of religious freedom in Sharia and the ICCPR? By which reasoning could 
Egyptian courts reach their established jurisprudence in this regard? this chapter will examine all 
apostasy and religious freedom related articles in different law fields, and in the light of codified 
law we will understand how Egyptian judiciary has applied and interpreted Egyptian statutory 
laws to establish its jurisprudence and rulings concerning apostasy related cases. Afterwards, I 
will focus on explaining the role of the concept of public policy as a key factor in defining the 
scope of religious freedom by the Egyptian judiciary and how it has been used to ground some 
apostasy consequences into the Egyptian legal system and ensure their application without being 
stated in any statutory law.  
 
Before starting our Investigation of the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt, I think it is 
important to refer to one of the most impressive literature in this regard. In his article Apostasy 
and Public Policy in Contemporary Egypt: An Evaluation of Recent Cases from Egypt's Highest 
Courts, Maurits S. Berger introduces a critical analysis of the legal situation of apostasy in 
Egypt. Berger points out that the abandonment of Islam in Egypt is sub divided into the act of 
apostasy and its legal consequences. From his point of view, apostasy enjoys a limbo status in 
Egypt because Egyptian statutory law does not make any reference to apostasy or to its 
punishment like in Islamic law. Berger argues that “both the act of apostasy as well as its 
consequences, which are two entirely different issues, and their relation to the freedom of 
religion can be understood more clearly in light of the concept of public policy.”259He based his 
argument on the evaluation of case law of the highest civil courts in Egypt including the Court of 
 
258DUPRET ET AL., supra note 10, at 219.                                                                                                                                   
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cassation, the Administrative courts of the State Council, and the SCC regarding apostasy and 
religious freedom. His research focuses only on personal status cases related to apostasy and 
judicial decision of apex courts that defines religious freedom and its relation to the concept of 
public policy. Such research does not include any cases do not deal with apostasy in terms of 
conversion per se except Abu Zayd’s case. Berger considers that the legal side of apostasy 
manifests itself solely in the realm of Egyptian Muslim personal status.260In addition, he asserts 
that Egyptian highest courts have used public policy to ground apostasy legal consequences into 
the Egyptian legal system for two reasons “a) because these rules were based on essential 
principles of the Islamic Shari'a, and b) to ascertain their applicability in light of a lack of any 
statutory rules.”261Berger refers that In Abu Zayd case (that will be discussed in this research) the 
Court of Cassation adopted a different approach through using public policy as a mean to protect 
Islam and society fundamentals The introduced analysis of the case law of the three highest 
Egyptian civil courts concludes that apostasy in the courts' definition does not pertain to a 
freedom of belief, but to the practice of a belief which is left to the internal order of that 
particular religion, and related to public policy. It also, assumes that there is a blatant 
contradiction between, on the one hand, the prohibition of apostasy and, on the other hand, the 
constitutional guarantee of "freedom of belief" and similar provisions in the IHRL instruments to 
which Egypt has committed itself.262Berger believes that such violation of human rights is not 
caused by the political atmosphere like most violations of human right in Muslim countries; 
rather, he argues that “this political dimension is absent in the particular case of apostasy in 
Egypt: we are dealing with a sound rule of Islamic law that has been upheld for many decennia 
by a judiciary that generally is recognized as independent.”263He reasoned this by assuming that 
power struggle between Muslim jurists and apex courts in Egypt over the monopoly on 
authoritative interpretation of Islamic law has pushed these courts, which are secular courts with 
a long-standing reputation of neutrality and non-partiality, to adopt a conservative position with 
regard to Islamic law precisely the prohibition of apostasy. Through this approach only these 
courts could win the monopoly on authoritative interpretation of Sharia.264 
 
260Id. at 722. 
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The current study introduces a wider view of the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt to end up 
with supporting some Berger’s arguments and challenging some of his conclusions. Through our 
analysis we could see how the non-categorization of apostasy in codified laws has resulted in its 
legal ambiguous status in Egypt. As Berger refers, only the legal consequences of apostasy rather 
than the act itself plays a role in Egyptian case law.265The legal enforcement of some apostasy 
consequences in Egypt and its relation to religious freedom could be understood more clearly in 
light of the concept of public policy according to the caselaw of apex courts. This research will 
illustrate how these courts have used this concept to ground the application of some apostasy 
consequences through categorizing apostasy under the practice of a belief which is left to the 
internal order of that particular religion, and related to public policy. Such consequences are 
considered as violation of the concept of religious freedom as defined by the ICCPR. On the 
other hand, this research does not limit the investigation of the legal side of apostasy in Egypt to 
the realm of Egyptian Muslim personal status because renouncing Islam in Egypt could result in 
other legal consequences in other law fields in Egypt like criminal law and administrative law 
fields. Consequently, our analysis will also include some aspects of judicial practice that does not 
deal with apostasy in terms of conversion like blasphemy cases in criminal law domain. 
Examining a variety of judicial decision concerning apostasy will illustrate that grounding the 
enforcement of some apostasy legal consequences has been practiced by some courts under some 
legal regulations other than the concept of public policy. For instance, the Court of Cassation and 
some lower personal status courts ground their application of some apostasy legal consequences 
on personal status matters basing on Article 3 of the Egyptian Personal Status law. Furthermore, 
public policy was invoked by some courts to reason the recognition of the abandonment of Islam 
in identity cards. The main argument of this research contradicts with Berger’s conclusion that 
the political dimension is absent in the particular case of apostasy, and that Egyptian secular 
courts adopted a conservative position regarding the prohibition of apostasy. In contrast, this 
paper argues that the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt is a manifestation of secular 
reconstruction of Sharia by a modern state through its judiciary.  
 
265Id. at 720. 
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A. Examining the Legal Framework of Apostasy in Egypt: 
The fact that Egyptian codified laws do not regulate the act of apostasy or impose its legal 
consequences in explicit and definite law articles has made its legal framework in Egypt 
characterized by ambiguity and fragmentation.266Ambiguity is manifested in the legal approach 
of the Egyptian state that avoided to make any formal reference to apostasy regulating rules and 
consequences through its constitutions or law codes. Such avoidance stems from the State 
awareness that imposing any legal limitation on conversion from one religion to another would 
be regarded as an obvious breach of the notion of religious freedom as defined by IHRL and, as a 
result, it would be considered by international community as a breach of its international 
obligations towards IHRL. The fragmentation of apostasy rules within the Egyptian legal system 
means that committing the act of conversion from Islam to any other belief entails its legal 
consequences in different law fields like administrative law, criminal law, and personal status 
law. Our analysis here could prove that the Egyptian state through its legislature and judiciary 
has maintained its approach regarding constitutional Islamization or Islamism to shape the legal 
framework of apostasy in Egypt. Creating an ambiguous legal framework to replace the need for 
a clear codified regulation resulted from a clear political decision by legislature to ensure the 
state control over the process. The intended closure of such a political process has promoted the 
role of litigation as an alternative process. Similar to the adopted methodology of interpreting 
Sharia “principles” in constitutional Article 2, the state judiciary has a flexible position in 
interpreting Sharia norms concerning apostasy and choosing which of these norms could be 
incorporated within the Egyptian legal system and which could not from the perspective of the 
state or “judges”.267The Egyptian judiciary in this case is not restricted by any obligatory 
religious interpretation by Al-Azhar or any other institution unlike the case of interpreting IHRL, 
where the state is accounted by international community according to the prescribed 
 
266
I would like to refer here that using the expression of fragmentation to describe the position of apostasy rules 
within the Egyptian legal system is borrowed from Yara Nassar’s thesis in this issue. It was one from other 
important readings that inspired choosing the topic of this paper due to their direct contradiction to the writer’s point 
of view. See generally Nassar, supra note 205.  
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The assumption in this paper that judicial decisions defining and interpreting Sharia related norms usually reflect 
the point of view of the executive is based on the fact that the justices of apex courts in Egypt (like the SCC) are 
appointed by a decree from the President of the Republic, and it will be supported by the upcoming analysis of 
Egyptian courts approach in shaping apostasy consequences in Egypt. Such assumption does not negate the 
existence of any aspect of judicial independence in Egypt, which is supported by various striking judicial decisions 
in different law fields.  
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interpretation of religious freedom that I have explained earlier. Accordingly, this flexible 
position helps judges to at least formulate their verdicts in a manner that is consistent with the 
state formal obligations to apply Sharia principles and respect IHRL.   
1. Religious Freedom and the Egyptian Constitution: 
As stated earlier in this research, the absence of an explicit regulation of apostasy has always 
made the Egyptian constitutions have a direct rule in shaping the legal framework of apostasy in 
Egypt. This because the absence of apostasy in the codified laws drives Egyptian courts to 
interpret constitutional provisions regarding Sharia and religious freedom to make their decisions 
on apostasy related cases. Chapter one of this paper introduced a detailed examination of the 
status of Sharia in the 1971 constitution as Egypt’s most enduring constitution that shaped the 
legal situation of Sharia and, consequently, apostasy case law for more than forty years. Now, we 
have to understand status of religious freedom according to this constitution. Article 46 of the 
1971 constitution reads “[t]he State shall guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of 
practice of religious rites”268The Supreme Court defined the scope of religious freedom in a 
landmark case in 1975 as El Fegiery refers that:  
The Court upheld that freedom of religion is not absolute and that the manifestation of 
religious beliefs must be subject to and considered in relation to public order, morals and 
values. The Court pointed out that Islamic Shari‘a and its principles are constitutive 
elements of public order and that under this the constitutional right of freedom of religion  
can be restricted.269 
 
This judicial decision has been cited by many Egyptian courts including the SCC, which added 
in one of its decisions that “freedom of belief is absolute, while the practice of beliefs may be 
subject to restrictions based on public order, morals and the protection of rights and reputation of 
others.”270These decisions show that the manifestation of beliefs or the practice of belief is the 
only aspect of religious freedom that is subject to restrictions based on public order, morals, and 
values. This stable interpretation of the scope of religious freedom in the Egyptian constitution of 
1971 could lead us to three main observations; firstly, it apparently agrees with the notion of 
religious freedom as defined by the ICCPR as it only restricts freedom to practice belief as long 
as these restrictions are based upon public order, morals or values. Secondly, it used the 
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ambiguity that blurred the ICCPR’s definition of religious freedom to gain a more flexible 
position in defining the scope of religious freedom in Egypt. According to what this paper 
referred previously, neither the ICCPR nor the HRC comment in this regard introduced a strict or 
an obligatory definition of both the categories of public order and freedom to practice belief. 
Consequently, we could say that the combination between emphasizing the illegality of any 
limitation on religious freedom that is driven from a single religion and the absence of any clear 
strict definition of public safety, order, health or morals according to which any state could limit 
freedom to manifest religion has offered a loophole for states parties to the covenant to breach its 
concept of the right. This means that any state could limit any aspect of the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience or religion as long as this aspect is categorized by the state as a freedom to 
manifest religion, which variates from one belief to another. Furthermore, any state party to the 
covenant could justify such limitations by the protection of public safety, order, health or morals, 
which have no strict definition. The next two sections of this chapter will show us how Egyptian 
judiciary has defined public policy and freedom to manifest religion to legitimize and impose 
some legal consequences of apostasy in the Egyptian legal system. The third observation is that 
the Supreme Court and the SCC after it used Sharia principles (as defined by them), which has 
no definite meaning in the constitution, under the cover of public order to base some restrictions 
on freedom to manifest one’s belief. Again, we can understand here how the Egyptian State 
through its constitutional judiciary has controlled “the terms of the game” through its exclusive 
power to define different vague terms like Sharia principles, public policy (al nizam al amm), 
and freedom to practice belief. The upcoming analysis of the main features of apostasy related 
case law will reflect how constitutional or legal vagueness of these terms lend judiciary more 
flexibility in defining apostasy consequences in Egypt. Accordingly, resorting the current legal 
position of apostasy in Egypt simply to the role of Sharia as the main source of law in Egypt 
reflects a superficial understanding of this legal situation.  
2. Apostasy in the Egyptian Penal Code: 
 
a. Examining Apostasy Related Articles in the Penal code: 
 
The Egyptian penal code does not regulate the act of apostasy directly; however, it includes some 
articles that deal with some offences against religion. Although these articles are not limited to 
protect Islam only, they have been used as the legal base to charge Muslim apostates or converts 
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especially when their apostasy is accompanied with any of the criminalized offences like 
blasphemy.271This does not negate that they also have been used to charge non-Muslims if they 
commit such stated offences against any heavenly religion. Egypt’s main blasphemy law is found 
in Article 98(f) of the Egyptian penal code, which also includes other Articles that criminalize 
different forms of religious insult. They include Articles 160 and 161. I will start by and focus on 
investigating Article 98(f) because it is the main Article which has been used to charge Muslim 
apostates in front of criminal courts. Article 98(f) reads:  
 Detention for a period of not less than six months and not exceeding five years, or paying 
a fine of not less than five hundred pounds and not exceeding one thousand pounds shall 
be the penalty inflicted on whoever exploits and uses the religion in advocating and 
propagating by talk or in writing, or by any other method, extremist thoughts with the aim 
of instigating sedition and division or disdaining and contempting any of the heavenly 
religions or the sects belonging thereto, or prejudicing national unity or social peace.272 
 
Many important observations concerning the statement of this Article Should be highlighted for 
the purpose of our analysis here. Article 9(f) does not refer to apostasy from Islam or conversion 
from other heavenly religions as a form of acts that are considered by their nature as disdaining 
and contempting of these religions. The scope of protection under this Article is limited to 
heavenly religions (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism). Egyptian legislature has continued to adopt 
the same approach to formatting religious related articles, which is using vague expressions and 
terms like “national unity” and “social peace” (that was omitted later) to ensure a wide range of 
flexibility for judicial interpretations. The legislature also used these vague, secular or non-
religious terms to ensure the apparent consistency of the Article with the ICCPR’s notion of 
religious freedom. Finally, Article 98(f) categorized blasphemy as a misdemeanor whose 
committer face detention or pay a fine. 
The comparison between the criminalization of blasphemy under Article 98(f), as the legal base 
to charge Muslim apostates and Egypt’s main blasphemy law, with the legal or juristic position 
of apostasy according to Sharia reveals many contradictions between both. The previous 
examination of the juristic status of apostasy under Sharia demonstrates that the act of turning 
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away from Islam has different forms which are classified in three main categories: utterance 
related, action related, and belief related. In Sharia, blasphemy is a synonym for the serious 
offence of using of foul language with regard to God, the Prophet, the angles, other Prophets, and 
the Companions of the Prophet. As I referred before, depending on certain reported incidents in 
the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) mentioned in the hadith literature, the majority of 
Muslim jurists consider blasphemy as a form of apostasy that entails death penalty.273On the 
other hand, some jurists regard the committers of these offence as Muslims who deserve death 
penalty.274Consequently, we could comprehend how Article 98(f) does not represent a legal 
regulation based upon a juristic position in Sharia, but in contrast, it’s a secular legal regulation 
of a criminalized act by the state that contrasts with its juristic description in Sharia. Such 
contradiction is manifested in many aspects. For instance, insulting God, the prophet or the 
religion is a grievous sin in Sharia and punished by death penalty, while the discussed Article 
categorizes it as a misdemeanor whose perpetrator is punished by either detention or fine. 
Moreover, Article 98(f) does not refer to any Islamic juristic source as a base for its rulings; 
rather, I think that it only reflects a quick legal interference by a modern state to suppress any 
public speech or writing that may lead to sectarian clashes in the future.275 
 
On the other hand, Article 98(f) has been usually criticized by human rights organizations and 
advocates as an unjustified and unconstitutional limitation on freedoms of expression and belief 
that is incompatible with international human rights standards. In its 2010 special report, 
Freedom House described Egypt’s blasphemy and religious insult laws, including Article 98(f), 
as “incompatible with international human rights standards [because] they place serious and 
unjustified limitations on freedom of expression and freedom of religion, and have a broad and 
negative impact on the enjoyment of other human rights.”276The report refereed that the 
broadness and vagueness of Article 98(f) terms have made it a tool for “settling personal or 
political scores; silencing regime critics, human rights defenders, and opposition parties; and 
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275This assumption is supported by the fact that Article 98(f) was promulgated according to law no.29 of 1982 that 
enacted after the bloody sectarian violence happened in El Zawya Al Hamra in Cairo and resulted in the death of 
tens of citizens 
276FREEDOM HOUSE, POLICING BELIEF: THE IMPACT OF BLASPHEMY LAWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2010), available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/policing-belief-impact-blasphemy-laws-human-rights. [accessed 10 
March 2019].                                                                                                                                                                              
 
65 
targeting vulnerable groups like homosexuals.”277Amnesty International had also confirmed this 
in its year 2000 report titled Egypt: Muzzling Civil Society when it emphasized that:  
Amnesty International believes that Article 98 (f) of the penal code . . . is vaguely worded 
and has been abused in such a way as to allow for the imprisonment of prisoners of 
conscience. Some defendants have been sentenced for the publication of materials 
discussing religious issues, whilst others have been imprisoned because their religious 
practice has been considered a criminal offence. Over the last two years at least 30 people 
have been brought to trial under charges based on Article 98 (f) for “exploiting religion 
for extremist ideas”, though none of these defendants has used or advocated the use of 
violence.278 
Other human rights organizations pointed out that religious related Articles in the Egyptian penal 
code have been used to suppress any differing interpretations of Islam; for instance, the Becket 
Fund for Religious Liberty in one of its published submissions mentioned that “Articles 98(f), 
160, 161, 176, and 178 of the Penal Code are consistently used against individuals who engage 
in peaceful debate about religion.”279The Egyptian Initiative for Personal rights through one of 
its released reports in 2016 argued for the unconstitutionality of Article 98(f) because it does not 
agree with the required constitutional standards of drafting penal law articles.280The Article does 
not state explicitly the criminalized acts and their composing elements, but instead it includes 
vague and broad terms.281Some of the mentioned reports refereed that the abuse of the discussed 
Article has been promoted by the practice of Egyptian courts. Freedom House report pointed out 
that the 1966 ruling of the Court of Cassation which allowed to convict individuals basing on 
Hisba principle promoted the abuse of Article 98(f).282Hisba is “[t]he Islamic legal principle 
[that] basically gave citizens, which would be regularly considered to have no personal interest 
in the case, the right to file cases against others in the name of protecting the right of God or the 
essential elements of the Islamic Faith.”283The report added that the procedural  permission of 
this principle resulted in the prosecution of dozens of Egyptian academics and intellectuals 
during 1980s and 1990s and they were convicted of blasphemy as a result of Hisba suits.284In 
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1996 the Egyptian parliament limited the use of Hisba suits by enacting a law that “prohibits 
hisba claims from reaching court unless they are first deemed valid by a prosecutor.”285 
Furthermore, some human rights organizations consider that enforcing blasphemy and religious 
insult articles of the Egyptian penal code as an illegitimate restriction on freedom of 
expression.286According to their point of view, this because they have been applied for 
prepublication censorship to ban many religious related books and charge their authors of 
blasphemy. Recently, such censorship expanded to include internet blogs.287Article 98(f) has 
been criticized as a discriminatory Article because the scope of protection under it is limited to 
heavenly religions (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism), while “[u]nrecognized minority religious 
groups such as the Baha’i and Ahmadiyya . . .  are not protected and are disproportionately 
affected by the law.”288Human rights proponents see another feature of its discriminatory effects 
is promoted by judicial practices and decisions that use Article 98(f) to punish Muslims who 
convert to another belief and violate their right to change their religion. 
 
The Egyptian penal code includes other Articles that criminalize different forms of religious 
insult and some acts that are considered as assault on religious rituals. Article 160 reads: 
A penalty of detention and paying a fine of not less than one hundred pounds and not 
exceeding five hundred pounds or either penalty shall be inflicted on the following: First: 
Whoever perturbs the holding of rituals of a creed or a related religious ceremony or 
obstructs it with violence or threat. Second: Whoever ravages, breaks, destroys, or 
violates the sanctity of buildings provided for holding religious ceremonies, symbols or 
other objects having their profound reverence and sanctity in relation to the members of a 
creed or a group of people.289 
Also, Article 161criminalizes other forms of religious insult that aim to disdain religious 
celebrations. It states that: 
These penalties shall be imposed on any encroachment that takes place by one of the 
methods prescribed in Article 171, on a religion whose rituals are publicly held. The 
following shall fall under the provisions of this Article: First: Printing and publishing a 
book which is viewed as holy by members of a religion whose rituals are publicly held, if 
a text of this book is perverted in a way that changes its meaning. Second: Imitating a 
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religious celebration in a public place or public community, with the aim of ridicule, or 
for the attendants to watch.290 
 
One of the more significant findings to emerge from our analysis here is that there is no explicit 
regulation or criminalization of the act of apostasy or conversion from Islam through the 
Egyptian penal code. However, this code includes some articles that deal with some forms of this 
act like religious insult and blasphemy. None of them refer to apostasy from Islam or conversion 
from other heavenly religions as a form of acts that are considered according to their nature as 
disdaining and contempting of these religions. Egypt’s main blasphemy law is found in Article 
98(f) that has been used as the legal base to charge Muslim apostates or converts especially when 
their apostasy is accompanied with any of the criminalized offences like blasphemy. It does not 
state explicitly the criminalized acts and their composing elements, but instead it includes vague 
and broad terms. This article represents the adopted secular (non-religious based) approach by 
the Egyptian state to deal with some religious related crimes that contradicts with the legal 
position of apostasy and the standards of religious freedom in both Sharia and IHRL.  
b. Criminal Courts’ Approach to Blasphemy Related Cases: 
 
Before investigating the judicial practice of Egyptian criminal courts regarding blasphemy cases 
and the practice of other Egyptian courts regarding apostasy related cases, it is important to 
understand the structure of the Egyptian court system. The structure of the Egyptian court system 
is established in a pyramidal form.291At the top of this pyramid is the Supreme Constitutional 
Court whose jurisdiction includes interpreting constitutional provisions, reviewing the 
constitutionality of laws and regulations, settling the conflicts on competence between judicial 
bodies, and interpreting laws and regulations that have the force of law.292Under the SCC the 
Egyptian court system is divided into two parallel systems: common or general justice court 
system and administrative justice court system. The jurisdiction of general court system includes 
civil, criminal, commercial, and personal status matters.293It has three basic levels: Courts of 
First Instance, Courts of Appeal, and the Court of Cassation. The Courts of First Instance 
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include: Summary Courts (mahkaim juz’iaa), Elementary Courts (mahakim ibtda’iya), and 
Plenary Courts (mahakim kullya). Each of these courts has its prescribed competence and 
composition.294Appeals against Summary Courts’ judgments are raised before Courts of First 
Instance, while appeals against the decisions of First Instance Courts are placed before the 
Courts of Appeal. Courts of Appeal (mahakim al-isti’naf) are divided into two chambers civil 
chamber and criminal chamber. The civil one hears appeals for plenary courts’ judgments, and 
the criminal chamber that is called criminal court (mahkamit al-jinayat) has competence to 
decide on felonies. The rulings of Courts of Appeal, except that of death penalty, are not subject 
to appeal before the Court of Cassation concerning the facts of the decided cases. The Court of 
Cassation is the supreme court of Egypt’s common court system its main function is summarized 
in the following paragraph: 
Its [mission] is to control the judgments of the Courts of Appeal following a motion for 
cassation introduced by any interested party, including the public prosecutor. The motion 
must be founded on an error of law which would have been committed by the lower 
court. The allegations can be the misapplication or misinterpretation of law, irregularity 
in the language of the judgement or procedural errors. The control of the Court of 
Cassation only bears on these questions and not on the facts.295 
 
The administrative justice court system, which is adopted from the French legal tradition, is 
headed by the State Council (majlis al-dawla) that represents the entire administrative court 
system in Egypt. According to its prescribed competence by constitution and law, the State 
Council has an exclusive jurisdiction to take decisions in administrative disputes, disciplinary 
cases and appeals, and disputes pertaining to its decisions. It consists of two sections; the first 
one is the legislative advisory section, which is responsible for giving legal opinion on draft 
laws, draft regulations, and actions practiced by the government or any public entity.296The 
second section is the judiciary section. It is structured in three levels of judicial jurisdiction that 
includes: administrative courts and disciplinary courts (first instance courts), Court of 
Administrative Justice (appeals court), Supreme Administrative Court (apex court).297 
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According to the limited scope of the current research, this subsection is not going to introduce a 
full survey of all blasphemy related cases, but it will focus on examining some significant 
judgments that could enable us to understand how Egyptian judiciary defines the elements of 
blasphemy crime in the light of its vague definition in the penal code. It is significant here to take 
into our consideration that in most decisions of blasphemy cases there is no direct reference to 
the position of apostasy or blasphemy in Sharia because the concerned court only focuses on 
applying blasphemy provisions in the penal code. This judicial approach is consistent with the 
legal drafting of blasphemy articles that do not refer to any Islamic juristic source as a base for 
its rulings and only reflect a quick legal interference by a modern state to suppress any public 
speech or writing that may lead to sectarian clashes. Accordingly, in most of blasphemy cases 
the defendant could be brought to the court because of his blasphemous statements that evoked 
public outrage and could constitute a grievous sin according to Sharia, while the court tries him 
for committing blasphemy misdemeanor. Some researches refers that only the office of the 
Public Prosecutor can file blasphemy cases basing on Article one of the Egyptian Criminal 
Procedures law which rules that criminal lawsuits could be filed only through Public 
Prosecutor’s office except in cases provided by law.298However, blasphemy cases like other 
cases of misdemeanors and petty offences could be referred to the court directly by the civil 
rights plaintiff according to Article 232 of the same law.299This explains the situations when 
some writers, actors, etc. were brought to courts to face blasphemy accusations in cases filed by 
normal people. 
 
In one of its rulings dated 7 January 1996 on the appeal no. 41774, the Court of Cassation 
defined the constituting elements of blasphemy crime which is stated in Article 98(f) of the 
Egyptian penal code.300The facts of the case could be summarized as follows: according to the 
speeches of both the plaintiff and his father the defendant used a razor to make the sign of the 
cross on the plaintiff’s right hand and threatened him to make the same sign using electricity. He 
also promised the defendant to give him some money if he converted to Christianity. The 
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299The Egyptian Criminal Procedures Code, No.150 of 1950, available at: https://egyptjustice.com/criminal-law. 
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defendant filed an appeal before the Court of Cassation against the conviction ruling of the first 
instance court and the appeal court according to which he was sentenced to detention for one 
year under Article 98(f) of the penal code. As a fulfillment of its prescribed competence to 
review law application by lower courts, the Court of Cassation reversed the ruling of lower 
courts on this case. The court see that the rulings of lower courts did not prove that the criminal 
incident satisfy the elements of blasphemy crime. The court reasoned its decision and defined the 
elements of blasphemy crime as follows: 
According to Article 310 of the Criminal Procedures law any conviction ruling should 
include a clear statement of the criminal incident that entails the decided punishment . . . 
it is not enough to make a passing reference to such incident, but the ruling should narrate 
the significance of each evidence in a comprehensive manner elucidates its support for 
the whole criminal incident and its consistency with other facts. . . the crime of exploiting 
and using religion in propagating extremist thoughts, which is stated in Article 98(f) of 
the Penal code, requires to be exist the presence of a materialistic aspect [the criminal act] 
which is exploiting and using religion in advocating and propagating by talk or in writing 
or by any other method, extremist thoughts, and the presence of a moral aspect [criminal 
intent] that the perpetrator must aim through his acts to instigate sedition and division or 
to disdain and contempt any of the heavenly religions or the sects belonging thereto or 
prejudicing national unity or social peace.301 
 
In another blasphemy case in 2012, a plaintiff brought an action in the Agouza Summary Court 
of First instance (mahkamit al-ajuza al-juza’ya) demanding the punishment of the Egyptian actor 
Adel Emam and others according to Article 98(f) of the Egyptian Penal code accusing them of 
insulting Islam and Muslims by exploiting religion in their work (movies and plays) to promote 
extremist ideas; with the aim of provoking strife, contempting Islam in general and Islamic 
political groups in particular.302After reviewing the case facts the court dismissed both criminal 
and civil actions on the grounds that the case facts and incidents do not represent a criminal act at 
all. Although the court dismissed both criminal and civil actions, its reasoning behind the 
decision could reflect the secular approach of the judiciary in defining blasphemy and even 
apostasy consequences within Egyptian legal system. In this ruling the judge explains that the 
court as a part of the Egyptian legal system, which belongs to civil law systems, is not restricted 
in its reasoning by precedent case law. The court refers that in contrast to common law systems, 
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the court’s obligation to follow precedent case law could only represent a moral obligation rather 
than a constitutional or legal obligation. This assumption is based on the ruling of Article 1 of the 
Egyptian Civil code no. 131 of the year 1948 that mentions sources from which judges should 
deduce legal rules if there is no law provision governing the reviewed case or issue, and they do 
not include precedent case law: 
1.Legislative texts shall apply to all matters dealt with in these texts in their explicit 
language or in their content.  
 
2. If there is no legislative text to be applied, the judge shall rule by custom, if there is no, 
under the principles of Islamic law, if it does not exist, in accordance with the principles 
of natural law and the rules of justice.303 
 
Accordingly, depending on its interpretation authority, the court believes that Article 98(f) aims 
to protect national unity and social peace not heavenly religions or their sects.304Thus, 
committing blasphemy crime under Article 98(f) requires the existence of a criminal intent to  
prejudice national unity or social peace and instigate sedition.305Through this ruling the court 
emphasizes that its “role is to interpret the codified law itself, article 98 (f), and not Islamic 
Shari’a.”306Also, the judge adds that: 
if the perpetrator aimed to obstruct the holding of rituals of a religion, the legislature 
could intervene to criminalize such acts under Articles 160 and 161; but whoever has 
another opinion should refer to an evidence either from Quran or Sunnah because 
contempting religion is not punished by hadd or qisas in Sharia as verse (5:105) states 
that “ O you who have believed, upon you is [responsibility for] yourselves. Those who 
have gone astray will not harm you when you have been guided. To Allah is you return  
all together; then He will inform you of what you used to do.”307 
 
Despite the court’s emphasis on its role to interpret codified law precisely blasphemy related 
provisions in the penal code and not Sharia, the ruling introduces the court’s understanding of the 
concept of religious freedom in Sharia to support its adopted interpretation. According to this 
interpretation, the notion of religious freedom in Sharia is based upon the principle of no 
compulsion in religion; thus, this means that there is no compulsion to follow or embrace an 
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orthodox religious though. There is no prohibition against criticizing any religious thought, and 
this does not contradict with saying that there is a punishment for apostates in Sharia.308 292In 
accordance with some modernist thinkers who challenge the traditional position of pre-modern 
or classic Muslim jurists and scholars regarding apostasy, the judge adopted some of their 
arguments (that was discussed  and refuted previously in this paper) to support his understanding 
of religious freedom in Sharia. For instance, the judge argues that the apostate should not be put 
to death on the mere ground of his apostasy because apostasy is mentioned in Quran in many 
verses without prescribing any temporal punishment on this act. Apostasy is mentioned in Quran 
as a grievous sin whose committer is threatened with a severe punishment in the afterlife. The 
judgment refers that there is an almost consensus or agreement among the main four Islamic 
juristic schools and the majority of Muslim scholars (gumhor al-fuqaha’) that apostasy is 
punished with death penalty; however, the court concurs with some modernist opinions 
considering apostasy capital punishment as a political sanction, and as a result, an apostate 
should not be killed for his mere apostasy except if this act was followed by a harm to the 
community or the state. The judge assumes like some modernist thinkers that capital sanction for 
apostasy is based upon a speech relying on only one authority (khabar al-ahdd) "whoever 
changes his religion, then kill him.”; consequently, according to this assumption, this speech 
could not be relied upon to establish a fundamental principle of Islam because there is a juristic 
rule in Usul Al- fiqh considers single narrated speeches as a non-authoritative source from which 
juristic or legal rules could be deduced in Sharia.309The court believes that its interpretation of 
Article 98(f) is consistent with one of recent fatwas issued by the Grand Mufti of Egypt at this 
time which rules that the apostate should be asked forever to repent and not be killed. 
Furthermore, from its perspective this interpretation is also consistent with the ICCPR’s 
definition of religious freedom.  
 
On the 28th of December 2015 South Cairo Elementary Court issued an important ruling on the 
case no. 21078.310In this case the court reviewed the appeal of the ruling issued by a first 
instance court (Misr Al-kadima Misdemeanors Court) on a blasphemy case. The defendant 
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brought the appeal to South Cairo Elementary Court after he was sentenced to five years of 
detention as a punishment for blasphemy crime. This case acquired its fame in the media in 
Egypt because it is related to media censorship. The defendant is a TV program presenter called 
Islam Bahery, and he was brought to the court basing on his opinions and sayings that he 
expressed through a TV program called “With Islam Bahery” and his social media 
accounts.311The plaintiffs brought an action in Misr Al-kadima Misdemeanors Court demanding 
the punishment of the defendant according to Articles 98(f), 160, and 161of the Egyptian Penal 
code accusing him of insulting Islam and Muslims through exploiting religion in his TV program 
aiming to instigating sedition and disdaining Islam in general. They added in their plea that the 
defendant aimed to disdain Imams, jurists, scholars, and followers in particular, who carried the 
burden of transferring the Prophet’s sunnah to us through a unique scientific methodology. 
Consequently, they consider that his approach leads to prejudicing national unity and social 
peace.312South Cairo Elementary Court refers that its ruling on this appeal is guided by the Court 
of Cassation’s definition of the constituting elements of blasphemy crime on the appeal no. 
41774 (that was examined previously) and also its decision on the appeal no. 653 which states: 
Saying that freedom of belief is guaranteed according to the constitution does not allow 
to any person argues against the axiomatic articles of any religion to intentionally disdain 
or contempt this religion. If it became apparent that these arguments intended to prejudice 
the sanctity of a religion, it could not be protected under the cover of religious freedom. 
The existence of the moral aspect [of blasphemy crime] – like in all crimes- could be 
concluded by the court through the facts of the case. It is not required in this case that the 
conviction ruling includes explicit statements of the convict to prove his criminal intent, 
but it is sufficient that his statements and speeches as whole could prove his intention.313 
 
After reviewing the case facts, the court confirmed the accusations of the plaintiffs against the 
defendant. The ruling explains that the court reached its decision through its belief that the 
criminal incident satisfy the elements of blasphemy crime. The ruling states that the defendant 
speeches through his television program constitutes the materialistic aspect of blasphemy crime 
(exploiting and using religion in advocating and propagating by talk or by any other method 
extremist thoughts), and they include the following opinions: 
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• He stated that jurists and scholars the authors of tradition (juristic) books did not 
construct a valid science, but in contrast their writings represent backwardness, deviance 
and racism.  
• He described the science of hadith as a trivial science; accordingly, he believes that every 
Muslim should judge any hadith according to his thinking and could refuse it even if it is 
authentic. 
• He described the four Imams (the founders of the main Sunni doctrinal legal schools in 
Islamic law: Abu Hanifa, Malik, Al-Shafii, and Ebn Hanbal) as corrupt and terrorists who 
should be killed. 
• He said that the Islamic tradition is rubbish.  
• He described the ruling of adultery punishment in Quran and its conditions as fool 
speech.314 
Concerning the fulfilment of the moral aspect of blasphemy crime in the discussed incidents, the 
court refers that “after reviewing the case facts and watching the related videos it concluded that 
the convict intended through his speeches and writings to instigate sedition by disdaining Islam 
to prejudice national unity.”315This criminal intent is manifested in his insulting statements and 
extremist methodology that he used to present his opinions to the public. Accordingly, the 
criminal incident satisfies the elements of blasphemy crime according to Article 98(f). At the 
end, the court decided basing on its discretion authority to decrease the detention punishment of 
the convict from five years to one year. After this, the convict was released by a presidential 
clemency before finishing the detention period. 
 
Now, let us answer the key questions of this chapter regarding the criminal aspect of the legal 
framework of apostasy in Egypt. How did the Egyptian legal system through its penal code and 
criminal courts try to balance between its constitutional obligations to respects the “rule of law” 
(respect human rights and enforce ratified international covenants like the ICCPR) and respect 
the principles of Sharia? In consistency with the Egyptian penal code that does not criminalize 
the act of apostasy explicitly and only deals with some offences against religion like blasphemy, 
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which is used as the legal base to charge Muslim apostates especially when their apostasy is 
accompanied with any of the criminalized acts, in  most decisions of blasphemy cases there is no 
direct reference to the position of apostasy or blasphemy in Sharia because the concerned court 
only focuses on applying blasphemy provisions in the penal code. Accordingly, the legislature 
used many vague secular or non-religious terms, as I referred previously, to ensure the apparent 
consistency of the statues with the ICCPR’s notion of religious freedom. On the other hand, 
ignoring the juristic rulings of apostasy or blasphemy in Sharia to be considered in the penal 
code reflects the legislature’s monopoly over interpreting Sharia principles including the 
authority to choose which of these norms could be incorporated within the Egyptian legal system 
and which could not. How did the discussed approach could deal with the contradiction between 
apostasy rulings in both Sharia and the ICCPR? In order to escape from solving this conflict or 
facing the consequences of privileging any of the contradicting normative orders over the other, 
the Egyptian legislature avoided to regulate or categorize the act of apostasy in the penal code. 
Does the criminal aspect of the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt agree with standards of 
religious freedom in Sharia and the ICCPR? According to the elaborated juristic rulings of 
apostasy in Sharia, we could easily conclude that Article 98(f) and other religious insult Articles 
do not represent a legal regulation based upon a juristic position in Sharia, but in contrast, it’s a 
secular legal regulation of criminalized acts by the state that contrasts with their juristic rulings 
in Sharia. Such contradiction is manifested in many aspects; For instance, insulting God, the 
prophet or the religion is a grievous sin in Sharia and punished by death penalty, while the penal 
code categorizes it as a misdemeanor whose perpetrator is punished by either detention or fine. 
Such example is manifested in the decision of Islam Bahiry’s case. The court proved that the 
convict described some Quranic rulings as fool speech and repudiated some of the axiomatic 
articles of faith. These speeches are considered as implicit apostasy whose committer deserves 
apostasy punishment (includes the corporal punishment and civil death) from the perspective of 
Sharia. In this case the convict was sentenced to one year of detention as a punishment for 
blasphemy crime in contrast to Sharia rulings. On the other hand, assessing religious related 
articles on the penal code precisely Article 98(f) and their implementation by Egyptian courts 
according to the ICCPR’s standards of religious freedom could show some contradictions to 
these standards. In spite of its secular wording that aimed to ensure the apparent consistency of 
the Article with the ICCPR’s notion of religious freedom through non basing its ruling upon any 
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religious norm, the scope of protection under Article 98(f) is limited to heavenly religions (Islam, 
Christianity, and Judaism) in violation of the scope of protection under Article 18 which includes 
theistic and non- theistic belief. The practice of criminal court in this regard has focused on 
reviewing cases of religious insult or assault according to law and not apostasy or religious 
conversion cases. However, as it was mentioned in this chapter, many human rights 
organizations have criticized Egyptian courts approach as they believe that the vague wording of 
penal law articles and has been abused by judges in such a way as to allow for the imprisonment 
of prisoners of conscience and to charge authors of religious related books and accusing them of 
blasphemy. By which reasoning could Egyptian courts reach their established jurisprudence in 
this regard? Egyptian courts based their decisions on blasphemy related cases upon the existence 
or the absence of the constituting elements of blasphemy crime in any examined case. These 
elements include the materialistic aspect of blasphemy crime (exploiting and using religion in 
advocating and propagating by talk or by any other method extremist thoughts) and the moral 
aspect (to instigate sedition by disdaining Islam to prejudice national unity). 
 
3. Apostasy Situation in the Domain of Personal Status Law: 
Identifying Historic Evolution of Personal Status Law: 
As it was pointed out to earlier in this research, most of the Arab countries during the 
colonization era since the early nineteenth century received the colonizers’ law, which had been 
developed to serve as state law. On the other hand, Sharia that was the common law of Muslim 
countries before this time was given effect and recognized to operate in particular law fields like 
personal status law. The term “Personal Status Law” was not originated from Sharia, but it could 
be equivalent to the idea of family rights norms in Sharia.316In order to identify its substance and 
scope, the Egyptian Court of Cassation was keen to explain the meaning of personal status law in 
one of its early decisions in 1934; the court defines the Personal Status Law as: “what 
differentiates one person from another in terms of natural and family characteristics and which is 
taken into consideration by the law to entail legal effects governing his/her social life: whether 
he/she is a man or a woman; a spouse, a widow, a divorcee, a father, a legitimate child; whether 
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he/she enjoys full legal capacity or not.”317Thus, Family Law regulates the personal lives of 
individuals including marriage, divorce, inheritance, children rights, donations, alimony, . . . etc. 
The first promulgated in Egypt to regulate family relationships was Law No. 25 of 1920, and it 
was based on the Hanafi school that was the Islamic doctrinal school adopted by the Ottoman 
Empire.318This promulgated law was amended and by many subsequent laws like Law No. 25 of 
1929, Law No. 44 of 1979, Law No. 100 of 1985, and Law No. 1 of 2000. All these laws were 
promulgated as temporary solutions to face some of the new arising social and economic 
realities, but not as a comprehensive code governing family rights.319Concerning the jurisdiction 
over personal status cases, before 1955 personal status domain in Egypt has been a system of 
multiple Jurisdictions.320Since the falling of Egypt under the political domination of the Ottoman 
Empire, each religious group in Egypt had its own courts with competence to review personal 
status cases.321Sharia courts were competent to review personal status cases among Muslims. It 
also had jurisdiction over non-Muslims if one of the spouses was a Muslim or when two non-
Muslim courts had competence to judge the same case.322In 1955 by virtue of law No. 462 of 
1955 Sharia courts and all other religious courts were abrogated. National courts instead have 
become competent to hear personal status cases.  
 
The Applicable Law in Personal Status Cases: 
Regarding the applicable law in personal status matters, Article 3 of the Egyptian Personal Status 
law states that: 
Judgments [in personal status matters] shall be issued in accordance with the Personal 
Status and Endowment Laws in force. In cases where the codified laws do not state a rule 
the most predominant opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine shall be applied. However, 
judgments shall be rendered in personal status disputes between non-Muslim Egyptians 
who belong to the same sect . . .  according to their religious laws as long as they do not 
contradict with public order.323 
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In addition, the Court of Cassation has been confirming this approach through its jurisprudence.  
In one of its rulings dated 3 January 2005 on the appeal no. 485, the Court of Cassation 
elaborated the role of Sharia in personal status cases: 
According to the stable rule in the Cassation Court’s jurisprudence Sharia is the general 
applicable law in personal status matters. . . according to the most predominant opinion of 
Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine except in cases where the issued laws included articles 
regulating the reviewed matters. In these cases, codified law rules should be applied. 
Accordingly, any silence of the codified law concerning any matter should not be 
understood as an intention by the legislature to contradict with any statement in Quran, 
authentic Sunnah, or a ruling constituted a consensus reached by Muslim jurists.324 
 
Through the mentioned rulings we could understand that in Egypt “the application of a law in 
personal status matters is based on the religion of the parties”325unless the legislature issued 
another ruling in the same matter. In these cases, Muslims are governed by Sharia rules precisely 
in accordance to the most predominant opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine. Non-Muslims who 
belong to the same sect are governed by their religious laws as long as they do not contradict 
with public order. Thus, in cases where non-Muslim litigators are not belonging to the same 
religious sect or their religious rules regarding the reviewed matter are considered by the issue 
court as contradicting with public order, they are governed by Sharia rules. This legal situation 
justifies why the domain of family law in Egypt has been the most affected legal field by Sharia 
even after the abrogation of Sharia courts. According to our upcoming analysis, the main reason 
of this impact of Sharia is caused by the fact that many of personal status cases are judged basing 
upon a direct application of Sharia norms with a direct reference to their sources in Sharia and 
the adopted juristic opinions. Such implementation of Sharia norms in family cases has taken 
place under the control of the legislature who chose the incorporated norms in the codified law, 
the matters to be silent about in the law, and the juristic doctrine to be followed by courts in these 
silence cases. Accordingly, the legislature has incorporated Sharia norms in personal status law 
field in a more prominent manner due to the nature of the judged cases. This religious nature also 
has resulted in arising apostasy issue in family cases more than any other field of Egyptian law. 
The issue court has to be sure about the religious identity of the litigators because any change in 
it could result in changing the applicable law or the court ruling. On the other hand, sometimes 
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some litigators convert to another religion or sect to change the applicable law or the decision of 
the court in their favor. Furthermore, any party could claim the apostasy of the other litigator to 
affect the court decision.               
a. Apostasy Consequences in Personal Status Law and Egyptian Courts Competence 
to Declare Someone an Apostate: 
Regarding Sharia as the general applicable law in personal status matters in cases where codified 
law is silent about makes Sharia norms applicable on apostasy related cases. This because 
personal status statutes do not regulate apostasy consequences in family matters. Thus, apostasy 
consequences are to be determined by the court through seeking the guidance of the most 
predominant opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine in Sharia. For instance, basing on juristic 
rulings of apostasy consequences in Sharia  that was reported in more detail in this research, if 
the court examines a marriage of an apostate it should base its decision on the juristic rule of 
Hanafi doctrine that Apostasy results in annulment of the marriage contract upon apostasy of one 
or both partners without need for judicial decision. Hence, Egyptian courts have to follow Hanafi 
juristic doctrine’s approach in apostasy consequences in marriage, inheritance, property, 
children’s religion, . . etc. I think that it important before examining the judicial practice of 
personal status courts in apostasy related cases to understand the scope of this practice. The 
previous analysis of our research to the juristic situation of apostasy crime in Sharia has shown 
us that the impact of renouncing Islam is not only limited to capital punishment, but it also 
affects the whole life of the apostate, who suffers in Sharia from a civil death. Such legal 
consequences are related to principal and general norms in Sharia and their ignorance or 
elimination is not an allowed choice from religious perspective. In contrast, the application of 
apostasy consequences in family trials is only limited to the discussed case and its facts. 
Accordingly, if the issue court established the apostasy of any person basing on the reviewed 
facts, this would only affect the court decision on this case without resulting in depriving the 
apostate from any other civil rights basing on his apostasy except by another court decision. 
Therefore, depriving from civil rights converted from an inevitable consequence of apostasy in 
Sharia to isolated legal consequences applied by the court on the demand of harmed plaintiffs. 
Again, we could see how the legislature’s approach and the practice of courts limited the scope 
of the applied Sharia norms even in the domain of personal status Law the most affected legal 
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field by Sharia in Egypt. Through this approach, the Egyptian state could control the substance 
and the borders of apostasy consequences in family matters.  
If, as mentioned before, religion determines the applicable law in personal status matters in 
Egypt, how can Egyptian courts judicially establish conversion from Islam? In his article 
Submitting Faith to Judicial Scrutiny through the Family Trial: The "Abu Zayd Case", Kilian 
Bälz identifies Egyptian courts approach in this regard.326Since embracing a belief or conversion 
from it is a purely spiritual affair that could be hardly judicially established, Bälz refers that the 
Court of Cassation in the past followed a pragmatic approach for this problem.327This pragmatic 
approach means that:  
apostasy can only be established in two cases: (i.) if someone pronounces an 
acknowledgement [iqrar] declaring to have turned away from Islam, or (ii.) if a document 
has presented according to which he has opted for another religion. In other words, 
someone who considers himself a Muslim is also legally considered a Muslim. The 
question whether someone is truly a Muslim is beyond judicial scrutiny: A court has no 
right to declare someone an infidel but is bound to the submissions of the parties.328 
 
Bälz reports that this pragmatic approach has been replaced by Egyptian courts in some latter 
cases with another approach, which allows for a judicial scrutiny of faith:  
In contrast to the aforementioned approach, however, there are cases in which courts have 
permitted the establishment of apostasy on the basis of evidence presented by witnesses. 
The performance of duties and acts of worship of Christianity, for example, have been 
considered sufficient evidence for turning away from Islam. The second approach thus 
allows for a judicial scrutiny of faith.329 
 
Family courts are competent to review personal status matters including, for instance, an action 
for dissolution of marriage on grounds of apostasy.330Accordingly, in any apostasy related case 
personal status courts are competent to establish apostasy as a preliminary question falls within 
the jurisdiction of the court. The issue court could establish it basing on the acknowledgement of 
the litigant himself, an official document, or evidence presented by witnesses or other parties. 
The Court of Appeals reasoned this approach by distinguishing between apostasy as a crime with 
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a substantial element that falls under judicial scrutiny and belief which is matter of conscience 
that does not fall under judicial examination.331The Court also defined apostasy as:  
Apostasy [ridda] ... is legally defined as 'turning away from Islam' [ruju' ‘an din al-Islam]. 
The apostate [murtadd] is the one who turns away from Islam to unbelief [kufr]. This 
requires a declaration of unbelief through an explicit declaration or an act in which it is 
implicit .... [These conditions are met if] someone denies what is established through the 
verses of the Qur'an or the Hadith of the Holy Prophet.332 
 
This definition is consistent with apostasy definition in Sharia as it includes both explicit and 
implicit apostasy forms. Now, let us examine the approach of personal status courts to the 
application of apostasy consequences in the light of the displayed legislative situation.  
b. Personal Status Courts’ Approach in this regard: 
 
Due to the nature of their jurisdiction, personal status courts have to deal with apostasy 
consequences in family cases. Regarding Sharia as the general applicable law in personal status 
matters in cases where codified law is silent about makes apostasy consequences in Sharia 
applicable in family cases. According to the limited scope of the current research, this subsection 
is not going to introduce a full survey of all apostasy related cases in family caselaw, but it will 
focus on examining some significant judgments that could enable us to understand how Egyptian 
personal status courts apply apostasy consequences basing on Sharia norms and their adopted 
reasoning behind their decisions. Following the same categorization in Sharia, our analysis will 
include apostasy consequences in inheritance, marriage, property, apostates’ children religion. 
 
1) Inheritance: 
 
In one of its old rulings in 1966, the Court of Cassation elaborated two important standards 
governing apostate’s inheritance in Egypt.333Firstly, the ruling confirms that apostasy could be 
only judicially established basing on the acknowledgement of the person himself because the 
question whether someone is truly a Muslim is beyond judicial scrutiny. Secondly, apostasy is a 
de jure impediment to inheritance. The court based this on the juristic consensus among Muslim 
jurists that the apostate does not have the right to inheritance even from those whose co-
 
331Id. at 145. 
332
Id. at 146. 
333Court of Cassation, Jan. 19, 1966, appeal 28 Judicial year 33.                                                                                                    
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religionist he has become because, as it was mentioned before, his conversion is not approved or 
accepted according to Sharia. The decision adds that the silence of the codified law concerning 
this matter should not be understood as an intention by the legislature to contradict with this 
juristic ruling because in such cases the legislature states that the most predominant opinion of 
Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine shall be applied.334The discussed ruling could lead us to some 
significant observations. The Court of Cassation in this old ruling followed the pragmatic 
approach to assess apostasy judicial establishment. Also, basing on our previous analysis to 
apostasy consequences in Sharia, the court applied Sharia ruling concerning apostate’s 
inheritance depending on the juristic consensus in this regard. However, this decision was not 
concluded through deducing this rule from Sharia primary sources or making any reference to 
them; rather, it was reached through applying the most predominant opinion of Imam Abu 
Hanifa doctrine according to the law and the court’s jurisprudence. 
2) Property: 
 
In another apostasy related case in 1990, the Court of Cessation issued a significant decision 
regarding the legal situation of apostate’s property.335The ruling includes three important 
principles that guided the court decision. Firstly, adopting the pragmatic approach, the ruling 
asserts that apostasy could be only judicially established basing on the acknowledgement of the 
person himself because the question whether someone is truly a Muslim is beyond judicial 
scrutiny. Also, the explicit statement of Al- Shihadateen336is considered satisfactory by the court 
to consider any person as a Muslim. Secondly, the court sees that the that the apostate does not 
lose his property by apostasy, but his disposal rights are suspended. Thirdly, the apostate should 
be asked to repent, and in case of repentance only he could restore his property and disposal 
rights that were suspended by apostasy. This decision is consistent with the adopted reasoning of 
the aforementioned ruling; however, it added another point concerning the act of apostasy itself. 
Despite the court refers that the apostate should be asked to repent, the ruling does not mention 
 
334
Id. at 180.                                                                                   
335Court of Cassation, Nov. 27, 1990, appeal 34 judicial year 55.                                                                                                    
336Al- Shihadateen is an Islamic religious statement that reflects the essence of the religion and required to be 
stated by anyone to embrace Islam. It simply means the belief that there is no God except Allah and the prophet 
Muhammed (pbuh) is Allah’s messenger. 
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the legal procedures of this action or the responsible entity for this act. I think this because 
apostasy is not categorized or criminalized by law. 
3) Apostates’ Children Religion: 
 
Identifying apostate’s children religion is one from other questions that Egyptian courts have to 
answer in order to judge apostasy related cases in personal status field. In this regard, the Court 
of Cassation issued a ruling on the appeal no. 255 in 1998.337The court decided that apostates’ 
children are considered Muslims if they were born before apostasy. Children who were born 
after apostasy are not considered Muslims or follow their parent’s new belief, but they choose 
their religion after reaching puberty age.338The court reasoned this decision as follows: 
According to Islamic jurisprudence, apostates’ children are considered Muslims if they 
were born before apostasy because they follow them in Islam and not apostasy. Sons who 
were born between non-Muslim parents after apostasy do not become Muslims. Children 
subordination to parents in Islam ends after the appearance of puberty signs or reaching 
the age of fifteen because the Prophet (pbuh) said “any baby born with instinct until his 
tongue identifies him either thankful or infidel.” Accordingly, apostate’s son could choose 
any religion or sect after puberty and he will be considered belonging to this religion 
because Islam supported religious freedom for non-Muslims as our God said “no 
compulsion in religion” which means that do not compel anyone to embrace Islam.339 
 
After this, the court also followed the pragmatic approach through confirming that religious 
belief could be only judicially established basing on the acknowledgement of the person himself 
because the question whether someone is truly a Muslim is beyond judicial scrutiny. The court 
ruling concerning the religion of apostates ‘sons is consistent with the legal position of apostate’s 
children in Sharia. In addition, the reasoning of the court in this case is directly based upon the 
main opinion in Islamic jurisprudence with a passing reference to a speech of the Prophet from 
Sunnah and a Qur’anic verse. The court ignored to discuss the act of apostasy itself or 
repentance, like the last ruling, and focused its investigation to identifying the religion of 
apostates’ sons.  
4) Marriage: 
 
 
337Court of Cassation, Dec. 28, 1998, appeal 255 judicial year 68.     
338Id. at 779.                                                                    
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Like in Sharia, apostasy in personal status field in Egypt entails legal consequences on marriage. 
The most discussed case in this regard was the Nasr Hamed Abu Zayd case because of the many 
controversial legal questions that have been raised by this case.340These questions include the 
competence of a secular court to declare someone an apostate or infidel, basing apostasy on 
academic writing, the relation between apostasy and fundamental rights guaranteed under the 
Egyptian constitution, and the right of a third party to bring an action to a court demanding 
dissolution of a marriage on grounds of apostasy.341In 1996, the Egyptian Muslim scholar Nasr 
Abu Zayd was declared an apostate by the Egyptian Court of Cassation. The facts of the case 
could be summarized as follows: in 1993 a group of lawyers in Cairo brought an action against 
Abu Zayd, an assistant professor of Islamic studies and literature at Cairo University, in Giza 
First Instance Court to demand the dissolution of Abu Zayd’s marriage and his wife.342The 
plaintiffs accused Abu Zayd of apostasy basing on some of his writings that they considered as 
heretical. Since apostasy could be only invoked in personal status cases, the claimants who had 
no relation to Abu Zayd used the procedure of hisaba to “invoke his apostasy as a legal 
impediment to his marriage.”343 The claimants used this way because it was the only legal mean 
to affirm Abu Zayd’s apostasy. The plaintiffs’ action was dismissed by first instance court 
because it considered them as a third party who were not entitled to the action. The plaintiffs 
appealed against the ruling of first instance court in front of the Cairo Court of Appeals. The 
court reversed the ruling asserting that “Abu Zayd was an apostate and that his marriage must 
therefore be dissolved.”344The public prosecutor and the defendants appealed against the ruling in 
the Court of Cassation, which upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals. After this, the 
defendants filed a petition to the executive judge in Giza First Instance court demanding to 
suspend the execution of the decision.345On 25 Sep. 1996 the execution court ruled that 
dissolving the marriage of Abu Zayd cannot be executed.  
 
 
340 Bälz, supra note 326, at 136 
341Id. at 136.                                                                                                                                                                            
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343Berger supra note 239, at 729.                                                                                                                                      
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In this ruling the Court of Cassation permitted the establishment of apostasy basing on evidence 
presented by plaintiffs, which was some of Abu Zayd’s writings. The Court of Cassation 
reasoned its decision as follows:  
According to the majority of the Muslim legal scholars, among them the Hanafis, it 
suffices to consider a person an apostate once he deliberately speaks or acts in unbelief, as 
long as he meant to be degrading, contemptuous, obstinate, or mocking.                                                                                              
He denounces that the Quran is the word of God, describing it as "a cultural product," . . . 
and as being affiliated to a human culture, rendering it an incarnated human text. . .                                                                                                                             
He attacks the application of the Shari'a by describing it as backward and reactionary. He 
claims that the Shari'a is the reason behind the backwardness of Muslims and their 
degradation…He denies that God Almighty is [physically] on His great Throne and that 
His Chair encompasses the Heavens and Earth . . .  He is an apostate, because he has 
revealed his unbelief after having been a believer, even if he claims to be a Muslim. An 
apostate cannot be excused when he claims to be a Muslim, because he has adopted a 
stance contrary to Islam.346 
 
In order to justify its reasoning in a manner making it consistent with the constitutional freedom 
of religion, the Court of Cassation linked apostasy with public policy.347Maurits Berger refers 
that when apostasy rules are dealt as a matter of fact, Egyptian courts used to focus on applying 
its consequences on apostates. In this case public policy has been used to ground these 
consequences into the Egyptian legal system for two reasons “a) because these rules were based 
on essential principles of the Islamic Shari'a, and b) to ascertain their applicability in light of a 
lack of any statutory rules.”348In Abu Zayd case the Court of Cassation adopted a different 
approach through using public policy as a mean to protect Islam and society fundamentals as the 
ruling states that: 
To depart from Islam is to revolt against it, and this necessarily finds its reflection in the 
loyalty of the individual to the Shari'a, the state, and his ties with the society. This is what 
no law or state tolerates. ... No individual has the right to proclaim that which contradicts 
the public policy or morals (al-nizam al-'amm aw al-'adab), use his opinion to harm the 
fundamentals upon which the society is built, to revile the sacred things, or to disdain 
Islam or any other heavenly religion.349 
 
 
346Court of Cassation, Aug. 5, 1996, appeals 475, 478 and 481, judicial year 65, cited in Berger supra note 230, at 
728. 
347
Berger supra note 239, at 732. 
348Id. at 732.     
349Court of Cassation, Aug. 5, 1996, supra note 346. 
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The controversy of this case and describing it as the most prominent apostasy case in Egyptian 
law350have been caused by the huge criticisms which faced this ruling. This decision has been 
usually criticized by many legal scholars and human rights advocates as a manifestation of the 
legal abuse of family trials in Egypt to submit faith to judicial scrutiny or an example of how the 
highest court in Egypt committing takfir. Accordingly, for the purpose of this research, it is 
important to assess this ruling from different aspects. IHRL advocates see that the court enabled 
a third party to exploit the Islamic legal principle of hisba to abuse a family trial to declare 
apostasy of a Muslim who considers himself a believer.; as a result, Sharia principles have been 
applied in Egypt to shape the legal framework of apostasy and limit religious freedom.351The 
plaintiffs in this case used family trials because it was the only legal mean to affirm Abu Zayd’s 
apostasy basing on his writings that provoked outrage of the public. Thus, such abuse of family 
trials is caused by the ambiguous legal status of apostasy in Egypt as a neither criminalized nor 
permitted act. Also, it is an extension to the Egyptian state’s approach to legal Islamization that 
promoted the role of litigation as an alternative process to a political legislative solution through 
which Sharia norms could be enforced. Such ruling could be considered as a breach to standards 
of religious and expression freedoms according to IHRL because the ruling is based on a single 
tradition; however, the Cassation Court used public order loophole to protect its decision. As it 
was asserted before in this research, any state party to the ICCPR could justify limitations on the 
freedom to manifest religion by the protection of public safety, order, health or morals, which 
have no strict definition. The court in this case “argued that a Muslim making public statements 
contrary to the orthodoxy of Islam violates Egyptian public policy.”352Consequently, the court 
here interpreted public policy not in terms of religious freedom, but in terms of freedom of 
expression because the convict who considered himself a Muslim wrote opinions disdaining 
Islam.353In contrast to the pragmatic approach , the Court of Cassation established Abu Zayd’s 
apostasy on the basis of evidence presented by witnesses, and considered his writings equivalent 
to an acknowledgement of explicit unbelief.354I think that this ruling is only a reflection of the 
limited application of apostasy consequences in personal status law field in Egypt. The ruling 
 
350Nassar, supra note 205, at 28.                                                                                                                                                            
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tried to absorb public outrage through confirming that declaring Abu Zayd’s apostasy was based 
upon adopting the opinion of the majority of Muslim scholars, among them the Hanafis, to 
protect Islam from disdaining, while turned a blind eye to the opinion of this majority who sees 
that the apostate should face death penalty and be deprived from all other civil rights to end up 
with deciding the dissolution of Abu Zayd’s marriage and his wife! The notable thing that even 
this dissolution was not executed after this. This approach is consistent with all apostasy related 
cases ‘rulings in personal status field, which converted depriving from civil rights from an 
inevitable consequence of apostasy in Sharia to isolated legal consequences applied by the court 
on the demand of plaintiffs. Moreover, this ruling is not based on an Islamic juristic reasoning, 
but in contrast like in most of personal status it is based on a legal secular reasoning  that aims to 
enforce the state’s definition of Sharia principles and the scope of their implementation 
according to law. 
 
Finally, let us answer the key questions of this chapter regarding the legal situation of apostasy 
within the field of personal status law in Egypt. How did the Egyptian legal system through its 
personal status law try to balance between its constitutional obligations to respects the “rule of 
law” (respect human rights and enforce ratified international covenants like the ICCPR) and 
respect the principles of Sharia? in Egypt the application of a law in personal status matters is 
based on the religion of the parties unless the legislature issued another ruling in the same matter. 
In these cases, Muslims are governed by Sharia rules precisely in accordance to the most 
predominant opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine. In consistency with the state’s approach 
regarding apostasy, no rule prohibiting apostasy can be found in the codified part of personal 
status law. The legislature avoided to issue any statutory law prohibiting apostasy or imposing its 
legal consequences to avoid any explicit statement in law that criminalizes conversion from 
Islam in contradiction with the ICCPR. On the other hand, apostasy rules can be found only on 
caselaw as application of Sharia rules because the Court of Cassation has confirmed in its 
jurisprudence that any silence of the codified law concerning any matter should not be 
understood as an intention by the legislature to contradict with any statement in Quran, authentic 
Sunnah, or a ruling constituted a consensus reached by Muslim jurists. How did the discussed 
approach could deal with the contradiction between apostasy rulings in both Sharia and the 
ICCPR? Since religion is a governing factor in family cases, family courts focus only on 
 
88 
answering the question whether any of the parties is an apostate or not. In case of the 
establishment of apostasy, it is “perceived as a legal impediment to almost all personal status 
rights by virtue of the apostate having incurred civil death.”355The apostate in this case is only 
deprived from the examined right in the discussed case and not all civil rights like in Sharia. In 
most of personal status cases in this regard there is no reference to religious freedom or the 
punishment of the act of apostasy itself; however, in cases related to blasphemy or published 
writings like Abu Zayd’s cases the Court of Cassation categorizes the application of apostasy 
consequences under public policy to avoid any apparent contradiction with the ICCPR’s 
definition of religious freedom or freedom of expression and the constitutional obligation with 
these rights. Does the legal framework of apostasy rules in personal status field in Egypt agree 
with standards of religious freedom in Sharia and the ICCPR? The answer is no because it 
contradicts with both. From the perspective of IHRL imposing any legal consequences as a 
punishment for conversion from any belief to another basing on a single tradition. On the other 
hand, even if we could agree that the imposed apostasy consequences in family trials are 
consistent with its ruling in Sharia this legal framework contradicts with the juristic position of 
apostasy rules in Sharia as it converted depriving from civil rights from an inevitable 
consequence of apostasy in Sharia to isolated legal consequences applied by the court only on 
the demand of plaintiffs in separated cases. By which reasoning could Egyptian courts reach 
their established jurisprudence in this regard? According to our analysis, we could find that issue 
courts did not conclude their rulings through deducing apostasy rules from Sharia primary 
sources by using Islamic legal theory; rather, they were reached through applying the most 
predominant opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine according to the law and the court’s 
jurisprudence through a legal secular reasoning that reconstructs the implementation of apostasy 
consequences in some cases under secular categorizations like public policy. 
4. Apostates’ Legal Situation According to Administrative Law: 
 
a. The Recognition of Conversion from Islam in Administrative Law: 
Apostasy or conversion from Islam has also arose in administrative law domain in Egypt. Most 
of these cases are related to Egyptian Muslims who converted from Islam and filed cases against 
the government whose representatives refused to record their new religious status in identity 
 
355Berger supra note 239, at 723. 
 
89 
cards and documents.356As it was stated previously in this research, the State Council’s judicial 
section has an exclusive jurisdiction to take decisions in administrative disputes precisely that 
related to state actions “in all cases in which a state administrative body is involved.”357 
Accordingly, cases concerning the registration of new religious status in identity cards are 
examined by administrative courts. In these cases, the government represented in the Civil Status 
Department of the Ministry of Interior refused to acknowledge conversion from Islam through 
recording the new religion of the convert in identification cards.358Identity card in Egypt is an 
obligatory requirement by law from citizens to operate their legal rights like work, health 
insurance, marriage, etc.359Computerized identity cards must include the religion of the person 
that could only be from the three heavenly religions. Accordingly, apostasy related cases in this 
regard in Egypt could be classified into three categories: “cases filed by citizens who were 
Christians but converted to Islam and then reverted to Christianity, cases filed by citizens who 
were born and brought up as Christians and whose fathers [embraced]  Islam before they reached 
16 and could hold their own identity cards, and the third category includes cases filed by 
Muslims who converted to Christianity  and who failed to have their new religious status 
registered in their identity cards.”360 
b. Administrative Courts’ Approach to Conversion from Islam 
In order to understand the approach of the State Council concerning the right of apostates to 
record their new religious status in identity cards, it is essential to examine its reasoning in 
different cases of conversion from Islam. In his article Islamic Law and Freedom of Religion: 
The Case of Apostasy and Its Legal Implications in Egypt Moataz El Fegiery introduces a critical 
analysis of a series of recent decision of the State Council in this regard that could be useful for 
this research. Thus, I will depend on this analysis here to examine the practice of Administrative 
judiciary concerning apostasy cases. Through his analysis, El Fegiery concludes that “[t]he 
 
356El Fegiery, supra note 53, at 8. The following subsection draws heavily on Moataz Ahmed El Fegiery, Islamic 
Law and Freedom of Religion: The Case of Apostasy and Its Legal Implications inEgypt as it introduced a critical 
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jurisprudence of the State Council has exhibited three trends in its handling of the issue: the 
hardline approach, the liberal approach and the pragmatic approach.”361 
 
1) The Hard-line Approach: The Non-Recognition of Conversion from Islam: 
The hardline approach is considered as the mainstream approach regarding conversion from 
Islam in the jurisprudence of the State Council.362According to this approach that was followed 
by the State Councils’ courts for three decades, Egyptian Muslims are not allowed to modify 
their religious status in identity cards to reflect conversion from Islam to any other religion. It is 
believed that this approach is based on the prohibition of apostasy in Islam to protect public 
order in Egypt as a Muslim majority country.363For instance, the court of Administrative Justice 
followed this approach in the case of Nabil Hassan Sabry in 1980.364Nabil was a Muslim 
reverted to Christianity, and he filed this case after the refusal of the Civil Status Department of 
the Ministry of Interior to modify his identity card to record the new religion of the convert. El 
Fegiery summarizes the plaintiff’s claims as follows: 
The plaintiff argued that the Civil Code does not prohibit any individual from changing 
his religion. He also invoked the Law of Civil Status which allows citizens to change data 
in their documents as long as they present proof of the new data. The plaintiff cited 
Article 46 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1971, which guarantees freedom of religion. 
He then argued that Islamic law is not applicable in this case, since there is a clear 
provision in the Law of Civil Status, which includes the changing of religious 
information.365 
 
On the other hand, the Court of Administrative Justice confirmed the illegality of the required 
modification, and reasoned its decision by arguing that: 
[T]he rules of Islamic law are applicable in this case based on Article of 2 of the 
Constitution and Article 1(2) of the Civil Code, which allow judges to refer to customary 
law, Islamic Shari‘a and the rules of equity in the absence of a legal provision applicable 
to the case being examined. It then stated that there was no law regulating the issue of 
apostasy for those who embrace Islam; that customary law in this case is related to moral 
issues and that, therefore, the rules of Islamic law are applicable in this case. Apostates, 
according to the Court, have no civil rights in Islamic law. The right to change religious 
affiliation can only be provided for non-Muslims, but Muslims cannot denounce their 
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religion, whether to convert to another religion or to become non-religious. The Court 
affirmed that based on Islamic Shari‘a, apostasy must be prevented. The Court then 
moved to the facts of the case and observed that since the plaintiff converted to Islam, he 
was subject to its rules, and the refusal to make the required modification was legal, 
because the state could not condone his apostasy. Such an act, according to the Court, 
would violate a rule of public order, and therefore the state cannot legally recognize this 
act. The Court in this case also argued that the scope of Article 46 of the constitution on 
freedom of religion should be in line with Article 2, which considers Islamic law as the 
main source of legislation [and since the plaintiff has embraced Islam, he must then 
submit to its law which does not condone apostasy].366 
 
Through its decision, the Court of Administrative Justice has established many principles that 
have governed the right of apostates to record their new religious status in identity cards in 
Egypt. Firstly, the Court affirmed the Supreme Court’s definition of the scope of the 
constitutional right of religious freedom, which was elaborated in its mentioned ruling in 
1975.367According to this definition, the scope of the constitutional right of religious freedom is 
limited by “the consideration of public order, to which the rules of Islamic law are 
fundamental”368Secondly, the ruling differentiates between the scope of religious freedom basing 
on the religion of the convert.369While non-Muslims are free to change their religion, Muslims 
are not allowed to abandon their religion. Thirdly, this ruling has also affirmed the supremacy of 
Sharia rules over all other law sources to be applied on apostasy related cases basing on the 
supremacy clause of the constitutional Article 2. Fourthly, the decision refers that according to 
Sharia apostasy must be prevented. 
 
The discussed ruling demonstrates the followed reasoning behind the hardline approach. The 
ruling asserted the fact of the supremacy of Sharia or Islamic law over all other law sources in 
the Egyptian legal system. Accordingly, all constitutional rights, including the right of religious 
freedom, should be interpreted in a manner that does not contradict with what the court considers 
as Sharia rules like the prohibition of apostasy in Sharia. However, in consistency with 
judiciary’s approach in most of the discussed rulings in different law fields in this research, the 
court limited the application of apostasy rules in Sharia to a specific right and ignored the 
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application apostasy juristic rulings in Sharia regarding other civil rights and capital punishment. 
Furthermore, the court reasoned the obligatory nature of the application of apostasy rules in 
Sharia by categorizing it under a secular categorization which is public policy rather than using 
any Islamic juristic reasoning based upon Islamic legal theory.  
 
The Court of Administrative Justice also followed the hardline reasoning in the case of Jerjes 
Malak Wasef.370The plaintiff brought the case to the court to claim his right to record his new 
religious status in identity card after conversion from Islam. The plaintiff’s father was a Christian 
who embraced Islam in 1990. He changed his son’s religion to Islam in his birth certificate when 
he was 7 years old.371The court refused the plaintiff’s claim and reasoned its decision as El 
Fegiery refers that:  
The Court made a distinction between the right of a person to embrace religious beliefs 
and his or her right to manifest these beliefs in society. It reasoned that while the former 
concerns the individual and his private relationship with God, the latter affects society 
and can be limited. It, therefore, argued that the constitutional right of religious freedom 
should not infringe on public order and public morals, as affirmed before by the Supreme 
Court’s landmark decision in 1975. Then, the Court observed that Islam is the majority-
religion in Egypt, and although its rules respect the right of non-Muslims to believe in 
any divine religion, Islamic rules prohibit those who become affiliated with Islam, to 
leave it. This rule according to the Court is a part of public order that must be respected 
in the country. . . It has also pointed out that Egyptian legislators have not criminalized 
apostasy. However, when the judiciary examines claims brought by apostates to secure 
legal recognition of their conversion, the Court affirmed that judges should be guided by 
the requirements of public order, where Islam represents the main component of it. The 
Court has ruled that persons who voluntary decided to become Muslims are not allowed 
to manipulate religion after that and employ the state’s institutions to legitimize their 
apostasy. . . Moreover, the Court has argued that the ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) cannot be invoked in this case by the 
claimant, because Egypt made a general reservation on the convention on the basis of the 
rules of Islamic law. Therefore, it cannot be applied in a way that violates rules of Islamic 
law that are an integral part of the public order in Egypt.372  
 
Through its issued ruling in Malak Wasef ‘s case, we could note how the Court of 
Administrative Justice added some new aspects to its reasoning behind the hardline approach. 
Firstly, the court categorized conversion from Islam or apostasy under the right to manifestation 
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of belief that could be limited by public order, public morals, etc.. Secondly, the court interpreted 
the Egyptian statement regarding the ratification of the ICCPR as a general reservation on the 
convention on the basis of the rules of Islamic law and, as a result, the ICCPR’s provisions 
including Art. 18 cannot be applied in a way that violates rules of Islamic law that are an integral 
part of the public order in Egypt.  
1) The Liberal Approach: a Solution for Converts of Christian Origin: 
 
The liberal approach or reasoning constitutes, like the pragmatic approach, an exception to the 
mainstream reasoning regarding conversion from Islam in the jurisprudence of the State Council. 
According to this reasoning, the Court of Administrative Justice accepted the claims of only 
plaintiffs who reverted to Christianity to register their new religion in their identity cards. Such 
approach was adopted by the court under the leadership of Judge Farouk Abd el-Qader between 
April 2004 and September 2006 in 22 cases.373For instance, in Mohammed Mahdy’s case the 
Court ordered the Ministry of Interior to change the plaintiff’s affiliation in his identity card after 
his reversion to Christianity.374El Fegiery summarizes the Court reasoning in this case as he 
states that: 
In these cases, the Court considered the Ministry’s refusal to alter the identity card an 
unjustifiable interference in his personal choice. The Court has also argued that the act is 
just an administrative procedure that reflects reality and that this registration is necessary 
to establish rights and duties based on the correct religious status. In its response to the 
argument based on public order, the Court affirmed that Article 40 of the Egyptian 
constitution provides for equality between citizens in all rights and duties without 
discrimination based on religion, language, origin and sex. It also referred to Article 46, 
which protects the rights of individuals not only to freely believe in religions but to 
manifest religious faith. The Court cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the Arab Charter of Human Rights while also arguing that many centuries ago, Islam 
demonstrably recognized freedom of religion. To show the compatibility between Islam 
and religious freedom, the Court cited several Quranic verses that highlight the principles 
of freedom and non-compulsion in religious conviction. However, the Court’s 
understanding of freedom of religion in Islam was not applied to citizens who are born and 
brought up as Muslims and decided to convert to any other religion. In explaining this 
position, the Court ambiguously submitted that, according to Islamic jurisprudence, a 
Muslim cannot be considered apostate unless he or she feels comfortable with his or her 
apostasy. This argument infers that the Court would only guarantee the rights of persons 
 
373Id. at 14.                                      
374Court of Administrative Justice, April 26, 2005, Case 26103/85, cited in El Fegiery, supra note 53, at 14.       
 
94 
who became Muslims for a while and then decided to apostatize from Islam. By this 
reasoning, the Court avoided engaging in a thorough discussion on the issue.375 
 
Through this approach, we could understand how the Court of Administrative Justice, like the 
whole Egyptian judiciary, could use its exclusive authority of interpretation to define Sharia 
principles, human rights, and public order to establish its arbitrary reasoning of contradicting 
judicial rulings regarding the legal position of apostasy in Egypt. After taking into consideration 
the exceptional nature of this reasoning in comparison with the mainstream reasoning regarding 
conversion from Islam in the jurisprudence of the State Council, I think that the arbitrariness of 
the court reasoning stems from the fact that its reasoning either in this case or in the other 
discussed cases does not reflect a clear interpretive, juristic, or legal theory. Rather, it could 
reflect the conflicting judgments of the court, which demonstrate how a modern state through its 
judiciary could exploit its interpretive authority to impose its definition of the scope of religious 
freedom in contradiction to its definition in Sharia or the constitution. Accordingly, the limitation 
of the court’s rulings as a transformation from a conservative interpretation of religious freedom 
in Sharia to a more liberal one does not introduce a real understanding to the legal position of 
apostasy in Egypt. This because the former does not constitute a conservative and the latter does 
not constitute a liberal from the perspective of Sharia. Also, the court’s arguments regarding the 
constitutional religious freedom in the light of public order refute each other. Concerning 
apostasy in Sharia, the court in this ruling the Court cited several Quranic verses that highlight 
the principles of freedom and non-compulsion in religious conviction to demonstrate the 
compatibility between Islam and religious freedom, and as a result, establish its decision. In 
contrast to its approach regarding Christian reverts, the Court see that according to Islamic 
jurisprudence citizens who are born and brought up as Muslims and decided to convert to any 
other religion are not allowed to register their new religion in their identity cards. This because, 
according to the juristic explanation of the court, Muslim cannot be considered apostate unless 
he or she feels comfortable with his or her apostasy. Our previous analysis of the juristic position 
of apostasy in Sharia could let us see how the court used this arbitrary argument to create such 
distinction between apostasy of apostates of Muslim origin and Christian reverts. In addition, the 
court’s approach contradicts with its precedent rulings that established the non-permission of 
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Muslim converts to secure a legal recognition of their conversion basing on the application of 
Sharia principles which prohibit apostasy. Both arguments contradict with each other and 
contradict with the juristic situation of apostasy in Sharia. The court only misused or 
reconstructed some Islamic terms to justify its decision even in adopting contradicting 
approaches. Concerning the interpretation of the constitutional right of religious freedom in the 
light of public order, the court in cases that belong to the liberal approach argues that that Article 
40 of the Egyptian constitution provides for equality between citizens in all rights and duties 
without discrimination based on religion, language, origin and sex. It also refers to Article 46 
which protects the rights of individuals not only to freely believe in religions but to manifest 
religious faith. This argument contradicts with what has been elaborated by the mainstream 
reasoning regarding conversion from Islam in the jurisprudence of the State Council. The 
hardline approach followed the Supreme Court’s definition of the constitutional right of religious 
freedom as a non-absolute right and that the manifestation of religious beliefs must be subject to 
and considered in relation to public order and its constitutive elements including Sharia 
principles. Thus, we could say here that the Court of Administrative Justice in its liberal 
approach did not even respect the interpretation authority of the Supreme Court in defining the 
scope of the constitutional right of religious freedom to justify its limitation under the category 
of public order like the mainstream approach. 
2) The Pragmatic Approach: 
The pragmatic approach has been adopted by the Supreme Administrative Court in some 
cases.376The court aimed through this reasoning to permit the registration of the new religion of  
only persons who reverted to Christianity to register their new religion in their identity cards 
without raising or solving the legal issue of apostasy and religious freedom in Egypt. The court 
believes that allowing the registration of the new religion of Christian reverts agrees with the 
requirements of Egyptian law to include true information in citizen’s identity cards to avoid any 
legal errors.377For example, on the 9th of February 2008, the Supreme Administrative Court 
issued a similar ruling in the case of Beshay Rizq.378The court reasoned its decision by arguing 
that:  
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the Egyptian law requires that each citizen carries an identity card, by which he/she can 
interact with the state and society, and that the card should include true information about 
a citizen’s sex, profession, religion and marital status. Any change in this information 
should be reported to the mandated authority as stipulated in Article 47 of the law of civil 
affairs. This Article does not limit the changing of information related to their religion, as 
long as the change occurs among the three monolithic religions. The Court highlighted 
the fact that the registration only reflects the real status of a person who has already 
changed his religion. It does not mean that the mandated authority accepts the act or that 
it establishes a new legal status by the registration itself. The Court made an analogy with 
the change in legal status resulting from marriage, in which the registration does not 
establish this legal status, but that rather the satisfaction of the legal pillars and conditions 
of marriage, as stipulated in the law, is the basis under which the legal status of marriage 
can be established. The Court also argued that the registration of the new religious status 
of the claimant is necessary to protect the public order and societal interest, and it will 
protect against societal complexities or impermissible acts such as the marriage of non-
Muslim male to a Muslim woman [which is prohibited in Islam]. . . Rather, the 
registration of this new religious status is a requirement of a modern nation state. Finally, 
the Court decided that while the claimant can register his affiliation to Christianity in his 
official documents, his previous affiliation to Islam should also be mentioned in these 
documents.379 
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Administrative Court used the mentioned argument to avoid any legal 
discussion about apostasy or religious freedom. The court reasoning focused on the legal 
requirement to include true information in citizen’s identity cards to establish its ruling. 
However, the court also categorized the registration of the new religious status of the claimant 
under the protection of public order, which has been usually invoked by all State Council courts 
to reason their rulings regardless of their approach. The Supreme Administrative Court also 
maintained the discriminatory approach that was followed in liberal approach rulings as it 
limited the permission for the registration of the new religion for only persons who reverted to 
Christianity and not for converts of Muslim origin.380I think that this discrimination is very 
sufficient to refute all the court’s invoked arguments to allow changing the religion of Christian 
reverts in identity cards. In addition, the court in this approach insisted that the previous 
affiliation to Islam should be mentioned in identity card, which is considered by some human 
rights advocates as a kind of social stigmatization through referring to their rejection to Islam.381 
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Finally, let us answer the key questions of this chapter regarding the legal situation of apostasy 
within the field of Administrative law in Egypt. How did the Egyptian legal system through its 
Administrative judiciary try to balance between its constitutional obligations to respects the “rule 
of law” (respect human rights and enforce ratified international covenants like the ICCPR) and 
respect the principles of Sharia? As it was stated previously in this research, Apostasy or 
conversion from Islam has arose in administrative law domain in Egypt mostly in cases which 
are related to Egyptian Muslims who converted from Islam and filed cases against the 
government whose representatives refused to record their new religious status in identity cards 
and documents. Accordingly, Administrative courts have discussed apostasy and religious 
freedom in cases during “the process of reaching a ruling on the administrative issue, which is 
within the jurisdiction of the court.”382This means that Administrative courts have tried to 
balance between these constitutional obligations through limiting its judicial review to answer 
the question of the legality of registering the new religion of Muslim converts in their identity 
cards to decide the legality of state actions in this regard. How did Administrative judiciary’s 
approach could deal with the contradiction between apostasy rulings in both Sharia and the 
ICCPR? According to the displayed analysis we are talking here about three different 
approaches. The hardline approach asserted the fact of the supremacy of Sharia or Islamic law 
over all other law sources in the Egyptian legal system. Accordingly, all constitutional rights, 
including the right of religious freedom, should be interpreted in a manner that does not 
contradict with what the court considers as Sharia rules like the prohibition of apostasy in Sharia. 
However, in consistency with judiciary’s approach in most of the discussed rulings in different 
law fields in this research, this reasoning limited the application of apostasy rules in Sharia to a 
specific right and ignored the application apostasy juristic rulings in Sharia regarding other civil 
rights and capital punishment. Furthermore, it reasoned the obligatory nature of the application 
of apostasy rules in Sharia by categorizing it under a secular categorization which is public 
policy rather than using any Islamic juristic reasoning based upon Islamic legal theory. Through 
this categorization Administrative courts could avoid any apparent contradiction with the 
ICCPR. Through the liberal approach the Court of Administrative Justice accepted the claims of 
only plaintiffs who reverted to Christianity to register their new religion in their identity cards. 
Concerning apostasy in Sharia, the court in this approach the cited several Quranic verses that 
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highlight the principles of freedom and non-compulsion in religious conviction to demonstrate 
the compatibility between Islam and religious freedom, and as a result, establish its decision. In 
contrast to its approach regarding Christian reverts, the Court see that according to Islamic 
jurisprudence citizens who are born and brought up as Muslims and decided to convert to any 
other religion are not allowed to register their new religion in their identity cards. This because, 
according to the juristic explanation of the court, Muslim cannot be considered apostate unless 
he or she feels comfortable with his or her apostasy. The Supreme Administrative Court aimed 
through the pragmatic approach to permit the registration of the new religion of only persons 
who reverted to Christianity to register their new religion in their identity cards without raising 
or solving the legal issue of apostasy and religious freedom in Egypt. The court believes that 
allowing the registration of the new religion of Christian reverts agrees with the requirements of 
Egyptian law to include true information in citizen’s identity cards to avoid any legal errors. 
However, the court also categorized the registration of the new religious status of the claimant 
under the protection of public order, which has been usually invoked by all State Council courts 
to reason their rulings regardless of their approach. Does the legal framework of apostasy rules 
in administrative law domain in Egypt agree with standards of religious freedom in Sharia and 
the ICCPR? The answer is no because it contradicts with both. From the perspective of IHRL the 
three adopted approaches contradict with the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief 
which necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace 
one’s current religion or belief with another. This because the mainstream approach of State 
Council’s courts rules that Muslims converts regardless of their religious origin are not allowed 
to modify their religious status in identity cards to reflect conversion from Islam to any other 
religion, whereas the two other exceptional approaches allow this modifications for only 
Christian reverts. On the other hand, I think that from the viewpoint of Sharia the three adopted 
approaches contradict with apostasy juristic rulings in Sharia. Firstly, the arising of apostasy 
related cases within the field of administrative law in Egypt has continued the legal 
fragmentation of apostasy rules in different law domains in Egypt to contradict with the juristic 
position of apostasy rules in Sharia as it converted depriving from civil rights from an inevitable 
consequence of apostasy in Sharia to isolated legal consequences applied by the court only on 
the demand of plaintiffs in separated cases. Secondly, both permission or non-permission for 
changing the religion of Muslim converts in their identity cards contradicts with apostasy juristic 
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rulings in Sharia. The non-permission for registering the new religion of Muslim converts, which 
represents the hardline approach, will lead to prohibited acts according to Sharia such as the 
marriage of non-Muslim male to a Muslim woman. As it was illustrated previously in this 
research, Islam like many other beliefs (including Christianity and Judaism) all its rulings and 
norms are based upon a main principle, which is the distinction between believers and 
unbelievers; consequently, embracing Islam or renouncing it automatically results in many other 
legal consequences in Sharia. The Supreme Administrative Court has invoked this argument 
through its pragmatic approach. Furthermore, the permission for registering the new religion of 
Muslim converts also contradicts with apostasy juristic rulings in Sharia because apostate suffers 
in Sharia from a civil death as he is not allowed to inherit, marry, and dispose of his property. 
Accordingly, even if the registration of the new religion in identity card does not establish this 
legal status, as stated by Supreme Administrative Court, it simply enables apostates to practice 
and enjoy all their civil in contrast to Sharia norms. By which reasoning could Egyptian courts 
reach their established jurisprudence in this regard? The hardline approach reasoned the non-
permission of registering the new religion of Muslim apostates basing on the supremacy of over 
all other law sources in the Egyptian legal system and the protection of public order. The liberal 
approach reasoned its permission to Christian reverts to modify their religion in identity cards 
basing on the court’s interpretation of the constitutional rights of religious freedom and equality 
between citizens from one side, and religious freedom in Islam from another side. The pragmatic 
approach reasoned its permission to Christian reverts to modify their religion in identity cards 
basing on the legal requirement of the Egyptian law to include true information in citizen’s 
identity cards and the protection of public order. 
B. Understanding the Role of Public Policy as a key factor in Imposing State’s 
Definition of Religious Freedom and Apostasy Consequences in Egypt: 
 
1. Examining Cassation Court’s Definition of Public Policy: 
According to the introduced analysis of the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt, we could note 
how the concept of public order has been used by Egyptian judiciary to define the scope of the 
(international and constitutional) right of religious freedom and ground the application of some 
apostasy consequences in Egypt without the existence of any reference to the prohibition of 
apostasy or its legal consequences in Egyptian statutory law. In order to understand the role of the 
concept of public policy in demarcating the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt, it is important 
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to display its definition by Egyptian courts precisely the Court of Cassation. Egyptian law 
borrowed the concept of public policy among other legal concepts from the French law by the end 
of the nineteenth century.383Such legal concept usually refers to fundamental legal principles to a 
society, which are not allowed to be contradicted or violated by any normative rules or laws of this 
society.384The Court of Cassation has defined public order as: 
[Public order] comprises the principles (qawa’id) that aim at realizing the public interest 
(al-maslaha al-‘amma) of a country, from a political, social as well as economic 
perspective. These [principles] are related to the natural, material and moral state of 
affairs (wad‘a) of an organized society, and supersede the interests of individuals. The 
concept of [public order] is based on a purely secular doctrine that is to be applied as a 
general doctrine (madhab ‘amm) to which society in its entirety can adhere and which 
must not be linked to any provision of religious laws. However, this does not exclude that 
[public order] is sometimes based on a principle related to religious doctrine, in the case 
when such a doctrine has become intimately linked with the legal and social order, deep-
rooted in the conscience of society (damir al-mujtama), in the sense that the general 
feelings (al-shu’ur al-‘amma) are injured if it is not adhered to. (…) The definition 
(taqdir) [of public order] is characterized by objectivity, in accordance with what the 
largest majority (aghlab ‘a amm) of individuals in the community believe.385 
 
Two main conclusions could be concluded from this definition. Firstly, there is no clear 
definition of the mentioned “principles” or “interest” that constitute the concept of public policy 
because they are considered according to the circumstances and standards of a given society at a 
particular time.386Thus, the courts are responsible for defining them on ad hoc basis to assess any 
legal act at or statute to be considered as a breach of public order or not.387Secondly, the 
paradox388of the public order stems from the irresolvable tension between formal legal equality 
and the values of the majority. This means that the issue court could base its ruling concerning 
any right on public order either because it decided to apply (what the court considered) formal 
legal equality among all citizens or the values of the majority. For instance, the discussed cases 
in this research could show us how Egyptian courts have adopted public policy in some times to 
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impose apostasy consequences basing on the application of Sharia principles as the values of 
majority, and to deny the application of these consequences in other rulings basing on the legal 
equality among all citizens to practice, what the court considered, their constitutional and legal 
rights of religious freedom. For this reason, it is believed that the “active principle of secularism” 
is manifested in the legal notion of public order as the issue court has the authority to decide 
what constitutes values of the majority, legal equality rules, essential religious principles of 
society, and when to adhere to any of these rules or make exceptions to them under the umbrella 
of public order.389In his article entitled Secularism, Sovereignty, Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a 
Secular or a Religious State? Hussein Ali Agrama illustrated this paradox of public order when 
he explained that: 
The paradox of the public order arises not just from the tension it embodies between 
formal legal equality and the substantive values of the majority, that is, between 
competing norms. It is also because those substantive values have become identified with 
state sovereignty, which, in turn, is legally expressed through exceptions. This results in a 
profound confusion about whether a court, in invoking the public order, is promoting 
norms or making exceptions to them.390 
2. Public Policy as a legal Base for Imposing State’s Definition of Religious Freedom 
and Implementing of Apostasy Consequences in Egypt: 
 
Egyptian judiciary’s definition of public policy has shaped the scope of the right to religious 
freedom in Egypt. According to what was demonstrated in this research, the ICCPR’s confirms 
that any restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion must be prescribed by law for the 
protection of public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others. Such restrictions or limitations based upon public morals must not be driven from a 
single tradition or applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights guaranteed in article 18. 
Consequently, we could say that the combination between emphasizing the illegality of any 
limitation on religious freedom that is driven from a single religion and the absence of any clear 
strict definition of public safety, order, health or morals according to which any state could limit 
freedom to manifest religion has offered a loophole for states parties to the covenant to breach its 
concept of the right. This means that any state could limit any aspect of the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience or religion as long as this aspect is categorized by the state as a freedom to 
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manifest religion, which variates from one belief to another. Furthermore, any state party to the 
covenant could justify such limitations by the protection of public safety, order, health or morals, 
which have no strict definition. While the Egyptian constitution confirms that State shall 
guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of practice of religious rites, the Supreme Court 
considers that freedom of religion is not absolute, and that the manifestation of religious beliefs 
must be subject to and considered in relation to public order, morals and values. In its landmark 
ruling in 1975, the Court pointed out that Islamic Shari‘a and its principles are constitutive 
elements of public order and that under this the constitutional right of freedom of religion can be 
restricted. Accordingly, the case law of the Egyptian civil courts, as it was shown in this 
research, regarded apostasy as a part of the practice of belief that is regulated by the “internal 
order” of Islam and can be restricted on the bases of public policy.391However, in some cases 
Egyptian courts use or exploit their exclusive interpretive authority to enlarge the scope of 
religious freedom through the ambiguous concept of public order. For example, the liberal 
approach, which was adopted by the Court of Administrative Justice in a series of cases, 
considered that the recognition of conversion from Islam in identity cards agrees with Article 46, 
which protects the rights of individuals not only to freely believe in religions but to manifest 
religious faith, and consistent with public order. Accordingly, we could understand how the 
paradox of public order works between invoking norms or making exceptions to them. 
 
On the other hand, this study has illustrated the fact that the concept of public order has been also 
used by Egyptian judiciary to ground and limit the application of some apostasy consequences in 
Egypt without the existence of any reference to the prohibition of apostasy or its legal 
consequences in Egyptian statutory law. Through our examination of some apostasy related case 
law, we could understand the duality392of apostasy in the Egyptian legal system which 
subdivided it into the act of apostasy and its legal consequences. Public policy has been used by 
judiciary to define and to categorize both. Concerning the act of apostasy, as it was mentioned 
before in this research, in some cases judges considered acts constituting apostasy (unless they 
are not criminalized by criminal law) like reviling the sacred things or to disdaining Islam as acts 
violating society fundamentals and, in this case, they adopt public policy as a mean to protect 
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Islam and society fundamentals like in Abu Zayd case.393However, according to what this study 
demonstrated, such protection  against these non-criminalized acts by law usually takes place 
through verbal statements and condemnations in court’s rulings without any legal punishments 
for these acts like in Sharia. Concerning the application of apostasy consequences, in this case 
public policy has been used to ground these consequences  into the Egyptian legal system for 
two reasons “a) because these rules were based on essential principles of the Islamic Shari'a, and 
b) to ascertain their applicability in light of a lack of any statutory rules.”394However, public 
policy has been invoked by Egyptian courts in some cases also to refuse the application of some 
apostasy consequences. For instance, when the Supreme Administrative Court in some cases 
adopted the pragmatic approach to permit the registration of the new religion of only persons 
who reverted to Christianity to register their new religion in their identity cards, it argued that the 
registration of the new religious status of the claimant is necessary to protect the public order and 
societal interest, and it will protect against societal complexities or impermissible acts such as 
the marriage of non-Muslim male to a Muslim woman. Again, public order has been invoked by 
Egyptian courts to justify the application of some apostasy consequences or deny their 
application at the same time. 
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IV. Conclusion: 
 
  
The Dominant Debate: Criticizing Egyptian Jurisprudence as a Limitation on Freedom of 
Belief as Defined by IHRL: 
The legal framework of apostasy in Egypt has been usually criticized as a violation of the 
Egyptian state’s international obligation to ensure religious freedom as defined by IHRL.395This 
research has shown that such violation does exist. Having investigated the scope of the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience or religion and focusing precisely on the freedom to change 
one’s religion under Article 18 of the ICCPR as identified and interpreted by the HRC, we 
reached that the scope of protection under Article 18 includes theistic and non- theistic beliefs; 
however, it prevents any restrictions on the right to freedom of religion that could be based upon 
any of these beliefs. The freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief necessarily entails the 
freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or 
belief with another. Accordingly, the use of threat of physical force, penal sanctions, or 
deprivation of any civil rights to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious 
beliefs is banned under this Article. Human rights organizations and advocates usually hold that 
the legal situation of Muslim “converts” in Egypt also contradicts with Article 46 of the Egyptian 
constitution that guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of practice of religious rites. 
Apostates in Egypt could face some legal consequences of conversion from Islam in different 
law fields. The Egyptian penal code does not regulate the act of apostasy directly; however, it 
includes some articles that deal with some offences against religion. Although these articles are 
not limited to protect Islam only, they have been used as the legal base to charge Muslim 
apostates or converts especially when their apostasy is accompanied with any of the criminalized 
offences like blasphemy. Egypt’s main blasphemy law is found in Article 98(f) of the Egyptian 
penal code, which also includes other Articles that criminalize different forms of religious insult.  
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Besides, in the domain of personal status law regarding Sharia as the general applicable law in 
personal status matters in cases where codified law is silent about makes Sharia norms applicable 
on apostasy related cases. As a result, the apostate could be deprived from any of his civil rights 
like inheritance, property disposal right, marriage, etc. if the court decided so upon the demand 
of any concerned plaintiff. In Administrative law field, Egyptian Muslims who converted from 
Islam, as it was explained, could face legal refusal to record their new religious status in identity 
cards and documents. Consequently, all these legal consequences of apostasy in Egypt are 
considered according to the standards of IHRL as a violation of the right to religious freedom. 
 
Such point of view that criticizes the non-recognition conversion from Islam  and the 
implementation of  some apostasy consequences usually argues that this approach contradicts 
with the general approach of Islam to freedom of belief as apostasy rules at all is a disputed 
matter in Sharia and negates with the principle of no compulsion in religion.396This study has 
found that such argument is refutable from the perspective of Sharia. The proponents of this 
perspective argue that Quran forbids religious coercion in many of its verses. In addition, they 
challenge the traditional position on apostasy and hold that the apostate should not be put to 
death on the mere ground of his apostasy. It is believed that their argument is inspired by their 
belief that capital punishment of apostasy in Sharia is the main obstacle in achieving 
reconciliation between the notion of religious freedom in both Sharia and IHRL. According to 
this approach, the whole issue should be rethought in the light of significant change in time and 
circumstances. From their point of view, abolishing capital sanction of apostasy in Sharia is a 
plausible argument to prove that apostasy rules at all is a disputed matter in Sharia that negates 
with the principle of no compulsion in religion and, as a result, Muslim states should ignore them 
to make their laws and judicial practice consistence with the concept of religious freedom as 
defined by IHRL. Our investigation of the most prominent arguments in this issue has led us to 
some important conclusions that are to be elaborated here. Firstly, these arguments are refutable 
from the juristic point of view. Secondly, even agreeing with abolishing apostasy capital 
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punishment will not change the fact that conversion from Islam is regarded as a grievous sin in 
Sharia. Thirdly, abolishing death penalty could not be accepted from a juristic perspective as a 
reason for abolishing apostasy legal consequences and regarding them as disputed matter in 
religion because they are set in Sharia, for they are related to general norms and apostasy is a 
grievous sin that could not be approved in Islam. 
The limitation of apostasy legal problem in Egypt as a mere human rights problem that has been 
caused by conservative interpretation of disputed Sharia norms has led the advocates of this point 
of view to consider Egyptian courts’ approach in this regard as conservative interpretation and 
implementation of Sharia rules; as a result, they see that such violation of could be resolved 
through adopting more lenient Sharia rulings.397The most obvious finding to emerge from this 
study is that the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt does not represent a conservative 
interpretation of Sharia rulings; in contrast, it contradicts with the juristic position of apostasy in 
Sharia and represents a manifestation of secular reconstruction of Sharia rulings by Egyptian 
state through its statutes and judiciary. The rhetoric of human rights has always limited the 
problem of apostasy in Egypt to the conservative interpretation of Sharia. Such rhetoric confirms 
that there are juristic solutions in Sharia that to achieve the standards of religious freedom as 
defined by the ICCPR through the recognition of conversion from Islam to any other belief 
without imposing any legal impediments on converts. Accordingly, Egyptian judges have to 
adopt non conservative or liberal interpretation of apostasy rules in Sharia to fulfil Egyptian 
international obligation to Article 18 of the ICCPR.  
 
The Ignored Debate: The Legal Framework of Apostasy in Egypt as a Manifestation of 
Secular Reconstruction of Sharia by a Modern State: 
The ambiguity of Article 2 or Sharia supremacy clause in the Egyptian constitution has a direct 
rule in shaping the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt. This because the absence of any 
regulation of apostasy in the codified laws drives Egyptian courts to interpret the constitutional 
provision regarding Sharia principles as the main source of law to make their decisions on 
apostasy related cases. The ambiguity of the discussed clause has resulted in promoting the role 
of the Egyptian judiciary in demarcating Islamization and all its related cases, like apostasy, in 
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Egypt. This could give us an explanation for the absence of any explicit regulation of the act of 
apostasy in statutory laws in Egypt. The Egyptian state has always maintained this legal 
ambiguity to impose its own definition of Sharia principles. The political intention of adopting 
Article 2 or Sharia supremacy clause since 1971 was not to enforce Sharia principles within the 
Egyptian legal system; rather, it was adopted to consolidate the political power of the ruling 
regime at this time. Consequently, Article 2 was formulated and kept with its vagueness without 
a definite interpretation of Sharia principles or the methodology of their deduction to push all its 
related political and legal conflicts to courts and litigation process. This process has been the 
only remained channel to discuss or reform constitutional Islamization after the closure of all 
other political channels including legislation. The vague form of Article 2 has enabled the state 
through its constitutional judiciary to have an ultimate control over the definition of Sharia 
principles and the scope of its enforcement. Also, the ambiguity of the definition of Sharia 
principles has been backed up by liberals or secularists who have opposed any further mandatory 
constitutional definition of these principles that could lead to a more conservative interpretation 
of Sharia. The present findings confirm that “the introduction of Article 2 has not substantially 
changed the Egyptian legal system, which has maintained its secular features.”398 
The SCC has adopted a modernist approach to interpret and deduce Sharia principles and norms 
to maintain the secular nature of the Egyptian legal system. In the absence of a clear definition of 
Sharia principles by the adopted constitution of 1981 and precisely by the discussed Article, on 
one hand, and renouncing a comprehensive Islamic review of the existing laws to be carried out 
by legislatures, on the other hand, the SCC had to innovate an interpretation theory to face the 
increasing resort to litigation procedure to reach political ends. The constitutional court managed 
to innovate its interpretation theory to balance between two requirements; firstly, to have an 
Islamic template to be accepted by the public, Islamists, and judges of other courts. Secondly, to 
create an interpretation methodology that ensures a liberal or modern interpretation of Sharia 
sources and norms as a fulfillment of its international commitments to protect international 
human rights and economic liberalism. In order to achieve this balance, the court’s methodology 
has relied upon a process of a secular reconstruction of Islamic law. The paradigm of operational 
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closure and cognitive openness is manifested in the court’s adopted methodology. The court’s 
theory ensures that Egyptian courts leaded by the SCC are the official readers and interpreters of 
Sharia texts and norms; thus, they have the authority to categorize sacred texts and Sharia 
sources, determine their obligatory nature, choose adopted juristic opinions, and choose the 
incorporated principles of Sharia. The system of secular law has maintained its operational 
closure by reconstructing principles of Islamic law within itself. However, such adopted 
interpretation methodology has not introduced a real alternative theory of Islamic interpretation 
to be followed by judges to take over the process. The SCC has only misused Islamic technical 
terms to Islamize its interpretation of Sharia upon which its decisions were built. 
 
Affected by the legal ambiguity of Sharia principles, the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt 
enjoys a limbo399status. The fact that Egyptian codified laws do not regulate the act of apostasy 
or impose its legal consequences in explicit and definite law articles has made its legal 
framework in Egypt characterized by ambiguity and fragmentation. Ambiguity is manifested in 
the legal approach of the Egyptian state that avoided to make any formal reference to apostasy 
regulating rules and consequences through its constitutions or law codes. Such avoidance stems 
from the State awareness that imposing any legal limitation on conversion from one religion to 
another would be regarded as an obvious breach of the notion of religious freedom as defined by 
IHRL and, as a result, it would be considered by international community as a breach of its 
international obligations towards IHRL. The fragmentation of apostasy rules within the Egyptian 
legal system means that committing the act of conversion from Islam to any other belief entails 
its legal consequences in different law fields like administrative law, criminal law, and personal 
status law. The Egyptian state through its legislature and judiciary has maintained its approach 
regarding constitutional Islamization or Islamism to shape the legal framework of apostasy in 
Egypt. Creating an ambiguous legal framework to replace the need for a clear codified regulation 
resulted from a clear political decision by legislature to ensure the state control over the process. 
The intended closure of such a political process has promoted the role of litigation as an 
alternative process. Similar to the adopted methodology of interpreting Sharia “principles” in 
constitutional Article 2, the state judiciary has a flexible position in interpreting Sharia norms 
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concerning apostasy and choosing which of these norms could be incorporated within the 
Egyptian legal system and which could not from the perspective of the state or judges. The 
Egyptian judiciary in this case is not restricted by any obligatory religious interpretation by Al-
Azhar or any other institution unlike the case of interpreting IHRL, where the state is accounted 
by international community according to the prescribed interpretation of religious freedom that I 
have explained earlier. Accordingly, this flexible position helps judges to at least formulate their 
verdicts in a manner that is consistent with the state formal obligations to apply Sharia principles 
and respect IHRL. 
Through the adopted approach, the implementation of apostasy legal consequences has been 
limited and fragmented in different law fields in contrast to its the juristic status in Sharia. The 
Egyptian penal code does not regulate the act of apostasy directly; however, it includes some 
articles that deal with some offences against religion. Although these articles are not limited to 
protect Islam only, they have been used as the legal base to charge Muslim apostates or converts 
especially when their apostasy is accompanied with any of the criminalized offences like 
blasphemy. Egypt’s main blasphemy law is found in Article 98(f) of the Egyptian penal code, 
which also includes other Articles that criminalize different forms of religious insult. They 
include Articles 160 and 161. In most decisions of blasphemy cases there is no direct reference 
to the position of apostasy or blasphemy in Sharia because the concerned court only focuses on 
applying blasphemy provisions in the penal code. This judicial approach is consistent with the 
legal drafting of blasphemy articles that do not refer to any Islamic juristic source as a base for 
its rulings and only reflect a quick legal interference by a modern state to suppress any public 
speech or writing that may lead to sectarian clashes. Accordingly, Egyptian courts based their 
decisions on blasphemy related cases upon the existence or the absence of the constituting 
elements of blasphemy crime in any examined case. These elements include the materialistic 
aspect of blasphemy crime (exploiting and using religion in advocating and propagating by talk 
or by any other method extremist thoughts) and the moral aspect (to instigate sedition by 
disdaining Islam to prejudice national unity). According to the elaborated juristic rulings of 
apostasy in Sharia, we could easily conclude that Article 98(f) and other religious insult Articles 
do not represent a legal regulation based upon a juristic position in Sharia, but in contrast, it’s a 
secular legal regulation of criminalized acts by the state that contrasts with their juristic rulings 
in Sharia. In personal status law field, the application of a law in personal status matters is based 
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on the religion of the parties unless the legislature issued another ruling in the same matter. In 
these cases, Muslims are governed by Sharia rules precisely in accordance to the most 
predominant opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine. In consistency with the state’s approach 
regarding apostasy, no rule prohibiting apostasy can be found in the codified part of personal 
status law. The legislature avoided to issue any statutory law prohibiting apostasy or imposing its 
legal consequences to avoid any explicit statement in law that criminalizes conversion from 
Islam in contradiction with the ICCPR. On the other hand, apostasy rules can be found only on 
caselaw as application of Sharia rules because the Court of Cassation has confirmed in its 
jurisprudence that any silence of the codified law concerning any matter should not be 
understood as an intention by the legislature to contradict with any statement in Quran, authentic 
Sunnah, or a ruling constituted a consensus reached by Muslim jurists. Since religion is a 
governing factor in family cases, family courts focus only on answering the question whether 
any of the parties is an apostate or not. In case of the establishment of apostasy, the apostate is 
only deprived from the examined right in the discussed case and not all civil rights like in Sharia. 
In most of personal status cases in this regard there is no reference to religious freedom or the 
punishment of the act of apostasy itself; however, in cases related to blasphemy or published 
writings like Abu Zayd’s cases the Court of Cassation categorizes the application of apostasy 
consequences under public policy to avoid any apparent contradiction with the ICCPR’s 
definition of religious freedom or freedom of expression and the constitutional obligation with 
these rights. Even if we could agree that the imposed apostasy consequences in family trials are 
consistent with its ruling in Sharia this legal framework contradicts with the juristic position of 
apostasy rules in Sharia as it converted depriving from civil rights from an inevitable 
consequence of apostasy in Sharia to isolated legal consequences applied by the court only on 
the demand of plaintiffs in separated cases. Furthermore, according to our analysis, we could 
find that issue courts did not conclude their rulings through deducing apostasy rules from Sharia 
primary sources by using Islamic legal theory; rather, they were reached through applying the 
most predominant opinion of Imam Abu Hanifa doctrine according to the law and the court’s 
jurisprudence through a legal secular reasoning that reconstructs the implementation of apostasy 
consequences in some cases under secular categorizations like public policy. Apostasy or 
conversion from Islam has also arose in administrative law domain in Egypt. Most of these cases 
are related to Egyptian Muslims who converted from Islam and filed cases against the 
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government whose representatives refused to record their new religious status in identity cards 
and documents. According to the displayed analysis, administrative courts adopted three 
different approaches in this regard. The hardline approach asserted the fact of the supremacy of 
Sharia or Islamic law over all other law sources in the Egyptian legal system. Accordingly, all 
constitutional rights, including the right of religious freedom, should be interpreted in a manner 
that does not contradict with what the court considers as Sharia rules like the prohibition of 
apostasy in Sharia. However, in consistency with judiciary’s approach in most of the discussed 
rulings in different law fields in this research, this reasoning limited the application of apostasy 
rules in Sharia to a specific right and ignored the application apostasy juristic rulings in Sharia 
regarding other civil rights and capital punishment. Furthermore, it reasoned the obligatory 
nature of the application of apostasy rules in Sharia by categorizing it under a secular 
categorization which is public policy rather than using any Islamic juristic reasoning based upon 
Islamic legal theory. Through this categorization Administrative courts could avoid any apparent 
contradiction with the ICCPR. Through the liberal approach the Court of Administrative Justice 
accepted the claims of only plaintiffs who reverted to Christianity to register their new religion in 
their identity cards. Concerning apostasy in Sharia, the court in this approach the cited several 
Quranic verses that highlight the principles of freedom and non-compulsion in religious 
conviction to demonstrate the compatibility between Islam and religious freedom, and as a result, 
establish its decision. In contrast to its approach regarding Christian reverts, the Court see that 
according to Islamic jurisprudence citizens who are born and brought up as Muslims and decided 
to convert to any other religion are not allowed to register their new religion in their identity 
cards. This because, according to the juristic explanation of the court, Muslim cannot be 
considered apostate unless he or she feels comfortable with his or her apostasy. The Supreme 
Administrative Court aimed through the pragmatic approach to permit the registration of the new 
religion of only persons who reverted to Christianity to register their new religion in their 
identity cards without raising or solving the legal issue of apostasy and religious freedom in 
Egypt. The court believes that allowing the registration of the new religion of Christian reverts 
agrees with the requirements of Egyptian law to include true information in citizen’s identity 
cards to avoid any legal errors. However, the court also categorized the registration of the new 
religious status of the claimant under the protection of public order, which has been usually 
invoked by all State Council courts to reason their rulings regardless of their approach.  
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The concept of public order the “active principle of secularism”400has been used by Egyptian 
judiciary to ground and limit the application of some apostasy consequences in Egypt without 
the existence of any reference to the prohibition of apostasy or its legal consequences in 
Egyptian statutory law. Through our examination of some apostasy related case law, we could 
understand the duality of apostasy in the Egyptian legal system which subdivided it into the act 
of apostasy and its legal consequences. Public policy has been used by judiciary to define and to 
categorize both. Concerning the act of apostasy, as it was mentioned before in this research, in 
some cases judges considered acts constituting apostasy (unless they are not criminalized by 
criminal law) like reviling the sacred things or to disdaining Islam as acts violating society 
fundamentals and, in this case, they adopt public policy as a mean to protect Islam and society 
fundamentals like in Abu Zayd case. However, according to what this study demonstrated, such 
protection against these non-criminalized acts by law usually takes place through verbal 
statements and condemnations in court’s rulings without any legal punishments for these acts 
like in Sharia. Concerning the application of apostasy consequences, in this case public policy 
has been used to ground these consequences  into the Egyptian legal system for two reasons “a) 
because these rules were based on essential principles of the Islamic Shari'a, and b) to ascertain 
their applicability in light of a lack of any statutory rules.”401However, public policy has been 
invoked by Egyptian courts in some cases also to refuse the application of some apostasy 
consequences. Again, public order has been invoked by Egyptian courts to justify the application 
of some apostasy consequences or deny their application at the same time. 
 
The Implausibility of the Balance between the Two Contraries: 
The evidence from this study suggests that the balance or reconciliation between the standards of 
religious freedom regarding apostasy in Sharia and the right to conversion from Islam according 
to IHRL is implausible. This research has demonstrated that we are in front of different law 
sources or normative orders one of them generally prohibits renouncing Islam, while the other 
permits or even encourages conversion from one belief to another upon the free will of the 
convert. Such contradiction could appear clearly even from naming the same act either by Sharia 
or IHRL. The word “apostasy” itself could reflect the prohibition of the act in Islam and its 
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negative categorization by Sharia. On the other hand, the word “conversion” could reflect the 
neutral or the permissive approach of IHRL concerning replacing one belief with another. In 
Sharia, Apostasy is punished by death penalty in Sharia. This opinion is held by the main four 
Islamic juristic schools and the majority of Muslim scholars (gumhor al-fuqaha’). Only two 
isolated opinions of traditional Muslim jurists see that the apostate should be asked forever to 
repent and not be killed. The apostate suffers in Sharia from a civil death as he is not allowed to 
inherit, marry, and dispose of his property. The apostate is also separated from his spouse and 
not allowed to choose another religion other than Islam for his children in some cases. These 
consequences are set in Sharia either because they are related to general norms or because 
apostasy is a grievous sin and prohibited act that cannot be approved or accepted from the 
perspective of Sharia. On the other hand, under Article 18 of the ICCPR, any individual in any 
territory around the world must enjoy the right to freedom of religion including the freedom to 
change one’s religion. The content of this right includes freedom from coercion to adopt a 
religion or belief, liberty of parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children, 
and freedom to manifest religion or belief. The only freedom that can be limited in this right is 
freedom to manifest one’s religion. The scope of protection under Article 18 includes theistic 
and non- theistic beliefs; however, it prevents any restrictions on the right to freedom of religion 
that could be based upon any of these beliefs. The freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief 
necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s 
current religion or belief with another. Accordingly, the use of threat of physical force or penal 
sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs is banned under 
this Article. Imposing any restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion must be prescribed by 
law for the protection of public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others. Such restrictions or limitations based upon public morals must not be driven 
from a single tradition or applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights guaranteed in article 
18. Recognizing any religion or belief as the official ideology in state’s constitutions and statutes 
should not impair the enjoyment of the recognized rights in the ICCPR. Consequently, one of the 
more significant findings to emerge from this research is that any legal attempt to balance 
between these direct contradicting norms could lead to the emergence of a legal framework that 
contradicts with both, like the case in Egypt. 
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Towards Resolving the Criticized Legal Situation of Apostasy in Egypt: 
Resolving the complicated legal status of apostasy in Egypt starts from realizing that the legal 
framework of apostasy in Egypt as a single indication among others of legal pluralism in Egypt. 
Consequently, reforming religious freedom related laws and their jurisprudence including 
apostasy legal framework could not be achieved by limiting the discussed issue as a human 
rights problem that can be resolved by adopting more liberal law provisions within the existing 
legal system; otherwise, it is a problem that stems from the conflict between different law 
sources and their interpretation by the state. This means that such reform would take place 
through renouncing the Egyptian state’s interpretation of religious freedom (the reason of the 
current legal ambiguity regarding apostasy) and replacing it with a clear legal regulation of the 
act itself and its legal consequences basing on giving effect to one source of law to regulate and 
categorize apostasy. In this case, the concept of legal pluralism could help in regulating the 
relations between different law sources to avoid internal conflict of laws and uncertainty of the 
applicable law. Accordingly, resolving the current situation of legal duality or conflict could be 
achieved through either agglomeration or integration between apostasy related regulations in 
Sharia and IHRL to enact clear legal regulations to categorize and deal with apostasy and 
identify its legal consequences. For instance, as we explained previously, agglomeration in this 
case could be applied through giving effect to one source of law to be applied in this law field, 
while limiting the application of other contradicting legal norms of other law sources in this 
field. 
 
Reforming the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt through a clear legal regulation should 
happen through a political process rather than judicial resolution. In this case, the legal process 
or litigation would act only as a guarantee to the implementation of the reached legal solution. 
As we referred previously in this research, the Egyptian state has maintained the ambiguity of the 
legal framework of apostasy and blocked all possible political channels to reform it by the 
legislature. As a result, the state could choose and limit the applied legal consequences of this act 
through litigation. I believe that the reason of such approach stems from the fear that opening 
any public political discussion by the legislature to reform the legal situation of apostasy or the 
act of renouncing Islam could lead to a more conservative implementation of Sharia rules in this 
regard.  Accordingly, the state has chosen legal ambiguity that leads to a modernist 
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implementation of Sharia rules rather than legal certainty that could lead to a more conservative 
implementation of Sharia to deal with or punish renouncing Islam. Through this policy the 
Egyptian state could maintain its formal respect to human rights including ones widely 
recognized as fundamental human rights in international agreements like the right to religious 
freedom. This means that adopting or starting any political discussion about reforming the legal 
situation of apostasy is conditioned by the permission of the Egyptian state through its executive 
and parliament.  
 
 
       
